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S. Rep. No. 150, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1860)
36th CoNGREss, ( 
1st Session. S 
SENATE. 5 REP. CoM. 
t No. 150. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
MARCH 23, 1860.-0rdered to be printed. 
Mr. TooMBs made the following 
REPORT. 
[To accompany billS. 307.] 
The select committee to whom was referred the memorial of residents 
and owners of lands in the parrishes of Ascension and lberville, Louis-
iana, praying the repeal of the ''Act to provide for the location of 
certain confirmed p1·ivate land claims in the State of Missouri, and 
for other purposes/' to whom, also, were ?·eferred the protest of the 
owners of the Houmas grant, have had the same ~mder consideration) 
and report: 
That it appears that on the 5th of October) 1774, one Maurice Con-
way and Alexander Latil purchased of the Bayou Golau and Houmas 
Indians a tract of land measuring upwards of half a league in front, 
on the river Mississippi, about seventy-five miles above the city of 
New Orleans. 
This purchase, it appears, was approved by Unzaga, the governor 
of Louisiana, to that extent, and with the common depth of forty arpents. 
The front is bounded on the river, at a common depth of forty 
arpents in the rear, and the side lines were described by the adjoining 
tracts. 
Afterwards, on the 9th of September, 1776, ]\faurice Conway peti-
tioned Governor Unzaga for an additional grant in the rear. Omit-
ting the formal parts, that petition sets forth as follows: 
"That your petitioner, intending to go and establish himself in the 
upper part of the country, on the land which he has purchased jointly 
with Alexander Latil, and, with your permission, from the Houmas 
Indians, which land is extremely deficient of fences, and is cleared out 
upwards of a league in depth, so that the cypress swamp being at a 
distance of about one league and a half from the river, your petitioner 
has no right thereto, in consequence of your not having granted to 
him but the common depth of forty arpents, which is so short that he 
cannot reach the cypress trees necessary for making fences, and other 
work absolutely necessary on a plantation. Therefore, your petitioner 
prays you will grant him all the depth whieh may be vacant imme-
diately after the said depth of forty arpents." 
The said Conway further avers that he was the sole proprietor, 
having purchased the moiety which belonged to Latil, and prays that 
Unzaga "will direct Louis Andry to put your petitioner in possession 
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of the said front and depth, setting the boundaries and giving to your 
petitioner a certificate of the whole for his information and security." 
In pursuance of this petition, Unzaga, on the 27th September, 1776, 
made his order that ' ( Captain Louis Andry shall go on the land men-
tioned in the foregoing petition, and shall put the petitioner in the 
possession of the land which may there be vacant on the back of the 
forty arpents of depth which he possesses, and running in the same 
directions, provided the same be vacant and do not injure the neigh-
bors, to the effect of which he shall set and mark the boundaries, and 
shall extend after th-is decree a PROCES VERBAL of his operations, which, 
signed by him and the said neighbors, shall be forwarded to me, that 
I may cause the complete title to issue." 
It further appears that, on the 9th day of October, 1776, Captain 
Andry made the survey, and certified that he. went on the land alluded 
to, accompanied by Conway and the commandant of the district, Louis 
Judice, and after having called on the Indian chief to designate the 
boundaries of his sale, his proces verbal then proceeds as follows : 
''And immediately after I have measured the space between those 
boundaries, drawing to that effect in the woods the lines necessary to 
ascertain its extent, [which lines are marked on the plan, a sketch of 
my operations which I have delivered to said petitioner,] and found 
that it contains ninety-six arpents in front on the river, growing wider 
one hundred and twenty degrees in depth, on account of its being situ-
ated on the bend of the river, the upper line common with Francis 
Duhan, running north fifty degrees to the west, and the lower one 
common with Michel Chiasson, running north seventy degrees to the 
east. 
''The measurement of said front being thus made, I proceeded to put 
the petitioner in the possession of the depth granted to him by the 
foregoing decree, to the effect of which I went back to the upper line 
common with Francis Duhan, in whose presence I found out the bound-
aries set by me on the 22d of December; 1773, and which still exist 
in the same situation, distance, and direction, both of mulberry wood-
the first * * * at the distance of thirty-seven toises, and two feet 
from the actual bank of the river, and the second * * * at one 
arpent or thirty toises more in the back. Afterwards I continued in 
. the same line, and in the aforesaid direction, of north fifty degrees west 
to the depth of forty arpents, opening to that effect a small road through 
the woods, at which place I caused to be driven two feet and a halfin 
the earth a boundary of cypress wood * * * at the further dis-
tance of two arpents-that is, at forty-two arpents from the. river-
another boundary similar in all its circumstances to the one just spoken 
of. This line being thus drawn, I went to the lower one common with 
Michel Chiasson, whom I also called, and after measuring the seven 
arpents which, by the decree of the 27th of September last, the gov-
ernor aforesaid granted to him, I caused two boundaries of mulberry 
wood to be driven in the said line, the first * * at the distance of 
twenty toises more in the depth. After that I continued the said line 
through the wood in the same direction of north seventy degrees east 
to the depth of forty arpents, at which point I caused to be driven two 
and a half feet in the earth a boundary of cypress, * * * and at 
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the further distance of two other arpents-that is, at the distance of 
forty-two arpents-from the river, I caused another boundary of the 
same size, and similar in all its circumstances to the foregoing, to be 
driven into the earth in order that the direction may not deviate. 
And in order that all the above may appear, I give the present cer-
tificate) which I have signed) with the said petition of Maurice Conway, 
and the said commandant and interpreter of this transaction, Louis 
Judice, the said Indian chief named Calabe, and the two adjoining 
neighbors, Francit3 Duhan and Michel Chiasson, having declared not 
to know how to sign. All which I do attest at the aforesaid coast or 
district the day and year above written." 
The proces verbal is accordingly signed by Andry, Conway, and 
Judice. 
On the 21st June, 1777) Galvez, the then governor of Louisiana, 
made the grant, which is in the following terms: 
"Bernardo de Galvez, colonel of the battalion of infantry of Louis-
iana, governor, intendant, and inspector general thereof, having seen 
the foregoing proceedings of the second adjutant of this place, the 
Captain Lewis Andry, concerning the possession which he has given 
to :Maurice Con way by virtue of the foregoing decree, issued by my 
predecessor, of all the vacant land, behind or in the rear of the forty 
first arpents, which he possesses, by ninety-six arpents in front, on the 
river, running in the same direction as these; and whereas the same is 
conformable to the rules made touching surveying of land and adjoining 
neighbors, so that no injury is done to said neighbors, who, so far from 
having made any opposition, have consented to said operations, of 
which I do hereby approve, and, using the faculty that the king has 
given me, I grant, in his royal name, to the said Maurice Conway the 
said land behind or in the rear of the forty arpents which are con-
tained in his plantation, situated in the district of La Fouche, by 
ninety-six in the front in the river, following the same direction as 
those, in order that, as his own property, he may dispose or enjoy the 
same conformably to the said operations, and complying with the con-
ditions prescribed in the ordinances made on the subject of lands." 
It does not appear that any of these original papers referred to are 
in existence, or were ever recorded, but assuming them to be genuine, 
they constitute the whole of the title of the claimant under the Houmas 
grant under the Spanish grant. 
It does not appear that the fact of the grant has ever been contested 
by this government. The whole question has been as to its extent. 
The first account we have of this claim under this government was 
an application made by the claimant, about the year 1804, to Governor 
Claiborne, of Louisiana, t.:> have the same surveyed, an<l in pursuance 
of an order from him, one Bartholomew Lafon was appointed to sur-
vey the same. 
Lafon's survey ran out the northwest line to Bayou Manchac, and 
the northeastern line to Lake 1\-faurepas, including all the lands included 
in these boundaries out to the Mauchac and Amite rivers, which was 
there the boundary on the east of the possessions of the Spanish 
crown. 
This survey, with the perfect Spanish grant, upon which it was reputed 
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to be founded, was laid before the board of commissioners, organized 
under the act of the 2d March, 1805, for the purpose of ascertaining 
and adjusting the titles and claims to lands within the Territory of 
Orleans and the district of Louisiana. It had then been parceled 
into three distinct tracts, one held by Donaldson and Scott, and the 
another by Daniel Clarke, and the third by William Conway, all 
claiming title by purchase or succession from J.\.Iaurice Conway. 
The two commissioners who composed the board at the time the 
claims and the evidence to support them were presented, decided that 
"the. claimants had fully established their right, that their title was a 
genuine and complete Spanish grant, and that it included all the land 
claimed by them and included in Lafon's survey. These decisions ap-
pear under the numbers 125, 127, and 133, in the transcript of their 
decisions laid before Congress, by the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 
8th day of January, 1812. Thomas B. Robertson, who became a 
member of the board subsequently to its action on these claims, 
entered a formal dissent from these decisions. According to the laws 
establishing this commission, these decisions of the commissioners 
were to be reported to Congress for its final action and decision 
thereon. 
That the claimants under the Houmas grant were entitled to ninety-
six arpents front on the Mississippi river, and the common depth of 
forty arpents rear, seems to have been conceded by all of the agents and 
officers of the government, and that they were entitled to a back con-
cession to some extent, seems also to have been generally admitted. 
The whole controversy rests upon the extent of the back concession. 
No officer or agent of the government, except two of the commissioners, 
appointed under the act of 1805, ever acknowledged the grant to the 
extent claimed. We may except also Judge Bibb, who, when Secre-
tary of the Treasury) held, that under the act of 1814, Congress had 
confirmed it to the whole extent claimed. This decision of Governor 
Bibb was subsequently reversed by the circuit court of the United 
States, and from which decision the claimants under the Houmas 
grant have not appealed. 
With these exceptions, the "\vhole action of the government, from 
the day of the treaty of 1803 up to the act of the 2d June, 1858, now 
under consideration, has been against the claim to the extent urged 
by the persons claiming under this grant. 
The grant of the 21st June, 1777, from Governor Galvez to Maurice 
Conway, contains the whole claim to the premises in dispute. It never 
was petitioned for, surveyed, or granted, otherwise than hereinbefore 
stated. It was a complete grant to all it conveyed, and the sole ques-
tion in controversy, admitting the grant to be genuine, is, how much 
it embraced. To that extent, the government of the United States is 
bound, both by the law of nations, and the treaty of 1803, by which 
we acquired the title of France to Louisiana. It required no further 
acknowledgment, no act of Congress, no confirmation of commission-
ers to the perfection of the right of those who claimed under it. ~rhe 
government of the United States covenanted, so far as concerns this 
controversy, to do nothing except to preserve the rights of property of 
those persons who owned property in Louisiana. The government of 
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the United States performed all of its treaty stipulations with France 
with fidelity and honor. It not only respected perfect rights of prop-
erty, but, with a wise liberality, it undertook to carry out with 
reference to the people of the ceded province, all of the undertakings, 
perfect or imperfect, of both the governments of France and Spain, the 
former proprietors of Louisiana. 
The act of 1805 required all persons claiming under incomplete 
titles, and peTmitted all persons having complete titles, to present them 
within a limited time to commissioners appointed under that act, whose 
duty it was to examine them, and report their decisions thereon to 
Congress. Their decisions were not final; they were subject to the 
determination of Congress thereon. 
The act of 1806 still further aided honest claimants under the French 
and Spanish governments. 
The act of 1807 vested in the commissioners the power finally to 
determine upon all cases which involved no more than the quantity of 
land contained in one league square; and the act of 1814 authorized 
the issuance of patents to all persons coming within the act of 1807. 
The claimants under the Houmas grant come within none of these 
acts of Congress. It has been before remarked that they sought to 
bring themselves under this act of 1814. This pretension, after having 
been allowed by Governor Bibb, was condemned by the circuit court 
of the United States. Efl'orts were made at different times to get a 
recognition of this grant to the extent claimed by its owners, both from 
Congress and the different departments of the government, from 1805 
to 1858; but all these efforts failed. A Yery full and accurate history 
of these efforts, and of this claim generally, is to be found in an opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Clifford, now of the Supreme Court, then Attorney 
General of the United States, given to the President, in pursuance of 
a resolution of Congress passed the 26th of June, 1846, to which your 
committee beg leave to refer the Senate, in order to avoid its repetition 
here. 
The difficulty, as before observed, in this grant is this: the back 
line of the survey never was closed. The surveyor ran but two arpents 
back of the first forty arpents ''to keep the course.'' How far the two 
lines from the river were to run was not specified. The petitioner 
wanted a timber privilege for less than 4,000 acres of land; repre-
~ented that he had no timber for fences, and other necessary plantation 
purposes; said that the cypress was one and a half leagues back of the 
river, and it seems asked a concession of all the back lands to get timber 
for his farm. 
Under the term, "all the back lands," the Houmas claimants, after 
-the treaty of cession, and never before, claimed and surveyed above 
180,000 acres of land for a timber privilege for less than 4,000 acres. 
This timber was scattered over more than 300 square miles, in a coun-
-try not naturally well adapted to easy transportation. 
This pretension was very naturally considered exhorbitant and un-
reasonable, and nothing but the clearest words of grant, unrestrained 
oy the facts and circumstances of the case, could be deemed sufficient to 
maintain it. Therefore the officers of the government and Congress 
uniformly, with the exception before stated, refused to recognize it. 
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The claimants under the Houmas grant have been in possession of 
the river front from 1777 to this time, and the extent of this posses-
sion to the rear does not appear to the committee ; but, in 1776, the 
King of Spain imported from the Canary Islands a company of poor 
immigrants, and settled them on the Iberville and Amite rivers, 
twenty or thirty miles from the river Mississippi, granted them lands, 
and established the town of Galveston, all within the limits of said 
grant as now claimed. 
Some grants upon the Mississippi river were made before this, and 
with which this Houmas grant conflicts, and others were made after 
this grant, within the limits as now claimed, without objection or 
complaint from these grantees, as far as your committee have been able 
to ascertain. 
Other persons, squatters, without legal rights, have also, from time 
to time, settled on these back lands, relying upon the uniform policy 
of the government to grant them preemption, if the land should prove 
to belong to the government and not to the claimants. All these set-
tlers in the aggregate, according to the memorial before your commit-
tee, amount to about five hundred families. Some of these occupants 
have located on their premises in pursuance of Spanish or French 
grants older than the B.:oumas grant, others under grants younger than 
that grant, and others still relying solely upon the goodness of the 
title of this government ; and it is a strong fact in this case that-, from 
1803 to this hour, as far as your committee have been able to learn, no 
effort has been made to eject any of these persons by the Houmas 
grantees. 
We have already shown that the title of the grantees was perfect to 
every extent that they had title at all-just as perfect without as with 
congressional action, if it were a good title-yet they seem never to 
have ventured to assert it in the courts, even against a squatter. 
Your cmnmittee do not deem it necessary to give any opinion as to 
the validity of the Houmas grant, or its extent, further than to say, 
that it is not, in their judgment, such a title as Congress ought to 
affirm, to the prejudice of the other parties at interest, without a judi-
cial affirmance of it. 
The act of the 2d June, 1859, gives a great and unjust advantage to 
the claimants, for which your committee see no sound reason, either in 
justice or sound policy. It gives the Houmas grantees paramount title 
to the lands in dispute, and requires all adverse claimants to make 
good their titles by suits at law; and if they fail, for any reason what-
ever, to show a perfect title in themselves, their lands all fall to the 
Houmas grantees. This is manifestly unjust to such adverse claim-
ants, and may inflict the most cruel wrongs upon them. But this bill 
is also unjust to the public. If the Houmas grantees have no good 
title to this vast body of lands, it is against sound principle and sound 
policy to give it to them. By the third section of said act, if any of 
these grantees within the lines of the Houmas grant should be able 
to maintain their titles, this section allows the Houmas grantees to 
float on the public lands for such deficiency. Therefore, if any portion 
of their grant shall be defeated, even by a better and superior title, 
though it may be derived from Spain or France, this act makes up the 
HOUMAS LAND CLAIMS. 7 
loss to the claimants under the Houmas grant from the public domain. 
This legislation, also, we think unsound and untenable. Your com-
mittee therefore· recommend that the second section of the act of 2d 
June, 1858, and also so much of the third section as refers to the 
second, be repealed, and that the title of the claimants under the 
Houmas grant be judicially settled; and for which purposes they 
herewith report a bill. 
APPENDIX. 
MARCH 26, 1860.-0rdered, That the opinion of the Attorney General, dated December 31, 
1847, made in compliance with ''A joint resolution in relation to the issuing of grants of cer-
tain land~ in Louisiana," approved June 26, 1846, and the statement of Louis Jan in, counsel 
for certain claimants under the Houmas land grant, be printed as an appendix to the report 
(No. 150) of the Select Committee. 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL's 0:FFICE, 
December 31, 1847. 
SrR: In compliance with the joint resolution of Congress, approved 
26th June, 1846, entitled ''A resolution in relation to the issuing of 
grants of certain lands in Louisiana," I have examined the questions 
submitted to me in the case to which it refers, and have now the honor 
to report the result of that examination, and my opinion thereon, for 
your consideration. 
The purpose which Congress had in view in instituting this exami-
nation, is very fully and explicitly disclosed in the resolution. It pro-
vides "that the Attorney General of the United States be, and he is 
hereby, directed to examine the evidences of title in the case of a cer-
tain Spanish land claim in the State of Louisiana, lying on the Missis-
sippi, above New Orleans, commonly known as the Houmas claim, and 
to report his opinion thereon to the President of the United States; 
and, if in the opinion of the Attorney General any patent or patents 
issued, or which may be issued under such claim, shall have been, or 
shall be issued, contrary to law, that the President of the United States 
be, and he is hereby, requested to cause proceedings to be instituted in 
behalf of the United States, and to have the validity of such patent or 
patents judicially determined.'' 
Two points of inquiry are obviously pre$ented in the resolution_, 
neither of which can be satisfactorily answered without an accurate 
knowledge of the facts. The first clause relates to the title of the claim-
ants to the land referred to in the resolution, and requires an opinion as 
to the evidences in support of it; which presents a distinct issue involv-
ing the validity of the whole claim. The second refers to the patents 
which have been issued on the claim; and, by necessary implication, 
to the circumstances under which those evidences of title are executed, 
and clearly puts in issue the authority assumed in granting them. 
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The evidences of title to be examined are not specified, nor is there any 
designation of the source from which they should be derived, other than 
what may be inferred from the description of the claim to which they 
relate. 
Under these circumstances, and with a view to obtain all the docu-
ments relating to the claim, I addressed a communication to the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office on the 20th of December, 1846, 
calling his attention to the resolution, and requesting him to furnish 
me with any information in his office upon the subject, and received 
with his reply what I suppose to be a full compliance with my request. 
In the meanwhile, other official engagements had intervened, admit-
ting of no delay, and rendering it impracticable to complete the exam-
ination, at that time, in a manner which its importance seemed to 
demand, and it was accordingly postponed. Having since resumed 
the subject, and examined all the papers relating to the title in my 
possession, and fully considered the several arguments filed in the 
case, I will proceed to state the result of my investigations, and the 
conclusions which I have formed upon the respective inquiries embraced 
in the resolution. 
It was my first object, after resuming the subject, to ascertain the 
origin of the title. There can be no doubt, I think, that a part of the 
tract of land in dispute was once possessed, and perhaps owned, by the 
Bayou Goula and Houmas Indians, who derived their right to the 
same under the authorities of the province of Louisiana, while it was 
subject to the dominion of France. The precise character of their in-
terest, or the extent and boundaries of their possessions, do not very 
satisfactorily appear. The first title paper produced in support of the 
present claim appears to have been executed during the period of the 
Spanish rule over the province, about twenty-nine years before its 
formal surrender and delivery by France to the United States. It 
purports to be a copy of a conveyance from the chief of those two tribes 
to one Maurice Conway and Alexander Latil, and bears date at New 
Orleans, the 5th October, 1774, wherein the said chief, in considera-
tion of the sum of one hundred and :fifty dollars paid to him in goods, 
cedes to them '' a tract of land measuring upwards of half a league, at 
the distance of twenty-two leagues from this city, on this side of the 
river, joining on the upper side lands belonging to John the black-
smith; and on the lower side, the place where are erected the huts in 
which the said two nations of Indians now live; but when the said 
huts will be taken away, to be transported on the other side of the 
river, the true boundary on the lower side will be the lands belonging 
to an old Acadian, named Peter; so by the measurement which the 
said purchasers will make of the said tract of land according to the 
said boundaries, its exact contents will be ascertained.'' This purchase, 
it appears, was approved by Unzaga, the then governor of Louisiana, 
by his order or decree, bearing even date with the conveyance, in 
which he also granted the lands to the purchasers, and directed them 
to apply to him in . order that, in virtue of the sale and approbation, 
he might cause a complete title to be issued to them. 
There is no evidence that a formal application in writing was ever 
made for a complete title, except what may be inferred from the recitals 
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of the grant, which appears to have been regularly executed by Un-
zaga, on the 1st of November, 1774, and is as follows: "In conse-
quence of the above certified copy and approbation of the sale that the 
chief named Calazare made, both in his name and in that of the Bayou 
Goula and Houmas Indian nations under his command, to Maurice 
Conway and Alexander Latil, of this city, of a tract of land which was 
granted to them by the ancient French governor, measuring upwards 
of half a league in front, on the river Mississippi, on the coast of Caba-
hanoce, in the district of Mr. Judice, joining on the upper side the 
plantation belonging to the blacksmith, and on the lower side that of 
an old Acadian, named Peter, and there being no opposition made on 
part of these two neighbors, and no injury being made to their respect-
ive boundary lines, using of the faculty that the king has given me, I 
grant, in his royal name, to the said Maurice Conway and Alexander 
La til, the above-mentioned tract of land, which measures upwards of 
half a league in front on the aforesaid coast, with the common depth 
of forty arpents, joining on the upper side the plantation belonging to 
John the blacksmith, and on the lower side that of the old Acadian, 
named Peter, that, as their own property, they may dispose of or enjoy 
the same, conformably to the said sale and conditions imposed by the 
regulations concerning lands.'' 
The extracts above given have not been compared with the original 
papers, there being none such in my possession in relation to this part 
of the case . . Finding them, however, in translations furnished by the 
claimants, which were published by the order of the Senate, and per-
ceiving no reason to question their accuracy, I have adopted them in 
tracing this branch of the title. They will be found in Senate docu-
ment .L?Vo. 144, second session Twenty-fifth Congress, appended to the 
memorial of the heirs of Wade Hampton, which was presented to Con-
gress in 1837. 
Whatever practical difficulties might have arisen at that time in an 
attempt to ascertain the side lines above-mentioned, growing out of 
the uncertainty that probably existed in regard to the precise bounda-
ries of the adjoining locations, it must be admitted, I think, that the 
land is too explicitly described on the face of the grant to be matter of 
controversy. The front is bounded on the river ; it has a common 
depth of forty arpents, which could readily be ascertained by a survey, 
and the side lines are described by the adjoining tracts; the practical 
uncertainty in regard to which, it may be presumed, constituted one 
of the causes which led to the petition of Conway to Unzaga, herein-
after mentioned. 
Pursuing the inquiry in the order of events, we come now to the 
grant, which is the principal subject of dispute. On this point we 
have, in the first place, what purports to be the original title paper, in 
the form and language in which it was first executed by the Spanish 
authorities in Louisiana. It having been furnished by the Land Office, 
and appearing to be genuine, I know of no reason to question its au-
thenticity, and therefore assume that the claimants are entitled to the 
full benefits of its provisions, so far as their rights under it are defined 
and can be ascertained. 
It contains the original petition of Conway addressed to U nzaga, 
• 
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and his order of survey thereon ; the proces verbal by Captain Louis 
Andry of the survey made by him under the order; and the grant 
made by Galvez, the successor of Unzaga. 
By a reference to the translation of these documents, furnished by 
the claimants, it will appear that the petition was made to Unzaga by 
Maurice Conway, and bears date the 9th September, 1776. Omitting 
the formal part, it sets forth as follows: "That your petitioner intend-
ing to go and establish himself in the upper part of the country, on the 
land which he has purchased jointly with Alexander Latil, and, with 
your permission) from the Houmas Indians, which land is entirely de-
ficient of fences, and is cleared out upwards of a league in the depth, 
so that the cypress swamp being at the distance of about one league 
and a half from the river, your petitioner has no right thereto in con-
sequence of your not having granted to him but the common depth of 
forty arpents, which is so short that he cannot reach the cypress trees 
necessary for making fences, and other work absolutely indispensible 
on a plantation, therefore your petitioner prays you will grant him all 
the depth which may be vacant immediately after the said depth of 
forty arpents." The petitioner further states that he is the sole pro-
prietor, having purchased the moiety which belonged to Latil, and 
prays that Unzaga "will direct Louis Andry to come and put your 
petitioner in possession of the said front and depth, setting the boun-
daries, and giving to your petitioner a certificate of the whole for his 
information and surety.'' 
Upon this petition the governor, on the 27th September) 1776, made 
his order or decree, in which he directs that "Captain Louis Andry 
shall go on the land mentioned in the foregoing petition, and shall put 
the petitioner in possession of the land which may there be vacant on 
the back of the forty arpents of depth which he possesses, and running 
in the same directions ; provided the same be vacant and do not injure 
the neighbors, to the effect of which he shall set and mark the bound-
aries, and shall extend after this decree a proccs verbal of his operations, 
which, signed by him and the said neighbors, shall be forwarded to 
me, that I may cause the complete title to issue." 
On the 9th October, 1776, Captain Andry made the survey, and cer-
tified that he went on the land alluded to, accompanied by Conway 
and the commandant of the district, Louis Judice, who, understanding 
the language of the Indians, he requested to call their chief, that he 
he might show the upper and lower boundaries ; that the said Judice 
having complied with the request, the said chief came, and answered 
by means of the said interpreter and commandant: ''that the said land 
sold by him extended and was previously occupied by the said Indians 
from the lower boundary of Francis Duhan, on the upper side, to the 
boundary of Michel Chiasson, on the lower one; which names do not 
now agree with those mentioned in the instrument of sale in conse-
quence of said lands having passed into the hands of several owners 
since the said period." The proces verbal then proceeds as follows: 
"And, immediately after, I have measured the space between those 
boundaries, drawing to that effect in the woods the lines necessary to 
ascertain its extent, (which lines are marked on the plan or sketch of 
my operations, which I have delivered to the said petitioner,) and found 
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that it contains ninety-six arpents in front on the river, growing wider 
one hundred and twenty degrees in the depth, on account of its being 
situated on the bend of the river, the upper line, common with }francis 
Duhan) running north fifty degrees to the west, and the lower one, 
common with Michel Chiasson, running north seventy degrees to the 
east. The measurement of the said front being thus made, I proceeded 
to put the petitioner in the possession of the depth granted to him by 
the foregoing decree: to the effect of which I went back to the upper 
line, common with Francis Duhan, in whose presence I found out the 
boundaries set by me on the 22di December, 1773, and which still exist 
in the same situation, distance, and direction, both of mulberry wood 
-the first *** at the distance of thirty-seven toises or fathoms and 
two feet from the actual bank of the river, and the second *** at one 
arpent or thirty toises more in the back; afterwards, I continued in the 
same line and in the aforesaid direction of north fifty degrees west, to 
the depth of forty arpents, opening to that effect a small road through 
the woods, at which place I caused to be driven two feet and a half 
into the earth a boundary of cypress wood ***; and at the further dis-
tance of two arpents, that is, at forty-two arpents from the river, I set 
another boundary, similar in all its circumstances to the one just 
spoken of. This line being thus drawn, I went to the lower one, com-
mon with Michael Chiassson) whom I also called, and, after measuring 
the seven arpents which, by decree of the 27th September last, the gov-
ernor aforesaid granted to him, I caused two boundaries of mulberry 
wood to be driven in the said line, the first** at the distance of twenty 
toises from the actual bank of the river) and the second * * at the dis-
tance of twenty toises more in the depth; after that I continued the 
said line through the wood, in the same direction of north seventy 
degrees east, to the depth of forty arpents, at which point I caused to 
be driven two and a half feet into the earth a boundary of cypress 
wood ** *; and at the further distance of two other arpents, that is, at 
the distance of forty-two arpents from the river, I caused another bound-
ary, of the same size and similar in all its circumstances to the forego-
ing, to be driven into the earth, in order that the direction may not 
deviate. And, in order that all the above may appear, I give the 
present certificate) which I have signed, with the said petitioner, 
Maurice Conway, and the said commandant and interpreter in this 
transaction) Louis Judice, the said Indian chief, named Calabe, and 
the two adjoining neighbors, Francis Duhan and Michel Chiasson, 
having declared not to know how to sign: all which I do attest, at the 
aforesaid coast or district, the day and year above written.'' The pro-
ces verbal is accordingly signed by Andry, Conway, and Judice. 
It is much to be regretted that the figurative plan or sketch referred 
to by Andry, and which he delivered to Conway, had not been pre-
served, or, if still in existence, that it had not been produced as a part 
of the evidence in the case. In the absence of that paper, it will become 
necessary to examine the proces verbal, or official certificate of survey, 
with more care; it being the only mode of ascertaining the lines ac-
tually run on the occasion, and the monuments set in the field in pur-
suance of the decree of Unzaga, and the essential foundation of all the 
initiatory proceedings upon which the grant is based. Of necessity 
.. 
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there must be some guide to ascertain the boundaries of the tract, or 
the whole proceeding would be void for uncertainty. There is not, at 
present, in the case any other evidence than this certificate, upon which 
we can rely for this information. 
On the 21st June) 1777, Galvez, the then governor of Louisiana, 
made the grant, which is in the following terms: 
a Bernardo de Galvez) colonel of the battalion of infantry of Louis-
iana, governor, intendent, and inspector general pro tempore thereof, 
having seen the foregoing proceedings of the second adjutant of this 
place, the Captain Louis Andry, concerning the possession which he 
has given to Maurice Conway, by virtue of the foregoing decree, issued 
by my predecessor, of all the vacant land behind or in the rear of the 
forty first arpents which he possesses, by ninety-six arpents in front of 
the river, running in the same direction as these; and whereas, the 
same is conformable to the rules made touching surveying of lands and 
adjoining neighbors, so that no injury is done to said neighbors, who, 
far from having made any opposition, have consented to the said ope-
rations, of which I do hereby approve; and using the faculty that the 
king has given me, I grant, in his royal name, to the said Manrice 
Conway, the said la~d behind or in the rear of the forty arpents which 
are contained in his plantation, situated in the district of Lafourche, 
by ninety-six in front on the river, following the same direction as 
those) in order that, as his own property, he may dispose or enjoy the 
same conformably to the said operations) and complying with the con-
ditions prescribed in the ordinances made on the subject of lands.'' 
Another translation of the petition, order of survey, proces verbal of 
the survey, and the grant, is to be found in Clarke's Land Laws, page 
954, substantially the same as that furnished by the claimants. 
The survey upon which the grant was made bears date the 9th Octo-
ber, 1776; and, in tracing this title, I have omitted any reference to a 
small tract of six by forty arpents) situate on the upper side of the Hou-
mas claim, which Conway purchased of Landry on the 18th of October, 
1776. The purchase having been made nine clays after the survey of 
Andry, and of course subsequent to all the initiatory proceedings upon 
which the grant to Conway was made, it can in no way affect any con-
clusion that may be formed upon the terms of this grant; nor does it 
appear to be embraced in the range of this investigation. 
Having thus shown the origin of this claim, it is only necessary here 
to remark that, under the grant, the claimants insist they are entitled 
to a tract of country on the left bank of the Mississippi river, with a 
front of a league and one seventh, and with a depth extending to the 
rivers Amite and Ibm·ville, and Lake Maurepas, the side lines diverg-
ing from the front north fifty degrees west, on the upper side, and 
north seventy degrees east, on the lower side, to the rear boundary 
aforesaid, and including by estimate more than one hundred and eighty 
thousand acres.-(See plat annexed, marked A.) 
The United States acquired the territory, at that time known as the 
province of Louisiana, by the treaty concluded at Paris the 30th April, 
1803, and it was formally delivered to the United States on the 20th 
December, of the same year. By that treaty it was stipulated that the 
inhabitants should be incorporated into the Union, and admitted as 
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soon as possible to the rights of citizenship, and that "in the meantime 
they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their 
liberty, property, and the religion which they profess." 
Subsequent to the treaty, and in anticipation of the delivery of the 
territory, Congress passed the act of the 31st October, 1803, entitled 
"An act to enable the President of the United States to take posses-
sion of the territories· ceded by France to the United States," by the 
treaty aforesaid, "and for the temporary government thereof." (2 
Statutes at Large, 245.) 
The second section provides "that, until the expiration of the pres-
ent session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary govern-
ment of the said territories be sooner made by Congress, all the mili-
tary, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing 
government of the same shall be vested in such person and persons, 
and shall be exe'rcised in such manner as the President of the United 
States shall direct, for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of 
Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and reli-
gion." vVilliam C. C. Claiborne, of Mississippi, was duly appointed 
governor of Louisiana on the same day the act passed. 
Shortly after the surrender of the province, and the appointment of 
Mr. Claiborne as governor, vVilliam Donaldson, in behalf of himself, 
William Marrener, and Patrick Con,vay, describing themselves as 
owners of a tract of land called the Houmas, presented their petition 
to Governor Claiborne, stating the grant of the tract to Maurice Con-
way, and that, ''being desirous of ascertaining the outlines and bound-
aries of the said land, with such precision as to avoid any interference 
with the proprietors of the neighboring grants, and thereby prevent 
expensive disputes, humbly prays that your excellency will be pleased 
to permit the said William Marrener, or such other person as n1ay be 
appointed for that purpose, to survey the said tract of land, and mark 
the boundaries thereof; and at the same time the directions may be 
given to the proprietors of the adjoining patents to show their bound-
aries to the said surveyor, that he may avoid any interference there-
with, and to the commandant of the district to protect him fi·om all 
illegal disturbances in the prosecution of said work.'' 
Upon this petition Governor Claiborne made the subjoined order: 
" The proprietors of land adjoining the tract within mentioned are re-
quested to show their respective boundaries, and the commandant of 
the district, if necessary, will extend to the surveyor his protection." 
The petition and order are without dates, in the form in which I 
find them, in Senate document No. 45, second session, Twenty-eighth 
Congress, p. 20. This is the first account we have of the claim under 
this government. 
It was subsequently laid before the commissioners appointed under 
the act of 3d March, 1805, when it was claimed in three several parcels 
-the upper tract by William Donaldson and John W. Scott, the 
middle by Daniel Clarke, and the lower by William Conway. 
In order to present a full view of this case, it now becomes necessary 
to examine certain surveys and ancient conveyances which were laid 
before the commissioners, and have since been relied on as supporting 
the views of the claimants in regard to the extent of the grant. 
t 
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1st. The Donaldson and Scott tract.-On the 28th December, 1804, 
a certain Bartholomew J_jafon, alleging himself to be a surveyor com-
Inissioned by Governor Claiborne, certified a plat and certificate of sur-
vey of this tract, conformably, as he says, to a survey made by William 
Marrener on the 27th June, 4th August, and 3d December, 1804, and 
to measurements executed by himself on the Iberville, which he de-
.scribes in the plat·as the northern boundary, car'rying back the depth 
to that river, 1naking the length of the upper line four hundred and 
sixty arpents and fifteen toises, and the lower line three hundred and 
eighty arpents. The copy of this certificate will be found in the 
proceedings before said board, as printed in Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 17. 
See also plat B, heTeunto annexed. 
The first title papers laid before the commissioners in reference 
to this tract consist of certain proceedings relating to a judicial sale 
in the matter of the estate of Colonel Gilbert Anthony St. Maxent, of 
which a certified copy in Spanish is among the papers, and a printed 
translation is annexed to the aforesaid memorial of the heirs of Wade 
Hampton, p. 24. There is recited in the proceedings what purports 
to be a clause of the will of St. Maxent, which is given in the follow-
ing words: "I declare for the effects which may be proper to have 
among my property, a plantation in the place called Houmas, at about 
eighteen leagues from this city, which I purchased for the price of six 
thousand dollars from Maurice Conway, about seven years ago, by act 
passed in one of the notaries' offices of this city aforesaid, measuring 
eighteen arpents in front, by upwards of four leagues in depth.'' The 
conveyance referred to by Maurice Conway to St. Maxent is not given. 
The extract from the will of St. Maxent is followed by an authenti-
cated copy of the petition of Peter de Marigny, with the order thereon, 
which, accotding to the certificate, appears in folio 276 of the proceed-
ings. It is not shown to whom the petition was addressed; but it sets 
forth that no more than fifteen hundred dollars had been bid for the 
plantation, and that he thinks it will be proper to suspend the adjudi-
cation thereof until the month of November then next. It further states 
that, by the cl~use of the will of St. Maxent before quoted, the said 
plantation measured eighteen arpents front, by upwards of four leagues 
in depth; that it had been appraised at the sum of four thousand five 
hundred dollars; whereas the sum which had been bid for it was but 
the half of the two thirds at which it was appraised; and that perhaps 
the inhabitants, "being ignorant of the depth belonging to the said 
_plantation, have not made the biddings according to the value which 
that depth must give it." He therefore prays that an order issue to 
Cantrelle, the commandant of the post, containing this representation 
.and the decree thereon, and directing him to have the plantation cried 
for sale until August next; to send circulars to the neighboring posts 
to receive the biddings of the bidders respectively; and, informing every 
,one of the depth, to cause the same to be adjudged in whole or in 
parts; which biddings, in the month of August, he should forward to ' 
the proper tribunal, that the adjudication might be made conformably 
"thereto, on the terms of credit to be granted, and on the securities to 
be required from the purchasers. The decree thereon was: "Let it 
be done as prayed for.'' 
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On folio 378, which, let it be observed, is subsequent to the forego-
ing petition, there is the following entry: "And, as for the lands of 
the Houmas, let the order prayed for be issued, inserti:qg therein the 
contents of the foregoing writing; and let appraisers be appointed who, 
after they have accepted of their appointment, and promised under 
oath to discharge well and faithfully the duties incumbent on them, 
shall proceed to appraise said lands, which shall be sold for cash in 
case more than two thirds of their appraisement value shall be bid for 
them, and the proceeds of the sale shall be forwarded by the first secure 
opportunity. · 
"JOHN VENTURA MORALES, 
''LICENTIATE MANUEL SERRANO.'' 
Morales was intendant of the royal revenue) and this decree seems 
to have been addressed to Evan Jones, the then commandant of the 
parish of Lafourche. 
On the 1st of August, 1798, Jones received the order on his way to 
the city of New Orleans, and, in a communication to the intendant, 
states that there are two persons in the city sufficiently acquainted 
with the quality and circumstances of the land; thei·efore, the intend-
ant could order, if he thought proper, that they appraise the same.-
(See Hampton's memorial, p. 25.) 
On the 3d of August, 1798, in consequence of the above, the in-
tendant directed the lands to be appraised by Simon Ducorneau and 
Alexo Lesassier. The said Ducorneau and Lesassier accordingly ap-
praiRed the land before a notary, describing it at about twenty-four 
leagues from the city, and "that, considering that the said lands mea-
sure about twenty-nine arpents in front by upwards of four leagues in 
depth, they do appraise the same, after consultation and agreement 
between them, at the sum of twenty-four hundred dollars, the said land 
being now uninhabited, without any buildings or improvements what-
soever thereon; which price they appraise it at, as the one which they 
consider it is worth, and no more." 
Thereupon, the following decree was made: " The present notary 
shall call on the printer, and showing him the foregoing appraisement, 
he will cause him to publish in his Gazette a notice informing the 
public that the sale of said lands shall take place on the 13th instant, 
at four o'clock in the afternoon, at this intendant's house. 
"MORALES." 
The notary accordingly caused the following notice to be published 
in the Gazette of the 9th August) 1798: 
"For sale: A land, of twenty-nine arpents in front by about four 
leagues in depth, situated at twenty-four leagues from New Orleans," 
&c. 
On foUo 382, under date of the 6th of August, 1798, there appears 
the following decree: "Whereas the foregoing decree is to be executed 
only in case Evan Jones, commandant of Lafourche, should not have 
been able to sell said lands, let an order, directed to him, issue, con-
taining the appraisement and this decree, directing him to proceed to 
the said sale, for cash, provided the price bidden for it be upwards of 
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the two thirds of the appraised value, there being no higher bidder, to 
pay the sum due for the making of the levee, causing the receipt 
thereof to be annexed to the proceedings, which, together with the 
balance of the proceeds of said sale, shall be forwarded to this tribunal, 
and to give due notice before the thirteenth instant, conformably to 
what has been already decreed on this subject. 
'"'JOHN VENTURA MORALES, 
''LICENTIATE SERRANO.'' 
It appears, however, that Commandant Jones had sold the land on 
the 12th of August, 1798 ; and it is worthy of special notice that) in 
his final act of sale, or title paper to the purchaser, to complete his 
action, and the one upon which all the rights acquired by the pur-
chaser depend, he describes the land sold by him "as measuring 
twenty-nine arpents in front by the depth which could be found." -(Sen. 
Doc. No. 45, p. 17. See, also, translation annexed to Hampton's me-
morial, p. 26.) 
Louis Faure having bid $1,650, more than two thirds of the ap-
praised value, and no person outbidding him, the said commandant 
adjudged the said lands to Faure and his heirs forever, and signed the 
act of sale. 
The next title paper produced before the board of commissioners is a 
conveyance by Faure to John W. Scott, dated 2d June, 1803. (See 
Spanish copy, Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 18.) This describes the land as 
"a front of twenty-nine arpents upon all the depth which can be 
found.'' 
An agreement, under date 3d November, 1803, between John W. 
Scott and William Donaldson, was also produced, as per Spanish copy) 
p. 19, which describes the land with "a front of twenty-nine arpents, 
with all the depth which can be found." 
2d. The Daniel Clarke tract.-The said Lafon, on the 25th Septem-
ber, 1805, alleging himself to be a surveyor commissioned by Gover-
nor Claiborne as aforesaid, certified a plat and certificate of survey of 
this tract, conformably, as he says, to a survey made by Marrener, and 
to measurements which he, Lafon, had executed in November, 1804, 
upon the river Amite and environs of Galveston, which plat was com-
posed of two parcels of land, one acquired from Marrener and the other 
from William Conway, in which he represents the river Amite and 
Iberville as the northern boundary of the tract, giving the length of 
the lower side line as three hundred and fifty arpents, and giving the 
upper as three hundred and eighty arpents.-(See copy of certificate 
among the proceedings of the commissioners, Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 
13. See also plat C, hereunto annexed.) 
Several conveyances were also laid before the board respecting this 
portion of the claim, which it becomes important to examine, so fiu as 
relates to the language employed in describing the depth of the grant. 
1. Conveyance bearing date 14th December, 1785, from the pro-
prietor, Maurice Conway, to Patrick Conway, of" ten arpents of front, 
with the depth which comprehends the title of the said lands.'' -(Sen-
ate Doc. No. 45, p. 14.) 
2. Conveyance, dated 17th March, 1802, from Patrick Conway to 
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William Marrener, of "ten arpents of front, and the depth correspond-
ing to the title granted by this government to ~Iaurice Conway."-
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 14.) 
3. Conveyance, dated 8th January, 1805, from William Marrener 
to Daniel Clarke, as "ten arpents front, with the depth according to the 
title of concession conferred by the late government to the late Maurice 
Conway."-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 15.) ' 
4. Conveyance, dated 11th June, 1805, William Conway to Daniel 
Clarke, of a portion of the land which he describes as "having ten 
arpents of face upon the river, bounded above by the lands of the buyer 
and below by those of the seller, and extends in depth to the river 
Amite, sold according to the general title which is in the vender, from 
having acquired it from Maurice Conway, by act of the 27th October, 
1786.-(See Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 13.) 
It will hereafter appear that the conveyance, above referred to, from 
Maurice Conway to William Conway, was produced before the board 
in the proceedings in relation to the third tract, and that it does not 
claim to the Amite. 
3d. The William Conway tract.-In this case, as in the two former, 
a plat and certificate of survey were produced before the commissioners, 
under the signature of Lafon, bearing date 20th February, 1806, in 
which certificate he alleges himself to be a deputy surveyor under Isaac 
Briggs, surveyor general of lands south of Tennessee. 
The certificate of survey states that the plat conforms to surveys 
executed by Andry, surveyor, in March, 1804, and those which he, 
Lafon, made in December, 1803, and makes the front twenty-seven 
arpents, and the depth extending back to the river Amite and Lake 
Maurepas.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 6. See also plat D, hereunto an-
nexed.) 
The petition of Maurice Conway, and the proceedings thereon, were 
also produced. 
Pursuing the order adopted in reference to the other tracts, I will 
now proceed to examine the conveyances offered to the commissioners 
in support of this branch of the title. 
1. Conveyance from Maurice Conway to William Conway, bearing 
date 27th October, 1786, by which he conveyed to said vVilliam 
"twenty-seven arpents of front, more or less, with the depth according 
to the title of concession that his excellency Senor Count Galvez gave 
by his decree of the 21st June, 1777." By the same deed he also con-
veyed to said William eight arpents by forty in depth, acquired by 
transfer from the heirs of Landry, 18th October, 1776.-(See Senate 
Doc. No. 45, p. 10.) 
2. Conveyance of Peter Part to William Conway, dated 27th ~farch, 
1791, by which he conveyed to said William, in exchange for other 
lands, "five and a halfarpents of front, by the depth offortyarpents."-
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 11.) 
The only account I have been able to discover of the derivation of 
Part's title, is contained in the aforesaid certificate of Lafon, from 
which it appears that Conway claimed title to this portion of the lands 
included in the plat, under a conveyance of Maurice Cr.nway to one 
Oliver Pollock, which it appears had belonged successively to a Dr. 
Rep. No. 150-2 
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Anderson and one Belsey alias Miro, who, having died, four and a 
half arpents in front by forty in depth had been purchased by Part from 
his testamentary executor, and exchanged with said Conway for other 
lands. It is by no means certain that this included the whole of the 
title vested in Pollock, as will be seen by a reference to the deed of 
Maurice Conway hereafter mentioned. The only one of these convey-
ances produced before the commissioners in support of the claim to this 
tract, was the above-named deed of Part to Conway. The certificate 
also states that William Conway claimed the rear lands as heir to his 
uncle. This is the substance of William Conway's title, according to 
the certificate under which he claimed the whole lands described in the 
plat. 
In addition to the conveyances laid before the commissioners, I find 
among the papers annexed to the memorial of the heirs of Wade 
Hampton, a Spanish copy of a deed by Maurice Conway to Oliver Pol-
lock, bearing date March 5, 1778, which conveys "thirty-six arpents 
front, and the depth as far as the lake.' ' -(See Hampton' s memorial, 
p. 21.) 
Annexed to the memorial aforesaid is also a mortgage by William 
Conway, describing himself as heir of Maurice Conway, to Oliver Pol-
lock, bearing date February 5, 1795, in which he describes the lands 
mortgaged as ''thirty arpents of front, and depth as far as the lake.' ' -
(p. 23.) 
There is also among the papers transmitted from the General Land 
Office what purports to be a Spanish copy of a conveyance or mortgage 
by William Conway to John Joyce, dated April 7,1798, in which he 
describes the lands mortgaged as ''thirty arpents of front, and the depth 
as far as the lake.'' 
The commissioners appointed in pursuance of the act of the 2d March, 
1805, and possessing no other authority than what is conferred upon 
them by its provisions, confirmed these claims. The decisions on the 
Conway and Clarke claims bear date respectively on the 3d March, 
1806, and the decision on the Donaldson and Scott claim on the lOth 
of the same month. 
The following is that on the Donaldson and Scott claim: 
'' William Donaldson and John W. Scott claim a tract of land situ-
ated in the county of Acadia, on the left bank of the 1\iississippi, about 
twenty-two leagues above the city of New Orleans, containing twenty-
nine arpents in front, with the depth to the river Amite, bounded on the 
upper side by land of one Simonet, and on the lower by land of Daniel 
Clarke. It appearing to the board, from an instrument of writing 
exhibited, that said land was sold at public auction on the 12th day of 
August, 1798, before Evan Jones, at that time commandant of La-
fourche, to Louis Faure, and it appearing, from sundry deeds of con-
veyance, likewise exhibited, that said land has become the property of 
the present claimant, the board do hereby confirm his said claim." 
The other two are so nearly similar that it is considered unnecessary 
to give them.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, pp. 12, 16, 21.) 
These decisions were made before one of the commissioners became 
a member of the board; and, as far as he was authorized to do so, he 
dissented from them.-(Senate Doc. No. 45 p. 6.) 
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Passing over, for the present, the consideration of the various acts 
.of Congress subsequent to the decisions, it only remains, in order to 
-€xhibit a summary view of the case, to trace, as briefly as is consistent 
with a proper understanding of the subject, the action of the executive 
{lepartment of the government in relation to the claim, and especially 
of the General Land Office, and to examine into the circumstances 
under which the patents were issued) with the sole purpose of forming 
an opinion as to the legality of the authority assumed in granting them. 
In order to a better understanding of the subsequent proceedings, it is 
proper to remark, that the first two parcels above named were pur-
chased by the late General Hampton, of South Carolina, prior to the 
issuing of the patents, and now appear to be claimed in common by 
Messrs. Preston and Manning, in the right of their respective wives, 
who were the daughters of said Hampton. The grantees of the Con-
way tract have also, as it would seem, conveyed their interest, which 
is now claimed by Mr. Rightor and others. No opportunity has been 
afforded to examine either of these conveyances. 
On the 14th January, 1829, James P. Turner, then surveyor gen-
eral, addressed a communication to Mr. Graham, Commissioner of the 
General Land Office, inclosing to him a rough plat of the tract claimed, 
showing its locality and extent, and that it interfered in part with 
other grants by the Spanish government) in which he says, that ''the 
Spanish government did (previously and subsequent to the date of this 
grant) make other grants to a number c,f inclividuals within the limits 
now pretended to be covered by the grant of Conway; and, further, I 
believe it will not be denieu that there never was any pretensions made 
for the present extent of the claim until after the right of the land in 
question became vested in the United States. And there is still another 
reason why this grant cannot be extended to the Amite river; that is, 
the petition of Conway, the decree of the governor, nor the proceedings 
of the surveyor, call for nor exhibit no such boundary; and it is a fact 
well known that it was the custom of the Spanish surveyors, in all cases 
where the grant called for specified boundaries, to exhibit such boun-
daries in their plat of survey. He also suggests that, if governed by 
the customs of the Spanish government, which he presumed could alone 
be the guide, he should commence at a certain point, run General 
Hampton "off such depth as would carry us back on the upper line, 
until it will intersect an older grant marked B, which appears to be 
strictly conformable to the decree of the Spanish governor, although 
this will not give the claim a depth of eighty arpents on the upper line, 
which I believe it was designed to have if found to be vacant." And 
he requests instructions.-(Sen. Doc. No. 45, p. 24.) 
To this letter Mr. Graham replied on the 17th February, 1829, and 
expresses the opinion that the grant is so vague in its terms, as to 
boundary and quantity, that it will be necessary for the courts of jus-
tice to interfere, for the purpose of defining and designating both; and 
that it is impossible the courts can sanction the boundaries as claimed. 
He says, "the object and purpose for which the grant was asked and 
obtained will, therefore, be the leading considerations on which the 
courts will probably decide the question; and, in so deciding, they 
possibly may limit the grant eithel' to the limits of the survey actually 
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made by Louis Andry, or to the termination of eighty arpents, the 
usual extent granted when the front grant was deficient in timber or 
otherwise; or to the distance of one and a half league, as required in 
the petition. Should the court assume any of these limits, facts and 
circumstances may possibly occur in the investigation of the subject 
that may induce it (the court) to extend the back line so as to be equi-
distant from any part of the river. If, therefore, in making your sur-
veys, you assume this limitation (to wit, a league and a half,) as the 
extent of the grant to Maurice Conway, dated the 21st June, 1777, I 
think that we shall have given full scope for the court to exercise its 
discretion ; and if the grant can be so adjudged as to exceed those 
limits, then it must extend to the utmost boundary of Louisiana, as 
they existed at the date of the grant, and to which the two described 
lines can be extended." He further states that the decision of the 
commissioners can only be considered as recognizing . the validity of 
the grant as a complete title, and not as confirming any other lands 
than those included in its terms; and directs the surveyor general, in 
laying down the tracts on his plat, to designate the boundaries as far 
as Andry surveyed by black lines, as also the confirmed claim,s inter-
fering with it, and to delineate the residue of the tract by dotted lines.-
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 26.) 
Mr. Graham having thus decided that a league and a half in depth 
was not open to entry, and given directions acccordingly, the lands in 
the rear, between that and the Amite river, seem to have been treated 
as public lands, and numerous sales of them were made at the district 
land office. 
The views of Mr. Brown, the successor of Mr. Graham, are also very 
clearly stated in his letter of the 17th June, 1836, addressed to the 
register at New Orleans. This communication appears to have been 
prepared in consequence of one received from Mr. Preston, wherein he 
apflied for a patent; or in case one should not be issued, he requested 
that the lands within the limits of the claim should be withheld from 
sale, and that patents should not be issued for the parcels sold. Respon-
sive to these requests, as it would seem, Mr. Brown says to the register, 
''that although this office can no~ recognize the claim as confirmed, un-
der any circumstances, to the extent contended for by the parties in-
terested, yet, as the law prohibits the sale of any lands to which a claim 
was filed in due time * * *, the sale of any portion of the land within 
the limits claimed * * * is unauthorized.'' He therefore instructs him 
to withhold all lands within the lines claimed from entry, and to send 
an abstract of the sales made, that the issuing of patents may be pre-
vented; and directs him, in case he should deem it necessary, to pro-
cure from the surveyor general a diagram showing the lands included 
in the grant as claimed before the commissioners.-(Senate Doc. No. 
45, p. 28.) 
On the same dav he also addressed a communication to Mr. Nich-
olas, then one of the senators from Louisiana, by whom the letter of 
Mr. Preston had been sent to him, stating that, inasmuch as he did 
not consider the claim as recognized by the United States to the extent 
claimed, he could not issue a patent, but had directed the register to 
withhold t he lands from entry.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 28.) 
HOUMAS LAND CLAIMS. 21 
In 1837, Mr. Preston again applied to the General Land Office, 
alleging that the land officers at New Orleans had permitted preemp-
tions and floats to be located on the land, and requested them to be 
cancelled.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 29.) 
The papers in the case were thereupon submitted by Mr. Whitcomb, 
the then Commissioner, to Mr. Birchard, the Solicitor of the General 
Land Office, who, on the 2d December, 1837, gave his written opinion 
that the claimants have "no legal title or equitable right whatever to 
.any land without the bounds of the tract heretofore surveyed for them, 
as derived from the Spanish government, from the Indians,'' or from 
the United States; and that the parties who had purchased had acquired 
.an equitable, if not a legal, right to demand that their titles should be 
perfected; and suggested to the Commissioner that he should recom-
mend to Congress to quiet all doubt about the titles of the purchasers 
by a special act.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, pp. 40, 42.) 
On the 27th December, 1837, the memorial of Mr. Preston, in behalf 
of the heirs of General Hampton, before referred to, was presented to 
the Senate, in which he prays that the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office should be directed to refuse titles to those who had pur-
chased by preemption or otherwise, by refunding the money paid and 
taking up the certificates of entry as far as possible; as, also, that he 
should be directeu forthwith to issue a patent for thew hole of the claim. 
This memorial was ordered to be printed on the 29th January, 1838, 
and is Senate Doc. No. 144, second session Twenty-fifth Congress. The 
J ournaJ of the Senate shows that the Committee on Private Land 
Claims, to whom it had been referred, were discharged from the sub-
ject on the 7th July, 1838. 
It next appears that Mr. Secretary vVoodbury, on the 14th Febru-
ary, 1838, made a communication to the Senate respecting land claims 
in Louisiana, containing a report from Mr. Whitcomb, in which the 
latter concurs in the aforesaid conclusions of Mr. Birchard with respect 
to the claim.-(See Senate Doc. No. 197, second session Twenty-fifth 
Congress, p. 2.) 
Nothing further seems to have been done in the case until the 19th 
March, 1839, when an application was made in behalf of some of the 
purchasers from the government for patents, and suggesting, also, that 
the land officers should be directed to receive payment from the pre-
emptioners who had presented the evidences of their claims.-(Senate 
Doc. No. 45, pp. 43, 48.) This application being referred to the Solic-
itor, he, on the 20th March, 1839, ahered to his former views, and 
.expressed the opinion that the purchasers were entitled to patents. He, 
however, advised the Commissioner, as the question was important, and 
his predecessor had disagreed on the subject, that he should ask the 
·opinion of the Attorney General and the direction of the Secretary of 
the Treasury.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 48.) 
Mr. \iVhitcomb, accordingly, on the 3d April, 1839, submitted the 
matter to Mr. Woodbury, the Secretary of the Treasury.-(Senate 
Doc. No. 45, p. 49.) 
It is evident from the communication of Mr. Whitcomb of June, 
1839, to the counsel of the parties applying for patents, as well as by 
-the letter-book of this office, that the question in some form was sub-
mitted to Mr. Grundy, the then Attorney General.-(Senate Doc. No. 
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45, p. 44.) In his letter of the 16th May, 1839, returning the papers 
to the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Grundy says: "I have had a 
full and free conversation with the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, and we concur in the opinion that Congress alone possesses the· 
power to make a fair and just disposition of the subjects in controversy; 
that much public mischief might arise should the executive branch of 
the government proceed to act at this time; and that Congress should 
be applied to at an early day in the next session to take such measures 
as justice to the respective parties may demand. Believing this to be· 
the most correct and judicious course, I herewith return the papers. 
relative to these two cases which were transmitted to me, at the same 
time assuring you that, should you think the public intere~t would be· 
promoted by an earlier action on the subject, upon your giving me an 
intimation to that effect, and furnishing me again with the papers, I 
will promptly transmit to you such opinions as in my judgment the 
law of the respective cases will warrant.'' 
It does not appear that any special Teport was ever made by the Com--
missioner of the General Land Office, but the Senate having before them 
the communication of Mr. Woodbury, of the 14th February, 1838, and 
the opinion of Mr. Birchard, with respect to this claim, which was: 
transmitted at the same time, ordered the petition of Wade Hampton 
to be taken from the files, and referred to the Committee on Private· 
Land Claims. (Senate Journal, 1st Sess. 26th Congress, p. 40.) In 
pursuance of this referrence, the committee reported a bill, No. 361 of 
that session, which proposed to confirm the claims made by Donaldson 
and Scott, and Clarke and Conway, ''to the extent of two leagues front-· 
ing on the Mississippi, and running back for quantity," which was. 
read the first time. No further action appears to have been had on 
this bill, and it never became a law. 
The counsel for the purchasers from the government having again 
applied to the Land Office for patents, the Commissioner, .on the 3d 
October, 1840, addressed a communication to the Secretary of the· 
Treasury, giving further explanation in regard to the claim, in which 
he states the reporting of the bill above-mentioned, limiting it to two· 
leagues fronting on the Mississippi, and running back for quantity, 
and that this ''must be understood as two leagues superficial measure,'' 
and that it furnishes an indication that the claim was not considered 
of greater extent. He further states, that the purchasers of the back-
land were desirous that patents should issue to them, and others re-· 
siding on different portions of it were anxious the same should be 
brought into the market. He therefore requests instructions in the 
premises, suggesting, as but a short time would elapse before the next 
session of Congress, whether it would not be better to defer any further 
steps until opportunity was afforded for legislation. (Senate Doc.) 
No. 45, p. 53.) And Mr. Woodbury concurred in this suggestion.--· 
(Page 54.) 
It further appears, by a communication from the register of the land 
office at New Orleans, of the 13th February, 1841, that Mr. Rightor· 
applied to him for three patent certificates, in the names of Donaldson 
and Scott, Clark, and Conway, and produced plats to him, drawn by 
H. T. Williams, then surveyor general of Louisiana, and certified by-
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him, that having referred to the letters of Mr. Graham and Mr. Brown, 
he had been led to the opinion that the claims were never considered 
as definitely confirmed; and that, under these circumstances, he had 
declined issuing the patent certificates, and he requests instructions. 
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 54.) In reply to this letter, Mr. Whitcomb, 
on the 30th June, 1841, requested the register tp defer any action on 
the application to issue patent certificates, until he should be instructed 
on the subject by the department.-(Page 55.) 
It appears, however, that in the meantime an application was made 
to the register at New Orleans for certified copies of the proceedings 
before the board of commissioners who had confirmed the claim, and 
that on the 12th June, 1841, the register had furnished them in the 
cases of the Donaldson and Scott and Clark claims. He certifies in 
the case of the first-named parties, as follows: ''that the document 
just above written is a full copy of the decision of the late board of 
commissioners, for the eastern district of the late Territory of Orleans, on 
the claim of William Donaldson and John W. Scott, as taken from 
the decisions on land claims of said board in this office." He also 
certifies "that the foregoing plat of survey, (Lafon's plat,) and the 
several other documents produced in evidence in support of the claim, 
are true copies taken from the records in my possession, and forming 
part of the archives of this office.'' (Senate Doc., No. 45, p. 21.) The 
certificate on the proceedings in the case of the C!ark claim, is in the 
same terms, (page 16.) That in the case of Conway is dated 16th Sep-
tember, 1841, and is also similar, (page 12.) It is alleged that these 
are certificates of confirmation within the true meaning of the acts of 
Congress relating to land claims in the Territory of Orleans. This 
point is one of considerable importance, and will be examined when 
I come to consider whether the patents were issued in pursuance of a 
lawful authority. 
It also appear~, that H. T. Williams, surveyor general of Louisiana, 
on the 6th July, 1841, certified from field notes of various surveyors 
on file in his office, plats and certificates of survey for the Donaldson 
and Scott and Clarke claims, carrying the boundaries to the Amite river, 
but excluding lands claimed under other grants. The Donaldson and 
Scott claim he certified to contain 36,582 acres, and that of Clarke, 
28,117 acres.-(See certificates of survey, Senate Doc. No. 45, pp. 22, 
23, and plats E and F, hereto annexed.) 
On the 9th August, 1841, Mr. Isaac T. Preston, one of the counsel 
of Rightor, the claimant of the Conway tract, made an application to. 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, producing certain docu-
ments, and claiming a patent under an act of the 18th April, 1814._ 
He also presented an answer to the report of Mr. Birchard. (Senate-
Doc. No. 45, p. 35.) These papers appear to have been referred to 
the Solicitor of the General Land Office, Mr. Hopkins, who, on the -
30th September, 1841, expressed the opinion that the title was valid, 
that the extent of the claim was legally substantiated, and "with 
some hesitation," decided that the act of 18th of April, 1814, confirmed 
the claim, and that the claimant~ were entitled to a patent for the 
quantity of land confirmed to them by the board of commissioners.- -
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 35.) 
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The application of Mr. Preston, the report of Mr. Hopkins, and 
other documents, were transmitted by Mr. Huntington, Commissioner 
of the General Land Office, to Mr. Forward, then Secretary of the 
Treasury, on the 14th February, 1842, requesting that the opinion of 
the Attorney General might be taken. (Senate Doc. No. 45) p. 89.) 
Before any opinion however was given, the papers were returned to the 
Land Office, no doubt with a view to procure a statement of the case; 
and on the 9th August, 1842, l\1r. Blake, the successor of Mr. Hun-
tington, again transmitted them in a communication to Mr. Young, 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury, giving a ''history of the facts,'' and 
propounding certain questions for consideration, as to the extent of 
the grant, and whether the act of the 18th April, 1814, was applicable 
to and confirmed the claim. (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 94.) The papers, 
it seems, were again sent to Mr. Legare, then Attorney General, whose 
first action upon the subject was to submit to Mr. Blake the following 
important inquiries: 
1. Whether '(a patent has ever been granted on any complete 
rench or Spanish title, beyond the extent of one league square, within 
the Territory of Orleans? 
2. ''Whether any certificates of confirmation have ever been issued by 
the commissioners, on complete titles as aforesaid, beyond the extent 
of one league square? ' ' 
Mr. Blake replied to thefirst in the negative, so far as he had been 
able to ascertain by a cursory examination of the records. In expla-
nations that followed, he deemed it proper to mention, that in the case 
of Miller and Fulton, confirmed by the act of the 29th April} 1816, 
Mr. Graham recognized the right of the claimants to a confirmation 
for a league square for each tribe of Indians from whom they pur-
chased, and the patent was granted accordingly. The case is not 
stated as an exception to the general answer in the negative, and an 
examination of the whole communication to which I refer will show 
that it cannot be regarded in that light. He also answered the second 
in the negative, and gave some explanations. (Senate Doc. 45, p. 
101.) About the same time, the counsel for some of the purchasers 
under the government made an application for patents, or to have 
their entries cancelled, and Mr. Preston made a representation upon 
the subject, in which he insisted that the aforesaid order of Mr. Brown 
was merely prospective in its operation, leaving the unlawful occu-
pants in full and quiet possession, and that they subjected the land, 
timber, &c., to depredation, and therefore requested that they should 
be notified and warned of their true condition. - (Senate Doc. No. 45, 
p. 103.) 
Mr. Legare, on the 2d September, 1842, considered the question 
whether the land within the limits of the claim was subject to entry, 
and communicated the following opinion to the Acting Secretary of 
the Treasury: 
"There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the sales made to pre-
emptioners within the (admitted or ascertained) limits of the Houmas 
claim, are entirely void under the 6th section of the act of 1811. But 
Commissioner Graham's order proceeded on the assumption that the 
lands he offered for sale were not included within the bounds of that 
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claim. Commissioner Brown, without conceding its validity to the 
whole extent, seems to have admitted that it had been regularly pre-
ferred before the commissioners to that extent. I am not yet prepared, 
from any information I possess, to speak to this fact. I only answer 
hypothetically, assuming the lands in question to be within the claim 
as propounded to the commissioners under the acts of 1805, 1806, and 
1807. The executive clearly had no authority to dispose of them with-
out a special act of Congress. The Land Office will therefore refuse 
patents on all certificates which they shall be satisfied fall within that 
category. Whether the entries not heretofore patented shall be can-
celled, depends upon the practice of that office, which must have been, 
I should think, settled long ago, and which I do not wish or mean to 
disturb. 
As to patents issued by Mr. Graham, I see no remedy but in the 
courts. If issued on lands covered by a complete Spanish grant, they 
are, of course, void, and will be so declared whenever they shall be set 
up in an ejectment. I should have greatly preferred to retain my 
opinion on this as on the other points of this case for fuller considera-
tion, and give it now only because it seems to be impatiently called 
for by the claimants." (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 104.) No opinion 
was ever given by Mr. Legare on the other points submitted, as to the 
extent of the grant, or whether the claim had been confirmed by the 
act of the 18th April, 1814. 
Whilst the case was pending before Mr. Legare, Mr. Blake addressed 
a letter, on the 7th October) 1842, to Mr. Newcomb, the surveyor 
general, in which, after stating that he finds a plat in his office certi-
fied by Mr. Newcomb, representing a survey of the Conway portion of 
the claim, he says that the extent was not finally settled, nor was the 
surveyor authorized to decide that matter, nor to approve of a survey, 
until the question was determined, and instructions given him; and 
concludes that, until the Attorney General should decide the question, 
the case must be considered as suspended. (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 
105.) Mr. Blake also addressed another letter to Mr. Newcomb, on 
the 8th November, 1842, on the subject of certain complaints made 
against him by persons representing themselves as residents on the 
Amite and Blind rivers, respecting the certificate given by him to the 
survey of the Conway tract, in which Mr. Blake states that he had 
been and was disposed to believe that, at the time, the surveyor gen-
eral was not aware of the instructions of 1829 and 1836, and of the 
fact that the question of limits had not been finally determined by the 
proper authorities.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 106.) 
On the 20th January, 1843, Peter Laidlaw, the register at New 
Orleans, issued patent certificates in the Donaldson and Scott, and 
Clarke claims, and advised the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
thereof. The certificate in the first mentioned claim is as follows: 
"It is hereby certified, that, in pursuance of the act of Congress 
passed on the 18th day of April, 1814, entitled 'An act concerning 
certificates of confirmation of claims to land in the State of Louisiana,' 
William Donaldson and John W. Scott have been confirmed in their 
claim to a tract of land situated in the county of Acadia, numbered 
133 in the report of the board of commissioners for ascertaining and 
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adjusting the titles and claims to land within the eastern district 
of the Territory of Orleans, dated at New Orleans, the 4th March, 
1806, designated as (here the sections are described) containing 
36,582 19 acres, as per plat herewith. Now, therefore, be it known, 
that, on presentation of this certificate to the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office, the said William Donaldson and John W. Scott 
shall be entitled to receive a patent for the land herein described." 
The certificate in the case of the Clarke tract is similar in its character;-
(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 125, and plats E and F hereto annexed.) 
Mr. Blake, on receiving the letter of the register advising him of 
the issuing of these certificates, wrote in reply under date of the lOth 
February, 1843, stating that, by a letter of the 10 June, 1841, his 
predecessor had been requested to defer the issuing of a patent certifi-
cate until he might be definitively instructed by the department, and 
says: "In view of that communication to the register, I am surprised 
to learn that you have issued the certificates you mention; and, as 
questions connected with the confirmation and limits of the Houmas 
claim have been submitted to the supervisory power) and have not yet 
been definitively settled, you will recall those certificates, and suspend 
the1n until you receive further advice from the department.'' (Senate 
Doc. No. 45, p. 106.) He also advised Newcomb, the surveyor general, 
on the 28th of July, 1843, that he was not authorized to give an offi-
cial sanction to any plat without definite instructions from the depart-
ment. - (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 111.) 
Some of the purchasers from the government having applied to the 
General Land Office, in March, 1843, that the sales to them might be 
cancelled, and the purchase-money refunded to them, Mr. Blake sub-
mitted this subject to l\1:r. Spencer, then Secretary of the Treasury, on 
the 7th June, 1843. (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 108.) Mr. Spencer accord-
ingly examined the question submitted to him, and on the 24th July, 
1843, communicated his decision to Mr. Blake, in which he states 
''that, admitting that Commissioner Graham was wrong, that the sales 
in question were unauthorized and void, yet the money paid is in th.e 
treasury, and it cannot be taken out without an application to Congress. 
The act of 12th January, 1825, authorizes this department to refund 
only when the United States has no title to the land sold, and that act 
does not reach this case; because, if the money is ordered to be refunded, 
that order must proceed on the ground that the Houmas title over the 
land in question is good. I cannot and will not decide that question. 
But I do not admit that Mr. Graham was wrong, and that the sales in 
question were unauthorized and void. The third section of the act of 
3d March, 1811, I am inclined to think, had no other effect than to 
suspend the executive power to offer for sale lands to which claims had 
been duly preferred, until the final decision of Congress thereon. From 
the date of the confirmatory act, all lands lying without the limits of 
the claim, as confirmed, would be relieved fi·orr1 that suspension, and 
become public lands, and subject to preemption rights attaching to 
public lands. The validity of these sales, therefore, depends on the 
decision ofthe question, 'when and with what limits has the Houmas 
claim been confirmed, if confirmed at all?' And, until that question 
is settled, no money can, under e:Aisting laws, be drawn from the 
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treasury for the purpose of being refunded on account of these sales; 
the power to refund, under the act of 1825, depending in this case oa 
the conflict of these sales with the Houmas claim as a valid and legal 
title, and not because they were made in violation of the act of 1811, 
as alle?ed.'' He, therefore, was of opinion that there was no authoriy 
in the department to refund the money claimed.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, 
p. 110. 
The counsel for the purchasers, it appears, addressed a communica-
tion to Mr. Spencer, on the 12th August, respecting his decision de-
clining to refund the purchase-money, which is not among the papers 
sent me. To this communication, :Mr. Spencer replied, on the 28th 
August, 1843, as follows: "The case is briefly this: the Secretary of 
the Treasury is authorized by law to refund the purchase-money for 
erroneous sales of land only where the United States had no title to 
the lands sold. Whether this department can, in this case, regard the 
United States as having had title or not, depends on the decision of the 
question, whether the 'Houmas claim' has been confirmed by law, or 
its validity judicially established; and if so, to what extent? The 
power of this department to refund, in this case, depending on the 
conflict of these sales with the 'Houmas claim,' so ascertained and 
decided to be valid, I know of no 'confirmation or other legal estab-
lishment' of the Spanish grant to Houmas. It is because the question 
of title is to be determined by the courts, that I refuse to decide it. 
There may be a cloud upon the title of the United States which justifies 
the General Land Office in declining to issue a patent, and yet the 
want of title may not be so clear as to justify the Secretary of the 
Treasury in refunding the money. I have no doubt as to the meaning 
of the act of January 12, 1825, the only law authorizing the Secretary 
of the Treasury to refund in cases of erroneous sales of lands. The 
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by that act to refund only in 
cases where the purchase is or may be void, the United States having 
no title to the lands sold: 1st, by reason of a prior sale; or, 2d, because 
of the right thereto having vested elsewhere under a prior British, 
French, or Spanish g.r;ant, recognized by confirmation by Congress, or 
its validity otherwise legally established; or, 3d, from want of title 
thereto in the United States from any other cause whatsoever. It is 
for want of title in eve1~y case. For such erroneous sales he may refund, 
and for such only, under that act. Or, in other words~ Congress has 
intrusted t.o the Treasury Department the power to refund only where 
the sales were absolutely void for want of title in the United States; but 
where voidable only against the United States, it has reserved to itself 
the power either to confirm the sales or to refund the purchase-money; 
or, at all events, it has not granted it to the Treasury Department. 
"As to the alleged issue of' patent certificates' for the 'Houmas 
claim' to its full extent, which you seem to regard as conclusive on the 
question of title, I have to remark that, whatever has been issued pur-
porting to be a 'patent certificate,' has been issued not only without 
the authority, but against the express instructions of the Commissioners 
of the General Land Office, and that a knowledge of the erroneous and 
unauthorized issue is believed to have been brought home to the holders. 
Even if the' Houmas claim' were confirmed, whether patent certificates, 
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or even a patent, could in that case rightfully be issued therefor, (and, 
of course, if issued, their legal effects as such,) would depend on the 
fact whether there was any provision of law authorizing the issue of 
such evidences of its validity; and this department can recognize nothing 
purporting to be a 'patent certificate' as having any effect whatever 
on the question of title, until it first appears that it is authorized by 
law to be issued for this claim, and that it has been regularly and fairly 
issued. 
"I am of opinion, however, that the act of April 18, 1814, to which 
you refer, authorizes 'patent certificates' and patents to be issued only 
for claims to tracts not exceeding a league square, which, by the act 
of J\IIarch 3, 1807, the commissioners had power finally to decide, and 
did so decide; and that, of course, it has no application to the 'Houmas 
claim,' which was submitted, in pursuance of law, to Congress for its 
final decision. 
"I regard Mr. Wirt's opinion, to which you refer, as having but 
little bearing on this case; it is founded on the admission that there 
was no authority in that case to sell, the land having been excepted 
from sale by act of Congress. In this case, however, I am inclined to 
think that the acts of 1806 and 1811 merely suspended action until the 
final decision of Congress on the claims ; and that, in sales made after 
the confirmation of the 'Houmas claim,' within its limits as claimed 
before the commissioners, but without its limits as confirmed by Congress, 
there would be no want of authority to sell. But, however that may 
be, this department is not authorized to refund money for sales eTro-
neously merely, lmt only for sales erroneous because the United States 
had no title to the lands sold. If, therefore, these sales were clearly 
unauthorized, still this department has no power to refund until it is 
ascertained whether the United States had or had not title; or, in other 
words, whether there has been a 'confirmation,' or other legal estab-
lishment of the 'Houmas claim,' and to what extent; and if so, in what 
cases the sales conflict with it."-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 112.) 
Mr. Spencer, on the 15th ~ovember, 1843, addressed a further com-
munication to another counsel of the purchasers, in which he states, 
'' that the claim which he had decided was disposed of on the assump-
tion contended for-that Commissioner Graham was wrong in making 
the sales, ancl that they were unauthorized and void. Assuming the 
ground that the act of 1825 would not authorize the Secretary of the 
Treasury to refund, except another point was settled by him, viz: 
that the United States had no title. 'rhis I refused to decide. Now, 
all this had nothing to do with determining the limits of the Houmas 
claim) be they more or less. That claim has been confirmed to a cer-
tain extent, or it has not. If not at all, then the title of the United 
States is not shown to be defective as to any part; if confirmed to a 
certain extent, and the sales by Commissioner Graham were without 
the limits of the claim as confirmed, they were authorized. But I 
haye not determined, nor will I undertake to determine, to what extent 
the Houmas claim has been confirmed. This is for the courts of law 
or Congress to decide." (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 114.) He afterwards 
returned the papers to the General Land Office, with a copy of his 
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communication above mentioned, so that the Commissioner might see 
what disposition had been made of the claim.-(Page 113.) 
There the matter seems to have rested until the 26th of May, 1844, 
when the counsel for the heirs of Hampton addressed a communication 
to the President, which he referred to the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office, and directed him to examine the case and give a condensed 
view of all the facts in writing. This communication and reference 
are not among the papers, but are mentioned in the report made in 
pursuance of the reference. 
On the 28th of the same month, the counsel also addressed a letter 
to Mr. Blake, requesting that patents might be issued, and that as an 
application of a similar character had been made some time before, 
when the embarrassments that existed were such that the Commis-
sioner did not feel authorized under the circumstances to issue patents, 
and, as he might feel an unwillingness to give the final decision with-
out the advice of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General, 
he, the counsel, had no objections, but, on the contrary, should desire 
their opinion, and should be pleased if the application with the papers 
in the case were submitted to them. (Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 115.) 
He also inclosed an opinion by Mr. McDuffie and Judge Huger, of 
South Carolina, in which they express the opinion that the parties are 
clearly entitled to the patents under the act of 18th April, 1814, (page 
120.) In consequence of this request, J\>Ir. Blake, on the same day, 
submitted this application to Mr. Young, Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury, for the opinion of the Attorney General, and his instruc-
tions.-(Page 116.) 
On the 5th June, 1844, Mr. Blake also made the report requested 
by the President, in which, after reciting the case, he states as follows: 
"In Mr. Johnson's letter· to you, he refers to the act of 12th April, 
1814, as requiring patents to be issued for claims not exceeding a 
league square, and to the act of 18th April, 1814, as, 'requiring pat-
ents to be issued on all claims which are included in the transcript of 
decisions made in favor of claimants, and transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Treasury,' states that, by these two laws, all the claims should 
be patented when surveyed, which had been confirmeu by the board 
of commissioners; and suggests that an order be given to issue patents 
in all such cases, when the requirements of the law are complied 
with. For claims confirmed by the act of 12th April, 1814) this 
office, on the presentation of the confirmation certificates required by 
this act, with the approved plats of survey, is prepared and will 
promptly issue patents in all cases that are regular and free from diffi-
culty; but as to the act of April, 1814, the decision of the late Secretary 
confines the act to cases not exceeding a league square. The question, 
however, as to whether it is coextensive with every claim favorably 
decided on in the transcripts, is uow s·ub iudice by the late submission of 
the papers to the Secretary of the Treasury ad interim, and a final 
decision on that point by the Executive will of course govern the action 
of this office.'' This report was not among the papers sent me, but 
was furnished by the counsel of the claimants. 
The counsel for the claimants having filed an argument in support 
of the authority to issue patents, which will be found in the Senate 
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document before referred to, (page 117 ,) Mr. Secretary Bibb, on the 13th 
August, 1844, transmitted to Mr. Blake his decision, that patents 
ought to be granted ;on the Donaldson and Scott, and Clarke claims, 
and that persons who had been permitted to enter lands within the 
boundaries of the three claims should have a return of the moneys paid 
by them according to the principles of an opinion before given by 
him.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 126.) A copy is also hereto annexed. 
In pursuance of this decision, the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office prepared the drafts of two patents) in the nature of quit claims, 
for the Donaldson and Scott, and Clarke tracts, according to the form 
used in the office in similar cases. The counsel for the claimants, 
however, objected to certain clauses in the forms prepared, and on the 
28th August, lc44, the matter was submitted to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. The grounds of the objection were, that in the proposed 
conveyance by the United States it was declared, that it should be 
'' subject to any just claim or claims, to all and every part thereof, of 
all and every person or persons, bodies politic or !corporate, derived 
from the United States, or from either the British, French, or Spanish 
authorities," and that the habendum was made "subject to any just 
claim or claims as aforesaid," and "so that neither the United States, 
nor any other person claiming under them, except as is provided in 
said act and the reservations aforesaid, may or can set up any right or 
title thereto." The Secretary of the Treasury directed these clauses to 
be omitted in the patents.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, p. 132.) 
The patents were accordingly issued, and bear date on the 22d day 
of August, 1844, .and are signed by the President) and not by his Sec-
retary. Having been transmitted to the counsel of the claimants on 
the 28th August, 1844, he, on the 19th October follo·wing, acknowl-
edging their receipt, entered a caveat, that in receiving them for a 
portion, the claimants do not relinquish their right, title, or claim, to 
the residue ; but, on the contrary, they will assert and maintain their 
right to the entire extent of the original claim.-(Senate Doc. No. 45, 
page 134.) 
The Donaldson and Scott, and Clarke tracts having thus been pat-
ented, two several applications were made in September and October, 
1844, for a patent for the Conway claim. (Senate Doc. No. 45, pp. 
134, 135.) And the surveyor general was afterwards instructed to fur-
nish the register with a plat in accordance with the decision of the 
Secretary of the rrreasury. The register was also advised of the 
decision.-(Pages 137, 138.) 
The certificate of survey and plat were accordingly made by the 
surveyor general, in this case, and bear date the 25th November, 1844, 
and they, together with the patent certificate, were transmitted by the 
register to the General Land Office on the 7th December, 1844.-(See 
annexed plat, marked G.) 
Before, however, the return of the plat and patent certificate to the 
General Land Office, a resolution passed the Senate on the lOth Decem-
her, 1844, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to communicate a 
copy of his written opinion, directing patents to be issued, with copies 
of the opinions given by the other officers connected with the General 
Land Office in relation to the claim, together with copies of the sur-
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veys, and of the transcripts of confirmation. (Senate Journal) p. 28.) 
These papers were accordingly transmitted to the Senate on the 8th 
January, 1845, and compose Senate Document No. 45, so often re-
ferred to. 
On the 7th day of January, 1845, the following joint resolution was 
passed in the House: 
n Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the issuance of grants 
or other evidences of title upon a Spanish land claim in the State of 
Louisiana lying on the Mississippi above New Orleans, commonly 
known as the Houmas claim, be, and the same are hereby prohibited 
until the further order of Congress in relation thereto.'' 
This resolution having been sent to the Senate on the same day, was 
there amended, so as to read in terms similar to the joint resolution of 
1846, under which this xamination is n1ade. This amendment was 
sent to the House on the last day of the session, but was not taken up, 
and therefore failed to become a law. In consequence of these pro-
ceedings, Mr. Blake seems to have held the case suspended. 
On the 5th March, 1845, a communication was received at the Gen-
eral Land Office, in behalf of the claimants of the Conway tract, inclos-
ing a letter from one of their counsel to the President, dated March 3, 
1845, requesting him to direct the Commissioner to issue a patent in 
conformity with the decision made by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
With that letter is a note from the Secretary of the same date, stating 
that the three claims ''are confirmed, and therefore patents ought to 
issue, if not already issued, conformably to the opinion'' delivered by 
him. Under this note is an order of the same date from the President, 
requesting the Commissioner to "issue patents in conformity with the 
above recommendation and opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury." 
But Mr. Blake still deferred action on the case. 
On the 12th May, 1845, another application for a patent was made 
by Mr. Isaac T. Preston, as counsel for the claimants, to Mr. Shields, 
the successor of Mr. Blake, who on the 24th June following, submitted 
the same with a report to Mr. Secretary Walker, in which he states, 
that under the decisions of the Supreme Court, he feels bound to 
regard the grant as within the scope of the authority of Galvez, and 
as lawfully executed by him, but that the question still remains as to 
the extent of the grant. On this point, after stating the answer in 
behalf of the claimants to the opinion of Mr. Birchard, he says: "It 
is then admitted that there was no actually defined rear boundary to the 
Houmas, but under the Spanish usages a navigable water course is 
claimed as that boundary. Mr. Graham was of opinion that the 
boundaries of the grant must be fixed by the courts, and in order to 
give scope for their discretion, limited the survey of the rear line to a 
league and a half, thereby giving upwards of 18,000 acres to the 
claim. * * * Looking to the object for which the grant was asked, I 
feel constrained to say, that I cannot decide that the usages of the 
province authorized such an extension, or that Galvez contemplated 
a grant for such an extent of territory, but must agree with Commis-
sioner Graham and Secretary Spencer, that the rear boundaries should 
be determined by the courts or by Congress.'' He further states, that 
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he cannot satisfy himself that the act of 18th April, 1814, has refer-
ence to any cases except those on which confirmation certificates were 
authorized to be issued for claims to the extent of a league square; 
concurring on this point also with Secretary Spencer, and answering 
the question what was required of the executive officers under existing 
laws in regard to this claim, he states, that under the provisions of 
the act of 3d March, 1811, the land to the extent claimed should have 
been reserved from sale until the final decision of Congress. The act 
referred to declares, "that till after the final decision of Congress 
thereon, no tract of land shall be offered for sale, the claim to which 
has been in due time, and according to law, presented to the Register 
of the Land Office, and filed in his office, for the purpose of being 
investigated by the commissioners appointed for the purpose of ascer-
taining the rights of persons." The report continues, that "by this 
course the claimants would be left to their original grant on which to 
rest and defend their rights under the supreme law of the land, and 
the Executive in any future proceedings would be governed by the 
decision of Congress, and of the courts;" and alluding to the directions 
of the former Secretary of the Treasury, and the President to issue a 
patent, he requests instructions on the subject. 
The joint resolution directing the Attorney General to make this 
examination, having subsequently passed, Mr. Secretary Walker has 
suspended the giving of the instructions requested. 
On the 6th June, 1846, the Senate passed a resolution directing the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office to furnish certain informa-
tion respecting the Donaldson and Scott, and Clarke claims, the nature 
of which will appear from the answer of that officer.-(Senate Journal, 
p. 329.) 
On the lOth June, the Commissioner m_ade his report, which on the 
12th was ordered to be printed.-(Senate Doc. No. 389, 1st session, 
29th Congress.) 
It appears by that report that the number of acres in these 
two tracts, according to the claim is ........................... 82,111.00 
The aggregate of acres embraced in the two patents is....... 64,699.79 
The difference about . ................................................. 17,411.21 
The seventeen thousand acres of the claim which was thus excluded 
from the patents are represented to be situated on the Iberville, or 
Manchac, and Mississippi rivers, and to be embraced in other private 
claims, and the report refers to the blue color, on plat H, to exhibit 
their location. It states that the number of patents issued for lands 
purchased within the limits of this claim, as patented was twenty, 
containing 2, 739.48 acres, that eleven of these patents had been sur-
rendered to be cancelled, and that the amount of the purchase m.oney 
refunded thereon was $2,163 12}; that the number of entries upon 
which application had been made to refund the purchase money, since 
the issuing of the patents, was one hundred and four, containing 
17,002.83 acres, and that the an1ount refunded was $21,253 54. By a 
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statement among the papers, it appears that the total number of 
acres entered under preemptions and otherwise in the three tracts, and 
the purchase-money received thereon, were as follows: 
Acres.............................................................. 40,253.75 
Purchase-money ................................................ $50,327 32 
I regret that I have not found it consistent with a proper under-
standing of the subject to abridge this narrative within narrower 
limits. Its length has much exceeded my expectations. It was, how-
ever, in some degree unavoidable, in order to present a clear view of 
the case to the President, on whom important duties are devolved by 
the joint resolution, in the event that my opinion should be adverse 
to the authority assumed in granting the patents. If any errors have 
occurred in selecting what appeared to be material, a reference to the 
source from which I have drawn will at once correct them. 
I will now proceed to examine the legal questions on which I am 
directed to report my opinion. 
In the first place, I ain of opinion that the grant by Galvez to :Mau-
rice Conway is a perfect and complete grant, duly made and consum 
mated before the cession of Louisiana to the United States, protected 
by the treaty of cession, and, in the language of the Supreme Court, in 
the case of the United States vs. Wiggin, (14 Pet., 350,) is "intrinsi-
cally valid, and needs no sanction from the legislative or judicial de-
partments of this government.'' 
The great question to be determined, however, as before remarked, 
is the extent of the lands which were severed from the domains 
of the crown of Spain by the terms of the grant; or, in other words, 
the limits and boundaries of the tract secured, and guarantied by the 
treaty. 
The claimants contend that it includes not only the lands surveyed 
and severed, but all the rear lands above describeu, as far as the rivers 
Amite and Iberville and lake Maurepas. It must be admitted that 
the language of the petition is somewhat broader than the survey and 
location. But, if there were no other means of identifying the land, 
or of ascertaining the limits, than are to be found in that source, I 
would be compelled to hold that the whole proceedings are so vague 
and indefinite that the grant must be considered void on that account. 
It is insisted that the words of the grant are so fully explained and 
qualified by the general expressions of the preamble) decree, and peti-
tion, as to avoid all such uncertainty, and manifestly to authorize such 
an interpretation of the terms of the grant, and of the description 
therein of the land granted, as will give to the grantee, and those 
claiming under him, all the domain in the rear of the first concession, 
belonging at that time to the government of Louisiana. In further-
ance of this view, it is insisted that the several papers, when consid-
ered together as parts of one transaction, will admit of no other 
limitation than the one assumed, which exter,tds the depth to the 
boundaries of the province. This cannot be admitted, it seems to me, 
without overlooking entirely the first action of Unzaga upon the peti-
tion of Conway, in which he directs the setting and marking of the 
boundar'ie.~ ). nor without rejecting altogether the esRential parts of the 
Rep. No. 150--3 
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official survey, 1nade in pursuance of that order, and constituting the 
most important element of the proceedings upon which the final decree 
or grant was based. After full consideration of the question, I dis-
sent from the views of the claimants, and have come to the conclusion 
that, by the terms of the grant and preliminary proceedings upon 
which it is founded, a complete legal title vested in the said Conway 
only to the extent of the survey, making the side lines forty-two arpents 
in the depth, or half a league from the front on the Mississippi river. 
In forming this conclusion, I have not been unmindful of the im-
portance of the suggestion that the evidences of title, in this case, are 
not to be measured by the strict, though just and certain, rules of the 
common law, but should be considered in connection with the usages 
and customs of the province prevailing at the time when the grant was 
made. The propriety of the suggestion is freely admitted, and has 
been fully weighed. It led me to examine whethnr there was any 
recognized usage or regulation which could come in aid of the proceed-
ings to expand the legal rights of the party beyond the survey and 
well-defined location upon the land. No case has been cited disclosing 
any such custom, usage, or regulation; and it is presumed none can 
be found, where the principle has been approved by the courts of the 
United States. Until that principle shall have been sanctioned by the 
courts of this country, I must hold that it is not competent for a judi, 
cial tribunal to enlarge the boundaries of a grant beyond the actual 
survey and location upon which it was made. It is even more certain 
that the principle cannot be sustained where, as in this case, the des-
cription of the land contained in the grant and papers annexed to it, 
is too indefinite and uncertain to give it force and effect, without the 
survey and location upon which it is ba.sed. It is too well settled, I 
think, to be controverted that, according to the laws, usages, and cus-
toms of the Spanish government, nothing short of an effective grant 
from the governor could confer a complete title, either to a front or 
back concession. It is undoubtedly true that an incomplete right 
might be acquired under an order or warrant of survey. Back con-
cessions, it seems, were seldom made; and in no instance of which 
there appears to be any authentic account, except to the proprietors of 
the front; and, where made, uniformly had a depth of forty arpents, 
reckoning from the rear line of the first concession. But the same 
forms of title appear to have been required in the one case as in the 
other; and in no case could a fee simple estate be acquired from the 
government, without the severance of a definit.e tract from the mass of 
the public lands, under the operation of a complete grant. Under 
these circumstances, I find myself obliged to decide, upon the facts 
before me, that the complete title stops with the limits of the survey 
and location. The examination which I have made of the question 
has produced full conviction on my mind that there is no principle of 
law, that has been recognized and approved, to justify the extension 
of the complete fee-simple title beyond those limits; anJ I can con-
ceive of none which it would be safe to apply to the titles of real estate 
to expand them. Any other rule of interpretation of the legal rights 
of these parties, in this respect, would be controverted in every stage 
of the proceedings under which they claim. It would be impeached 
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even by the prayer of the petition of Conway, in which he asks to be 
1mt in possession of the front and depth, setting the boundaries. It 
would be in direct conflict with the order of Unzaga, addressed to the 
surveyor., in which he directs that the surveyor shall set and mark the 
boundaries . It would repudiate the whole survey upon which the front 
as well as depth, in a great measure, reposes under the grant; and it 
would be wholly unsupported by the final decree or grant, which 
merely approves the previous operations, and grants the land accord-
ingly. 
In order to test the correctness of the conclusion, it may be proper 
to examine with more care the grounds upon which it rests, and to 
consider the objections that may be urged against it, and to compare 
both with some considerations not appearing upon the face of the 
papers. 
It is too well known, I think, to be disputed, that the regulations 
of O'Reilly were in full force at the date of this grant, and the survey 
of Andry. By the twelfth article of those regulations it is declared, 
that "all grants shall be made in the name of the king, by the gov-
ernor general of the province, who will, at the same time, appoint a 
surveyor to fix the bounds thereof, both in front and depth, in presence 
of the judge ordinary of the district and of two adjoining settlers, who 
shall be present at the survey. The above-mentioned four persons 
shall sign the proces verbal which shall be made thereof, and the sur-
veyor shall make three copies of the same, orie of which shall be 
deposited in the office of the scrivener of the government and cabildo, 
another shall be delivered to the governor general, and the third to 
the proprietor, to be annexed to the titles of his grant." - (1 Clarke's 
Land Laws, p. 979.) . 
It has never been questioned, I believe, that these regulations, during 
the period they were in force, were of binding obligation upon subor-
dinate officers ; nor is there any pretense that U nzaga relaxed their 
operation in this case, or dispensed with their requirements. On the 
contrary, it is shown by his decree, that they were substantially re-
affirmed and reenacted, in his order directing the surveyor to set and 
mark the boundaries. But suppose it were otherwise, they constitute 
the best known guide to the usages and customs of the province in 
regard to surveys. In this respect all will agree, I presume, that they 
should have considerable influence upon the question) as constituting 
the- most authoritative exposition of the law-making power of the 
province upon the general subject of surveys. They furnish, also, the 
best known criterion by which to judge what kind of a survey was re-
quired, when the terms of the grant were indefinite, to work a sever-
ance of the tract from the domains of the crown, and to convert it, 
under the operation of the grant, into private property. 
It cannot be admitted, at this day, that any other lands pass by a 
conveyance or grant, than such as can be identified and defined by 
some of the modes authorized by law for ascertaining such facts. The 
Spanish regulation, it seems, required the bounds to be fixed in front 
and depth, in presence of the judge ordinary and two adjoining set-
tlers. All the requirements of the article, so far as they are applicable 
to the duties of a surveyor, were obeyed and followed in this case. 
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This appears by the official certificate annexed to the title of Conway. 
A slight examination of the order of survey issued upon the petition, 
and of the certificate of survey, will be sufficient to demonstrate that 
the twelfth article of these regulations constituted the guide at least 
in these proceedings. The order or decree heretofore given in its exact 
language bears date at New Orleans, 27th September, 1776. The 
proper officer is directed, in substance, to go to the land, and put the 
petitioner in possession of that which may be vacant in the rear of his 
plantation, provided it is not claimed by others, and the possession so 
to be given do not injure the adjoining occupants, "to the e:.ffect of 
which," according to the translation of the claimants, "he shall set and 
mark the boundaries;" or, according to the version, (1 Clarke's Land 
Laws, p. 955,) "to which effect he shall establish his boundaries and 
limits." The disagreement is only in the form of expression, and can-
not affect the merits of the question, both versions requiring the sur-
veyor to mark or establish the boundaries of the tract to be surveyed. 
The regulations show what was intended by the order requiring the 
setting and marking of the boundaries ; it was, in the emphatic words 
of the twelfth article, to fix the boundaries thereof in front and in depth. 
Assuming that the tract does not extend beyond the forty-two arpents 
in depth, then Andry obeyed the directions of the authority under 
which he acted, performing his duty according to law, and his return 
is fully sustained. One class of the decided cases, cited by the counsel, 
lays down a principle of much importance on this point. It is, that 
an act done in pursuance of a public authority is presumed to be cor-
rect, or that "he who alleges that an officer intrusted with an impor-
tant duty has violated his instructions, must show it." Upon no just 
principle can those claiming under Conway be permitted to deny 
either the accuracy or the completeness of the certificate of Andry, as 
it is a necessary part of the title papers to uphold their rights, and 
bears upon its face the signature of Conway, placed there by himself, 
in pursuance of the regulations aforesaid. It is essential to the validity 
of the grant itself; and without it, in my judgment, these parties 
would take nothing by their claim. The manner of the survey, and 
the extent of the operations in the field, are stated in the official cer-
tificate with great particularity, showing a strict and full compliance 
with the rules of survey prescribed in the regulations of O'Reilly. It 
is only necessary to advert to the action of the surveyor when he closed 
the survey on the side lines. The last monument planted by him on 
the upper line was at the distance of forty-two arpents from the river. 
Did this close the survey on that line? The certificate so declares at 
the commencement of the next sentence: ''This line being thus drawn, 
I went to the lower one, common with Michel Chiasson," is the 
language in the translation of the claimants ; and in Clarke's Land 
Laws it is still stronger: "This line being concluded, I went to the 
lower one." The inquiry as to which of the translations is most literal, 
becomes immaterial, as each is alike conclusive, that this line was 
finished and terminated at the last monument described, which was at 
the distance of forty-two arpents from the river. The manner narrated 
in which the lower line was surveyed is not very dissimilar, and is 
given with equal care. It concludes, according to the translation of 
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the claimants, "in order that the direction may not deviate," after 
describing the last monument set in the field, which was at the distance 
of forty-two arpents from the river, making the depth correspond 
exactly with the other side line. Both lines are ended at points 
clearly ascertained and marked by monuments on the land. Some re-
liance is placed upon the closing words of the sentence in which Andry 
describes his last act, in the survey on the lower line. No such 
remark was made when he closed the upper line. These words are ren-
dered in the copy of the certificate appearing in Clarke's Land Laws, as 
follows: "In order to keep the course;" and are evidently descriptive 
of an intent which had been performed. They refer to an act done; 
to one that was complete, and not to one that remained to be performed. 
The order under which he acted authorized him to fix and mark the 
front and depth of the tract surveyed, and there his authority ceased. 
These acts were performed according to law, in the presence of the 
judge ordinary, and of the two adjoining neighbors, to whom, as well 
as to Conway, it was important to preserve the evidence of the course 
which he had run from the river, to the depth of the tract surveyed and 
located. The monument of which he was speaking had been planted 
to keep the course, as had been all the others previously described. It 
was not necessary to certify the purpose for which they had been 
planted at the close of each description of the cypress or mulberry stake, 
used to designate the intent; that was left for the close, and the words 
apply as fully to the first monument on the bank of the river, as to the 
one which marked the depth of the last line surveyed. He was speak-
ing of an intent which had ripened into an act. It is no more or less 
than if he had said, I have planted all these monuments to keep the 
course and mark the boundaries of the land. This is evident by the 
concluding portion of the certificate, which immediatelyfollows in these 
words: " And in order that all the above may appear, I give the fol-
lowing certificate." This certificate is signed by Andry, Judice, and 
Conway, and alleges the reasons why the adjoining neighbors did not 
affix their signatures, which was, that they did not "know how to 
sign." 
The figurative plan or sketch of the operations delivered to the gran-
tee was not laid before the commissioners who passed upon this claim 
under the act of 1805, nor is it among the papers submitted to me. 
It is thus demonstrated, as it seems to me, that the survey was made 
in conformity with the twelfth article of O'Reilly's regulations; and 
that it terminated on each side line at the distance of forty-two arpents 
from the river, the bounds having been fixed, both in front and depth, 
in pursuance of the prayer of the petition, and in obedience to the order 
ofUnzaga. 
The binding character of the treaty stipulations, in regard to the 
rights of private property, is too apparent, and has been too frequently 
recognized by every department of this governm;mt, to render it neces-
sary to remark upon any of the views which have been presented to 
enforce and illustrate that obligation. There cannot be any difference 
of opinion between the counsel and myself on this point) after we shall 
have ascertained the nature and character of the rights acquired under 
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the former government) 'which are entitled to that protection and guar-
antee. 
In further examining the question for that purpose, it now becoll!es 
proper to consider the principal evidence of title upon which these par-
ties rely, which is the grant issued by Galvez, on the 21st June, 1777. 
The argument for the claimants proceeds upon the ground, that the 
extent of the lands granted must be ascertained and measured by the 
descriptive words and sentences that precede the granting clause, aided 
by similar expressions to be found in the petition of Conway, and the 
preliminary proceedings, overlooking the fact, as it seems to me, that 
no one of the sweeping expressions to which they refer, gives either 
courses, distances, or monuments, or affords any other definite and cer-
tain rule by which to mark the limits and boundaries of the tract upon 
the land. The strength of the argument consists in the reliance which 
is placed upon the words) "all the vacant lands in the rear of the first 
forty arpents." These, it is insisted, in the connection in which the 
are employed, are broad enough to embrace their whole claim, and 
cannot be interpreted to include less, without distorting their true 
meaning, or departing from their usual and ordinary signification. 
There might be some force in the reasoning, if the words selected were 
as comprehensive as is supposed; and if, in their application to the 
subject-matter in dispute, they were certain to a common intent, or 
more especially if there were not other words in the same instrument 
evidently introduced to negative the expansive construction for which 
they contend, by limiting and qualifying their meaning, and thus giv-
ing force and effect to the grant. Let us examine the terms of the 
grant, solely with reference to its limitations, and see whether it be 
not so guarded, notwithstanding the peculiar structure and form of the 
instrument, as to defy every attempt to misunderstand its true mean-
ing and effect. It is manifest that it is based upon the proces-verbal 
or official certificate of survey. The correctness of this conclusion is 
demonstrated by the following considerations: 
1. The maker certifies that he had seen the proceedings of Andry, 
which could only refer to the return of his doings in the survey and 
location. 
2. He declares them to be conformable to the rules made, touching 
the surveying of lands and adjoining neighbors. 
The furm of the expression, in referring to the rules of surveying, 
clearly indicates that they were made previous to his coming into 
office, and, unquestionably, has reference to the aforesaid regulations 
of O'Reilly, which he found in full force when he assumed the duties 
of first magistrate of the province. 
3. Certifying the consent of the adjoining owners, from the aUega-
tions of the certificate, of which he could have no personal knowledge, 
he approves of the operations. 
4. The granting words are not followed by any description of the 
premises. The grantor evidently referred to the general designation 
of the tract which preceded the granting clause, and relied upon the 
following limitation to qualify and render explicit the whole purpose 
of the grant. 
5. Then comes the limitation which defines and exemplifies the 
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meaning and effect of the whole instrument. "In order that, as hi~ 
own property, he may dispose ot enjoy the same conformably to the said 
operations.'' 
6. The grant refers to "the foregoing decree of my predecesso'r," un-
der whose administration the proceedings had been commenced an(l 
perfected to the completion of the survey and location ; and there is 
not a word in it affording the slightest pretense that Galvez intended 
to do any more than to confirm those proceedings, and give them force 
and effect according to the survey; and with that manifest intent he 
granted th.e lands, limiting the grant to the previous operations. 
But suppose it were otherwise, and the rights of these parties to the 
hack lands reposed entirely upon the general descriptive expressions to be 
found in the grant or order of survey and petition, then I think the grant, 
upon principle and authority, so far as it relates to these lands, would be 
void for uncertainty. It would be impossibl~ by any means which they 
afford, unaided by the survey and location, to identify the land, which 
the title papers purport to sever from the public domain. It is neces-
sary, in order to effect a severance, not only that the words should be 
sufficient to convey title, but in the absence of any positive location) 
that the description should be such that those claiming under the grant 
can identify the land. To meet the pressure of the case in this respect, 
the parties in interest expand their claim to the boundaries of the pro-
vince, giving up all the intermediate points of limitation. 
It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that the language even of 
the petition, when taken in its broadest sense, will bear an interpreta-
tion to sustain any such widely-extended limits. Like all other instru-
ments, whose meaning is obscure, it must be considered as a whole in 
order to ascertain the intention of the maker. It clearly was not the 
intention or expectation of Conway that its descriptive words should 
mark the limits of the grant; any such hypothesis is contradicted by 
the prayer of the petition, in which he asks that he may be put in pos-
session of the front and depth, "setting the boundaries." The descrip-
tion set out in the petition was only intended as a general designation 
of the place where the land was situate, which was to be surveyed, 
located, and bounded, under the regulations of law. The vague and 
indefinite description given was doubtless sufficient to enable the gov-
ernor to determine whether it was expedient to issue the order of sur-
vey. It was for that purpose alone that it became necessary to employ 
any descriptive words in the petition; and in some instances it will be 
found that no description was given. If the petition had prescribed 
the boundaries, then, in a practical point of view, the survey was un-
necessary; it became a mere form to meet the req niremen t of law. The 
order of survey, and the operations under it; completely negative any 
such assumption. The bound.aries even of the front concession were 
not known, and could not have been given till after the survey; and it 
was doubtless a leading object of the proceedings to ascertain and define 
the extent of the front. Moreover, there is no language in the peti-
tion, when considered in its proper connection, that will sustain the 
views of the claimants, or bear out the interpretation for which they 
contend. The words "all the depth which may be vacant" evidently 
refer back to the previous recitals. That these recitals fall far short of 
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the boundary claimed, is most manifest. There is not an expression 
in the paper, when read in its proper connection, that makes any con-
siderable approximation to such a theory. The petition represents that 
the front was destitute of fences, and it being cleared out upwards of 
a league in depth, and the cypress being at the distance of about a 
league and a half, the petitioner had no right to that growth. There 
is some want of clearness in regard to the nature of the right of which 
he was speaking; it is highly probable, however, that he referred to 
the permissive right, enjoyed by front proprietors, to take timber from 
the back lands for fences, and other needful purposes, on a plantation. 
This may be inferred from what follows, when he says he had "no 
right thereto, in consequence of your not having granted to him but 
the common depth of forty arpents, which is so short that he cannot 
reach the cypress trees.'' Omitting what is of no importance, then 
follow the wordH so much relied on to expand the grant to the full 
limits of the claim: "Therefore your petitioner prays you will grant 
him all the depth which may be vacant immediately after the said forty 
arpents." It seems to me, if we give the petition its utmost scope, it 
only asks for the vacant land to reach the cypress trees, leaving it to 
be inferred from the representation that the trees were about a league 
and a half distant from the front. It is difficult to appreciate the rea-
soning which seeks to expand this distance to nineteen miles on one of 
the lines, and to fourteen on the other. 
That the practice of cutting timber upon the back lands for the pur-
poses aforesaid was permitted by the Spanish authorities, is no longer 
a subject of dispute, though it has been substantially settled that it 
gave the parties no rights in the soil, which would seem to be self:. 
evident. Even if the representation in regard to the distance of the 
cypress trees from the front could be relied on, the reference to the~n is 
too vague and general to afford any safe criterion, upon which to rely 
in the decision of the main question involved in the case; and the posi-
tions assumed by the claimants, and the course of the argument on 
their part, seem to admit the correctness of the conclusion. rrhe cy-
press trees are not referred to in the petition as a boundary, nor are 
they relied on as such; and yet they are spoken of as standing in the 
rear of the vacant depth to which the descriptive recitals relate. The 
recital which represents that the front had been cleared out upwards of 
a league needs confirmation, and cannot well be reconciled with the 
operations in the :field, if it be admitted that the cypress constituted 
the principal growth, which does not appear to be denied. The sur-
veyor found it necessary to cut a road through the woods, in order to 
run the course one half that distance) rendering it apparent that the 
petition had been prepared without any precise knowledge of distances, 
or of the actual state of things on the land. No one probably would 
contend that the petition alone could furnish any satisfactory means 
by which to delineate any well-defined tract with legal certainty and 
precision; and yet, when the whole proceedings are carefully examined, 
it will be found that there is nothing in the title papers to sustain the views 
()f the claimants) except what appears in that memorial. There can 
be no doubt that Unzaga, in issuing the order to the surveyor, had 
reference to the recital of the petition, knowing, as undoubtedly he 
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did, that the public interest would be protected by the direction which 
he gave to set and mark the boundaries; and that the ultimate rights 
to be acquired by the petitioner would depend upon the approval of the 
survey, and the final decree or grant. 
The next step in the order of the proceedings was the survey and 
location, which are admitted to have terminated at forty-two arpents in 
the depth. The general phraseology in regard to the place where the 
snrvey had been made, was incorporated into the preamble of the final 
decree, as descriptive of the proceedings upon which it was based; but 
the force and effect of the decree, or grant, was carefully restricted to 
the operations of Andry in the field, as they appeared in his official 
certificate of survey. It is clear, therefore, not only that the parties 
themselves did not regard the descriptive words in the petition as pre-
scribing the boundaries of the grant, but it is equally so that the de-
scription itself is too vague and uncertain to afford the necessary means 
of fixing a definite and certain location upon the land, and furnishes 
no reason whatever to support the present views of the claimants. If 
we depart from the survey and location, there does not appear to be 
any solid legal ground upon which to stand. Shall we stop when one 
of the side lines reach an elder grant? Shall they be continued to the 
cypress trees; and if so, where is that point? Shall they be pro-
longed into that growth; and if so) how far? Shall we stop at the 
first, second, or third considerable water-course? or shall the tract em-
brace all the residue of the domains of the crown within the claimed 
lines? The counsel contend that there is no legal resting place, until 
we reach the Amite and the lake. They are understood to insist that 
all the intermediate suggestions, as to the depth of the legal title, be-
tween the front tract and the rear boundary of the claim, rest in extreme 
uncertainty; and in that I agree. And as for the boundary claimed, I 
find nothing to support it, either in the title papers, or in any reference 
which has been made to the laws, usages, and customs of the Spanish 
government. · 
Separate the grant from the survey and location upon which it is 
founded, and it is clear to my mind that it. would fall within the prin-
ciple laid down by the Supreme Court in the ca~e of the United States 
vs. King et. al., (3 How., 786.) In thatcase a certificate of survey was 
lJrocluced, but on the evidence reported to the court, it was decided to 
be antedated and fraudulent. After having disposed of that point: 
Chief Justice Taney, in speaking for the court, says: 
"Regarding the case in this point of view, the right of the defend-
ant in error must stand altogether upon the instrument executed in 
1795 and in 1797 by the Baron de Carondelet; and it has not the aiel 
of any authentic survey to ascertain and fix the limits of the land, 
and to determine its location. The instruments themselves contain no 
lines or boundaries whereby any definite and specific parcel of land 
was severed from the public domain; and it has been settled by re-
J>eated decisions in this court, and in cases, too, where the instrument 
contained clear words of grant, that if the description was vague and 
indefinite, as in the case before us, and there was no official survey to 
give it a certain location, it could create no right of private property 
in any particular parcel of land which could be maintained in a court 
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of justice. It was so hel<l in the cases reported in 15 Peters, 184, 215, 
275, 319; and in 16 Peters, 159, 160. After such repeated decisions 
upon the subject, all affirming the same doctrine, the question cannot 
be considered as an open one in this court. Putting aside, therefore, 
and rejecting the certificate of Trudeau, for the reasons before stated, 
the instruments in question, even if they could be construed as grants, 
conveyed no title to the Marquis de Maison Rouge for the land in ques-
tion, and, consequently, the defendants in error can derive none from 
him. The l~nd claimed was not severed from the public domain by 
the Spanish authorities, and set apart as private property, and, conse-
quently, it passed to the United States by the treaty which ceded to 
them all the public and unappropriated lands." 
It is not proposed to refer to other decisions, asserting the same 
principle, to sustain the authority of .this case, believing that it is suf-
ficient that the highest court in the United States has declared that 
the proposition is no longer open to dispute. If the principle of that 
decision be admitted, the conclusion is irresistible, that the parties, in 
order to sustain the legal title, must fall back upon the survey and 
location, or abandon the issue, unless their rights can be upheld to the 
full extent of the claim upon the descriptive words. That the descrip-
tive words, in the connection in which they stand, are not sufficiently 
comprehensive to effect that object, seems to be manifest; and if they 
were, that they are too vague and indefinite to afford any safe reliance 
I entertain no doubt, whether they be tested by the rules of the com-
mon law, or by any other rules which have been recognized and ap-
proved by the courts of the United States. These several premises 
bring me again to the question, can the survey and location, thus 
clearly ascertained and established, be expanded beyond its own limits, 
while it remains uncontradicted by a single fact or circumstance in the 
case? I think not. No case has been produced to sustain any" such 
principle, and I think none can be. 
There is nothing disclosed in the ancient conveyances calculated, in 
the least degree, to relieve these parties from the present position of 
the case. The one most relied on is that of the judicial sale, which, 
when traced to its final consummation, results in terms more vague 
and indefinite, if possible, than the original grant itself, when consid-
ered without the survey and location. The description of a tract of 
land, giving "the depth which could be found," is so manifestly void as 
not to deserve a moment's consideration. The argument, therefore, as 
to the recognition of the extent of the claim, rests for its foundation 
upon the declaration in the will of St. Maxent, and the proceedings 
on the ex parte petition of Marigny, and the newspaper advertisement. 
These, I think) are greatly overbalanced by the terms of the final act 
of sale, which is the legal test to apply to the proGeedings. 
Of all the conveyances laid before the commissioners, one only men-
tions the Amite as the rear boundary of the claim, and that was the 
deed of William Conway to Daniel Clarke, executed on the 11th June, 
. 1805, more than two years after the treaty of cession. The two con-
veyances of Maurice Conway, the original grantee, to Patrick Conway, 
in 1785, and to William Conway, in 1786, describe the depth "accord-
ing to the title," without furnishing any additional guide to measure 
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its extent. The other titles are equally indefinite and uncertain in the 
language employed in the description of the depth, giving it ''as the 
depth which can be found," or "as the depth according to the title," 
Even Marrener, who, according to the certificate of Lafon, surveyed a 
part of the land, and who acquired a portion of it a short time before 
the claim was presented to the board, under the deed of Maurice Con-
way to Patrick Conway, as appears by his conveyance to Daniel Clarke) 
in 1805, describes the tract conveyed, "with the depth according to the 
title of concession delivered by the late government to the late Maurice 
Conway." The other three title papers mentioned in the statement-
Maurice Conway to Oliver Pollock, and the mortgages by William 
Conway to Pollock and Joyce, were not produced before the commis-
sioners, and do not appear to have been relied on at that time to make 
out the title. These are the only conveyances in the case, that I have 
found, which contain the description, "with the depth as far as the 
lake." Taken as a whole, I must conclude that any presumption to 
be drawn fl'om this source is greatly against the views of the claimants. 
It is further contended that the claim was fully recognized by the 
act of Governor Claiborne, in issuing the order upon the petition of 
Donaldson and others, in pursuance of an authority conferred upon 
him, as it is alleged, under the second section of the aforesaid act of 
Congress, approved October 31, 1803, and that it was confirmed to its 
full extent by the board of commissioners who passed upon the evi-
dences of title under the act of 1805. 
The first proposition evidently fails upon the proofs exhibited, even 
if we admit the authority under which it is assumed that the proceed-
ings referred to were instituted and perfected. It has already ap-
peared in the statement of the case that no survey was actually made 
by Lafon in pursuance of that order, and it follows, as a necessary con-
sequence, that none could be certified to affect the public interest, or 
to enlarge the rights of the claimants. The petitioners do not ask, in 
their petition, for any expansion of the rights which they had previ-
ously acquired under the government of Spain; and by no just mode 
of reasoning can it be maintained that Governor Claiborne intended to 
assume jurisdiction over any such question. But, unfortunately for 
the argument, even if the proceedings had been such as is supposed, 
the authority upon which they repose cannot be sustained. Whatever 
authority Governor Claiborne possessed, by virtue of his commission, 
was derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States, to 
which alone we can look as the source to uphold his acts. Congress 
has the exclusive power, under the Constitution, to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and 
other property belonging to the United States. The act under which 
he was appointed vested no authority in him over the public domain 
acquired by the treaty of cession. He could neither make a grant, or 
define the limits of one previously made, or perform any act to confer 
any right to the soil, not already complete and vested. In a word, he 
possessed no power to dispose of any portion of the public lands thus 
acquired, or to make any rule or regulation respecting the same. The 
act of Congress under which he was appointed merely provides that 
"all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers 
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of the old government shall be vested in such person and persons, and 
shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States 
shall direct, for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisi-
ana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." 
These powers were temporary, and were to be exercised in such 
manner as the President should direct ; and the directions of Mr. J ef-
ferson are to be found in the commission which he issued to Mr. Clai-
borne on the same day the act was passed. He gave him all the 
powers and authority which had been exercised by the former govern-
ors and intendants, with the following proviso, which, it seems to me, 
presents a full answer to the :first proposition: Provided, That he 
should have no power or authority ''to grant or con :firm to any person 
or persons whatsoever any title or claims to land within the same." 
It is clear, therefore, that Governor Claiborne could do no act, or 
authorize any to be done, which can be regarded as a recognition of 
the claim by the United States, in regard to its validity or extent. It 
thus appears, not only that no power was conferred to recognize any 
such claims, but that the exercise of any such authority was expressly 
forbidden. Whatever was done to recognize 'the claim under Governor 
Claiborne is utterly void, and of no effect. It was due to the claim-
ants to answer the proposition as made; but, in so doing, it is by no 
means intended to admit that the acts of Governor Claiborne are ob-
noxious to the charge which the answer to the proposition may seem 
to imply. It does not appear, from the proofs, that he claimed the 
power or attempted its exercise. In the order issued by him, which 
constitutes the only act upon the subject that he performed, he merely 
says : ''The proprietors of land adjoining the tract within mentioned 
are req?tested to show their respective boundaries, and the command-
ant of the district, if necessary, will extend the surveyor his protec-
tion." He gave no directions in regard to the survey, nor did he 
approve the certificates or plats after they were made by Lafon. There 
is certainly no recognition of the claim in that order, nor anything in-
consistent with the power conferred to protect the inhabitants in the 
enjoyment of their property. Moreover, the wise policy adopted by 
Mr. Jefferson, in withholding all power from Governor Claiborne to 
grant lands or confirm titles, was subsequently approved and substan-
tially enacted by Congress in the act passed 26th March, 1804. It is 
entitled ''An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing 
for the temporary government thereof." (1 Land Laws, 112.) ~rhe 
act did not take effect till the first day of October, 1804, and by one 
of its provisions the act of 1803 was continued to that time. The plats 
and certificates of survey on the claim of Donaldson and Scott, and 
the claim of Clarke, were executed subsequent to the passage of that 
law. In those certificates Lafon alleges himself as acting under an 
authority derived from Governor Claiborne. Before the execution of 
those certificates all such interference with the public domain had 
been expressly interdicted by Congress, as appears by the fourth sec-
tion of the act of 1804, which provides ''that the governor and legis-
lative council shall have no power over the primary disposal of the 
soil, nor to tax the lands of the United States, nor to interfere with 
claims to lands within the said Territory." And the fourteenth section 
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imposed penalties on any citizen of the United States, or other person, 
who should survey, or attempt to survey, or to designate boundaries 
to any portion of those lands belonging to the United States. The 
certificates of Lafon are dated subsequent to the time when this law 
took fffect, and were clearly 1nade in violation of its provisions. 
The certificate of Lafon in the case of the Conway tract is equally 
discredited, and alike unauthorized and insufficient for the purpose 
for which it is introduced. In that case he describes himself as a 
deputy surveyor, under the surveyor general of the United States 
south of Tennessee. The powers vested by law in the surveyor gen-
eral south of Tennessee were extended over the public lands to which 
the Indian title had been, or should be, extinguished, within the Ter-
ritory of Orleans, by the act of 2d March, 1805, (1 Land Laws, 127,) 
as appears by its seventh section. This power, however, by express 
words, related to the public lands, and not to private surveys. 
The act authorizing private surveys to be made by the surveyor gen-
eral in such cases as the commissioners should think necessary, was 
not passed till the 28th February, 1806, eight days after the date of 
Lafon's certificate in that case. It is manifest that the doings of Lafon 
can derive no aid from that law, for the obvious reason that the cer-
tificate bears date prior to its passage. 
It becomes important to inquire whether, in any view of the case, 
these plats can be considered as constituting a compliance with the act 
of 1805. By the fourth section of that act, it is declared that any per-
son claiming lands nnder any legal French or Spanish grant might, 
and any person claiming under any incomplete title should, deliver a 
notice to the register of the land office, or recorder of land titles within 
whose district the land may be, stating the nature and extent of his 
claim, together with a plat of the tract or tracts claimed, and should 
also deliver every grant) order of survey, deed, conveyance, or other 
written evidence of his claim, for the purpose of having it recorded. 
"Provided, hotofver, that where lands are claimed by virtue of a com-
plete French or Spanish grant, it shall not be necessary for the claim-
ant to have any other evidence of his elaim recorded, except the 
original grant or patent, together with the warrant or order of sur-
vey, and the plat). but all the other conveyances or deeds shall be 
deposited with the register or recorder, to be by them laid before the 
commissioners when they shall take the claims in to consideration." 
The plats of the surveys, which by the act of 1805 were directed to 
be laid before the commissioners, were the original plats executed under 
the French or Spanish authorities, as is clear from the language of the 
act. But if there were any doubt on this point, it would be removed 
by a reference to the third section of the act of 1806, (1 Land Laws, 
132,) which repeals so much of the act of 1805 "as makes it the duty 
of every claimant to lands within the territory of Louisiana to deliver 
to the recorder of land titles a plat of the tract or tracts, * * so 
far as relates to claimants whose tracts bad not been surveyed by the 
proper officer under the Spanish government, prior to the 20th Decem-
ber, 1803." The language of the act, and the construction thus 
placed upon it by Congress, render it obvious to my mind, that the 
certificates and plats of Lafon do uot constitute a compliance with the 
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requirements of the act of 1805, even if they had been executed in 
pursuance of a lawful authority, and had been based upon actual ope-
rations in the field. The act of 1805 relates in express terms, certainly 
by necessary implication, to the French or Spanish surveys. These 
plats did not emanate from either of those sources, as is manifest from 
their dates; but were such as had been executed by Lafon, under the 
circumstances before named, after the United States had acquired juris-
diction over the territory, and therefore do not fall within the letter or 
the intent of that act. 
That this claim has not been recognized by the executive department 
since the period of which I have been speaking, till the patents were 
issued, is so apparent as to render co~ment, to enforce the conclusion, 
in a great degree, unnecessary. It had been steadily resisted by the 
General Land Office from the first moment when it was presented to 
Mr. Graham, in 1829, and never received the sanction of the head of 
that bureau. The opinion given in favor of the claim by one of the 
solicitors stands alone, and was never approved by the head of the 
department. Until the events had taken place which gave rise to this 
investigation, no Secretary of the Treasury had deemed it within the 
scope of his authority to confirm the claim, or to decide upon its limits. 
It had been twice referred to my predecessors, neither of whom found 
it necessary to give an official opinion upon the main questions in dis-
pute. They were evidently under advisement before Mr. Legare, and 
from the inquiries propounded by him to Mr. Blake, we learn what 
some of the points were which he had under consideration. 
In view of all the circumstances exhibited in the statement of the 
case on this point, prior to the issuing of the patents) I am of opinion 
that they furnish no ground whatever on which to declare or to pre-
sume a recognition of the claim by the United States. 
But had the commissioners authority, under the act of the 2d March, 
1805, to enlarge the rights of the parties acquired under the former 
government, or to recognize and confirm the grant to the extent 
claimed? I think not. The act under which these adjudications were 
made was entitled, "An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles 
and claims to lands within the territory of Orleans and the district of 
Lousiana." (1 Land Laws, 122.) The jh·st and second sections pro-
vide that the titles of parties in possession under any duly registered 
warrant or order of survey, or by permission of the proper Spanish 
officer, and in conformity with the laws, usages, and customs of the 
Spanish government, shall be confirmed. The third section creates 
two land districts in the territory of Orleans, and makes provision for 
the appointment of a register in each, and also for the appointment of 
a recorder of land titles in the district of Louisiana. The fourth sec-
tion is the one above cited, to which I again refer. It makes provision 
for two classes of claims : 
1. Grants and incomplete titles bearing date subsequent to the 1st 
day of October, 1800, and the claims provided for in first two sections. 
2. Complete grants, claimed by Yirtue of any legal French or Spanish 
grant, made and completed before the 1st October, 1800. 
It only becomes necessary to consider so much of the section as 
relates to the rights of those claiming under the second proposition. 
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If they saw fit to exercise the right, they were permitted, at any time 
before the 1st day of March, 1806, to deliver to the register or recorder 
of land titles within whose district the land may lie, a notice in wri-
ting, stating the nature and extent of their claims, together with a 
plat or plats of the lands claimed. If they decided to exercise the 
right, they were required, on or before the day on which they delivered 
the notice and plat, also to deliver to the said register or recorder all 
the written evidence of their claim, and it is directed that it "shall be 
recorded." The act, however, declares in the proviso, before noticed, 
that it shall not be necessary for claimants to complete French or 
Spanish grants to ha,·e any other evidence of such claims recorded, 
except the original grant or patent, together with the warrant or order 
of survey and the plat. All the other conveyances or deeds were 
required to be deposited with the register or recorder, to be laid before 
the commissioners, ''when they shall take the clai1n into considera-
tion.'' 
The fifth section provides for the appointment of two persons in each 
district who should, together with the n:~gister, "be commissioners for 
the purpose of ascertaining, within their respective districts, the rights 
of persons claiming under any French or Spanish grant as aforesaid, 
or under the two first sections of this act." It further enacts, that 
"each board, or a majority of each hoard, shall, in their respective 
(listricts, have power to hear and decide in a summary manner all mat-
ters respecting such claims, * * * and to decide in a summary 
way, according to justice and equity, on all claims filed with the regis-
ter or recorder, in conformity with the provisions of this act, and on 
all complete French or Spanish grants, the evidence of which, though 
not thus filed, may be found of record on the public records of such 
grants; which decisions shall be laid before Congress in the manner here-
inafter directed, and be subject to their determination thereon.'' The 
same section further directs that two transcripts shall be prepared of 
the decisions in favor of claimants, one to be transmitted to the Sur-
veyor General, and the other to the Secretary of the Treasury; and 
that a full report of the claims rejected should also be made to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, 'cwhich reports, together with the tran-
scripts of the decisions of the commissioners in favor of the claimants, 
shall be laid by the Secretary of the Treasury before Congress at their 
next ensuing meeting.'' 
No form of expression occurs to me, which, if adopted as a substitute, 
would add either strength or clearness to the language above cited 
from the fifth section of the act of 1805, by which Congress reserved to 
itself the ultimate power of deciding all matters respecting these claims, 
which had not been concluded by the treaty stipulation to respect pri-
vate property. The decisions of the commissioners were to be laid 
before Congress for their determination thereon. There is no propo-
sition clearer to my mind than the one which denies the authority of 
these commissioners under that law to decide this claim finally as 
against the United States. 
It may be said, however, that the language of the petition indicates 
that it was the intention of Conway, when he presented it to Unzaga, 
to obtain a double concession, and that these parties have an equitable 
• 
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claim upon Congress to the extent of eighty arpents in the depth, 
being thirty-eight more than are included in the perfect and complete 
grant. In certain views of the case there is some force in the sugges-
tion, while in others it would seem to be unfounded. The strength of 
the suggestion consists in regarding that part of the claim as brought 
within the policy of previous laws of Congress passed upon the same 
subject. It presents a question exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
Congress, and can have no influence in determining any of the ques-
tions submitted to me. There would seem to be no reason to doubt 
that double concessions were granted by the Spanish authorities in 
some instances to the front proprietors. The first provision in any 
law of Congress, recognizing any such equitable claim, is to be found 
in the fifth section of the act of the 21st April, 1806. (1 Land Laws, 
138.) It is entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'an act 
for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to lands within the 
'rerritory of Orleans, and the district of Louisiana.' '' That provision 
made it the duty of the commissioners "to inquire into the nature and 
extent of the claims which arise from a right, or supposed right, to a 
double or additional concession on the back of grants or concessions 
heretofore made, * * * and to make a special report thereon to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, which report shall be by him laid before 
Congress at their next ensuing session." 
That in the opinion of Congress, front proprietors might have 1ome 
kind of a claim to a back concession, independent of the legal forms of 
title, is further illustrated by the fifth section of the act of the 3d 
l\!farch, 1811, (1 Land Laws, 189,) securing to them certain preemp-
tion rights. It provided that every person who, by virtue of a French 
or Spanish grant, recognized by the laws of the United States, or under 
a claim confirmed by the commissioners, owned a tract of land border-
ing on a river) and not exceeding forty arpents in depth, should be 
entitled to a preference in becoming the purchaser of the land, adja-
cent to and back of his own tract, not exceeding forty arpents in depth, 
nor in quantity that which is contained in his own tract, and three 
years were allowed for the making of the purchase. 
The preemption right thus secured was continued two years longer 
by the act of the 11th May, 1820, (1 I.Jand Laws, 330,) and the provis-
ion was substantially reenacted by the act of the 15th June, 1832, 
entitled ''An ~ct to authorize the inhabitants of Louisiana to enter 
the back lands, " limiting the time to make the application to three 
years, (1 Land Laws, 499.) The time thus allowed was further extended 
by the act of 24th February, 1835, one year from the 15th June, 1835.-
(1 Land Laws, 536.) 
The first law above named instituted an examination in regard to 
the nature and extent of the claim, and directed the report of the com-
missioners to be laid before Congress, which probably led to the subse-
quent legislation giving the proprietors preemption rights. None of 
the legislation to which I have referred regarded these claims as legal 
rights in the soil which could be enforced in a judicial tribunal. It is 
very cloar that no such supposed right or claim can have any influence 
in the determination of the extent of the legal title. The commif'sion-
ers appoin ted under the act of 1811 gave their views in regard to double 
• 
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concessions in the case of Benjamin Babin, cited in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in Jourdon vs. Barret, (4 How., 181,) where they are 
stated as follows: 
"The claimant has no other foundation for his title to the second 
depth) than having occupied the front and first depth, and having 
occasionally supplied himself with timber from this second depth. 
According to the laws, customs, and usages of the Spanish government, 
no front proprietor, by any act of his own, could acquire a right to 
lands further back than the ordinary depth of forty arpen ts ; and although 
the Spanish government has invariably refused to grant the second 
depth to any other than the front proprietor, yet nothing short of a 
grant or warrant of survey from thea governor could .confer a title or 
right to the land; wherefore we reject the claim." The court con-
cludes by saying) ''we give this as an instance of many similar ones 
reported.'' 
These are some of the considerations that might be urged before 
Congress in favor of the equitable claim of these parties to the residue 
of a back concession. . 
In further discussing the point, the court say, in that case, that the 
side lines of back concessions, when granted by the former government, 
as a general rule, were not permitted to diverge, but proceeded in a 
direct course from the front, so as to secure equal justice to the front 
proprietors, to whom alone, it seems, these grants were made. 
On the contrary, it might be contended. that the great extension of 
the front, which was effected by the last survey or location, over the 
previous Indian title, evidently including a large tract which had not 
been cleared, and the grasping character of the course on the side lines, 
fully accomplished all the purposes of the petitioner set out in the 
petition; giving him more than a double concession on the river, and 
a sufficient quantity of the rear land beyond his previous grant, to 
meet more conveniently all the objects mentioned in that memorial. It 
is highly probable that it was these considerations that induced the 
surveyor to regard it as incumbent on him to terminate the operations 
in the field at the points so explicitly described in his return. Having 
made these suggestions, I leave them for the consideration of those 
who have jurisdiction of the question to which they relate. 
This brings me to the second inquiry directed by the joint resolution, 
which puts in issue the authority assumed by the President, in pur-
suance of the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the granting 
of the patents. Two patents were issued, one on the claim of Donald-
son and Scott, and the other on the claim of Clarke, and respectively 
bear date the 22d August, 1844. 
To uphold theauthoritythusassumed, it is contended, in substance, that 
the claim had been previously confirmed by a law of Congress to its 
full extent, and that the law confirming it required patents to issue in 
such cases, and that the patents, being signed by the President and 
recorder of land titles, were issued in conformity to law. These views 
are enforced by various considerations, in which it is insisted that the 
decision of the President thus carried into effect is final and conclusive 
in the premises, and that the patents issued in pursuance of that de-
termination are wholly removed from all impeachment. 
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The first three propositions depend entirely upon the fact whether 
the assumptions on which they repose can be sustained, and must be 
determined by the act of Congress to which they refer. 
The two last cannot be admitted, unless the acts of the President 
and of the officers issuing the patents were performed in pursuance of 
an authority conferred upon them by law. The President, no more 
than the courts of law, can determine any matter finally, unless the 
power to do so is derived under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. 
The power over the public lands is vested by the Constitution exclu-
sively in Congress, and the President has no authority over the sub-
ject, except what may be inferred from the general power to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed, unless it be conferred upon him by 
an act of Congress; nor can the power, when conferred, be exercised 
in any other form or in any other mode of proceeding than that which 
the law prescribes. 
This view is too firmly established by the Constitution, as a primary 
principle in the distribution of its powers, to need any confirmation; 
and the proposition is too palpable to require any illustration to en-
force it. Whether the claim had been confirmed by an act of Congress 
depends entirely upon the proper construction of the act of the 18th 
April, 1814} upon which the claimants rely on this point to establish 
their rights. (1 Land Laws, 247.) It is entitled nan act concerning 
certificates of confirmation of claims to lands in the State of Louis-
iana," and it is worthy of special remark, that there is not a word in 
the act which proposes to confirm any claim whatever. 
By the first section it is enacted, "that in all cases where certificates 
of confirmation to lands, lying in either of the land districts established 
by law in the State of Louisiana, have been issued agreeably with the 
provisions of the act, entitled, An act respecting claims to lands in 
the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana, passed the 3d March, 1807, 
and which were directed to be filed with the proper register of the land 
office within twelve months after date, and on claims which are in-
cluded in the transcript of decisions made in favor of claimants, and 
transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury} the said certificates shall, 
in every case where the lands have not been already surveyed accord-
ing to law, be, by the said registers, delivered to the principal deputy 
surveyor of the district, together with the proper descriptions of the 
tracts to be surveyed, wherein the quantity, locality, and connection, 
when practicable, with each other, shall be stated, at any time after 
the expiration of three months from the passage of this act, unless the 
claimant shall otherwise specially direct." It was also made the duty 
of the said deputy surveyor south of Tennessee, to survey the land 
accurately, according to the said certificates of confirmation and 
description, and make general and particular plats thereof, which he 
should return to the office of the register, together with the original 
certificates. 
This law, it appears to me, is clear and distinct, and is susceptible 
of but one interpretation, consistent with its language. It directs, in 
cases where certificates of confirmation have been issued agreeably 
with the provisions of the act of 1807, and on claims included in the 
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transcript of decisions in favor of claimants transmitted to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, that the register should deliver the same, with a 
proper description of the tract to be surveyed, to the surveyor, who 
should survey the tract according to the said certificate and descrip-
tion, and return plats, together with the original certificates, to the 
register. And by the second section it is provided, that the register 
should thereupon issue a patent certificate to the claimant, and 
transmit the same to the Commissioner of the General Land Office; 
and if it should appear to him that the certificates had been fairly ob-
tained, and that they corresponded with the transcript transmitted to 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the plats returned by the surveyor, 
patents were to be granted. The very first requisite to obtain a patent 
was, that the certificate of confirmation should have been issued agree-
ably to the act of 1807, and be in the transcript of favorable decisions 
previously transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. It is by virtue 
of this provision that it is contended that this claim has been confirmed 
to its full extent. The construction cannot be sustained. No part of 
the act proposes to confirm any claim, but merely authorizes, under 
certain prescribed rules, the issuing of patents in a class of cases spe-
cially designated, and for lands which had been previously confirmed 
under the law of 1807. 
This is determined by the w9rds of the act upon which these parties 
rely, as well as those standing in the same connection, and is rendered 
still more apparent by that part of the second section which authorized 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office to determine whether the 
certificate required from the register, when produced, had been fairly 
obtained, and whether it corresponded with the transcript transmitted 
to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The benefits of the act were extended to all cases where certificates 
of confirmation to land had been issued agreeably to the provisions of 
the law of 1807. These are the only words of any importance by 
which to ascertain the first requisite) descriptive of the class of claims 
previously confirmed, to which the act applied. Let us now transpose 
the sentence, with a view to collect its meaning, and ascertain the 
second requisite prescribed by the act when thus transposed. It would 
read, "in all cases where certificates of confirmation to land have been 
issued agreeably to the law of 1807, and on claims included in the 
transcript of decisions made in favor of claimants." This mode of 
reading the sentence is perfectly consistent with its grammatical con-
struction, and presents the proper connection of the principal words 
more distinctly to the mind. 
It thus appears that the second requisite was, that the claims on 
which the certificates had issued, should appear in the transcript of 
favorable decisions which had been transmitted to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Then follows the third requisite, which was, that the cer-
tificates should be such as the previous law had directed to be filed 
with the proper register of the land office within the time specified. 
The sentence, as transposed, leaving out the words of no importance, 
and supplying the ellipsis, would read as follows: "In all cases where 
certificates of confirmation have been issued agreeably with the provis-
ions of the act of 1807, and have been issued on claims which are in-
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eluded in the transcript of decisions in favor of the claimants tnmsmit-
ted to the Secretary of the Treasury, and which certificates were directed 
to be filed with the proper. register of the land office within twelve 
months after date." 
The act was carefully limited to the certificates which had regularly 
issued agreeably to the law of 1807, and prescribed two important tests 
by which that fact should be ascertained. It WttS those certificates only 
which had been issued on claims included in the transcript of decisions 
made in favor of claimants, and which the law under whose provisions 
they had been issued by the commissioners directed to be filed with the 
proper register of the land office within twelve 1nonths after date. If 
the certific~te produced was regularly issued, and was one which the 
previous law directed to be thus filed, and the claim on which it had 
been issued was embraced in the transcript of favorable decisions, then 
the law provides that the certificate shall entitle the party to the ben-
efits of the act. The reference to the claim on which it had been issued, 
and to the direction of the previous law in regard to filing, are descrip-
tive of the certificate mentioned in the preceding part of the sentence, 
and were evidently introduced as a limitation upon the powers of the 
officers on whom the execution of the act was devolved. They were 
intended to guard the public interest against the receipt of certificates 
not genuine, or irregularly issued without authority of law, and to 
confine the operation of the act to those which had been regularly 
issued under the law of 1807; ·and as the best mode of ascertaining 
whether they had been so issued, and of guarding against mistake or 
fraud in regard to the paper produced, it was directed that the claim 
upon which it was founded should also appear in the transcript of 
favorable decisions. Congress, in so doing, not only prescribed what 
should be regarded as a certificate of confirmation regularly issued by 
the commissioners, but also prescribed the rules by which the paper, 
when produced as such, should be tested. It must have been in con-
formity with the act of 1807, and the claim on which it purported to 
be founded n'lust appear in the transcript of favorable decisions. These 
directions of law not only constituted a limitation upon the power of 
the officers charged with the execution of the act, but they became their 
guide in the performance of the duties assigned to them by its provis-
ions. Whenever any such certificate was presented, and the party 
holding it demanded the benefits of the act, three questions were first 
to be settled : 
1. Had the certificate been issued agreeably to the law of 1807? 
2. vVas the claim on which it was based included in said transcript? 
3. Was the certificate one which the previous law directed to be filed 
as aforesaid ? 
Until these several points were settled in favor of the certificate, no 
proceedings could legally follow; and if either of them were settled 
adversely, the party would take nothing by his application. Suppose, 
for example, that the certificate produced had been regularly issued 
under the law of 1807, but the claim had been omitted in the trans-
cript of favorable decisions, it is clear that there could have been no 
authority to grant a patent. On the other hand, suppose the claim to 
have appeared in the transcript, but no certificate had ever issued; the 
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same conclusion follows with absolute certainty. It was only where 
all the conditions were fulfilled that the authority to issue the patents 
could be exercised. These views will be confirmed by again referring 
to the second section of the act under consideration. It provides that 
the surveys, as soon as made, shall be returned to the office of the 
proper register) together with the original certificates of the commission-
ers. These certificates were such as had been issued by said commis-
sioners under the sixth section of the act of 3d March, 1807, entitled 
"An act respecting claims to land in the Territories of Orleans and 
Louisiana," (1 Land Laws, 153,) by which they were directed to tnms-
mit to the Secretary of the Treasury and Surveyor General '' tran-
scripts of the final decision made in favor of the claimants" by virtue of 
that act. And they were also required to ''deliver to the party a cer-
tificate, stating the circumstances of the case, and that he is entitled to 
a patent for the tract of land therein designated, which certificate shall 
be :filed with the proper register, or recorder, within twelve months 
after date.'' The power to issue certificates of confirmation, conferred 
bythat provision, was vested in the commissioners alone) and is expressly 
limited to claims included in the '' transcripts of final decisions made in 
favor of claimants'' by virtue of that act, employing the identical words 
subsequently incorporated into the act of 1814, and constituting the 
phrase in the last-named act upon which the claimants rely. The 
previous words of the sixth section of the act of 1807, in regard to the 
filing of the certificates, are also incorporated into the act of 1814, 
showing conclusively that the certificates of confirmation therein men-
tioned were the certificates which the commissioners had issued under 
the sixth section of the act of 1807, and that they were issued on the 
claims which the commissioners were directed to include in the trans-
cripts of favorable decisions. 
It only remains to ascertain what were the claims thus finally deci-
ded, which the commissioners by that provision were directed to include 
in the transcript of favorable decisions, and upon which they were 
authorized to issue the certificates of confirmation, to demonstrate the 
true meaning of the act of the 18th April, 1814. 
This question is answered by the fourth section of the act of 1807, 
which gave the commissioners full powers to decide upon all claims to 
lands within their respective districts, where the claim was made by a 
person who was an inhabitant of Louisiana on the 20th December, 1803, 
"and for a tract not exceeding the quantity of acres contained in a league 
square, and which does not include either a lead mine or salt spring; 
which decision ofthecommisRioners, when in favor of the claimants, shall 
befinal against the United States) any act of Congress to the contrary 
notwithstanding.'' 'J.lhe final jurisdiction of the commissioners is thus 
carefully limited to a tract of land not exceeding a league square. Their 
decisions on such claims, and such only, were final as against the 
United States. It was their decisions on such claims which, by the 
sixth section, they were required to include in the transcript, and 
transmit to the Secretary of the Treasury and surveyor general; and 
it was only upon these decisions made in favor of claimants that they 
were authorized to issue, or ever did issue, certificates of confirmation. 
And, by the eighth section of the same act, it is enacted that the com-
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n1issioners should "report to the Secretary of the Treasury their opinions 
on all the claims to land within their respective districts, which they shall 
not have finally confirmed by the fourth section of this act. The claims 
shall, in. the said report or reports, be arranged into three · general 
classes, that is to say: First. Claims which, in the opinion of the com-
missioners, ought to be confirmed in · conformity with the provisions 
of the several acts of Congress for ascertaining and adjusting the titles 
and claims to land within the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana. 
Secondly. Claims which, though not embraced by the provisions of the 
said acts, ought, nevertheless, in the opinion of the commissioners, to be 
confirmed in conformity with the laws, usages, and customs of the 
Spanish government. Thirdly. Claims which neither are embraced 
by the provisions of the said act, nor ought, in the opinion of the com-
missioners,' to be confirmed in conformity with the laws, usages, and 
customs of the Spanish government. And the said report and reports} 
being in other respects made in conformity with the forms prescribed 
according to law by the Secretary of the Treasury, shall by him be 
laid before Congress, for their final deterrnination thereon, in the man-
ner and at the time heretofore prescribed by law for that purpose." 
In the last mentioned act we have so clear and distinct an exposition 
of the class of cases on which the act of the 18th April, 1814, .was in-
tended to operate, that it is difficult to perceive how any doubt can 
arise upon the subject. The commissioners were directed to issue cer-
tificates of confirmation to claimants, and to transmit transcripts of 
their decisions to the Secretary of the Treasury in cases of claims for 
tracts not exceeding the quantity of acres in a league square, and such 
decisions, when in favor of the claimants, .were final. Nothing can be 
plainer or more certain than that the act of the 18th April, 1814, was 
applicable exclusively and solely to the cases in which the commis-
sioners were authorized finally to decide in favor of claimants. The 
claim of these parties was not within this class ; and they, or any of 
those under whom they claim, never received from the commissioners 
any certificate of confirmation, for the obvious reason that the com-
missioners had no power or authority to do or perform any such act in 
this or any similar case. The class of claims in which that of the 
claimants was embraced was to be reported to Congress for their final 
determination, in pursuance of the eighth section of the act of 1807. 
Congress accordingly did act on these claims, as appears by the act of 
the 14th April, 1814, and confirmed those founded on incornplete titles 
to the extent of a league square. The claims that had been brought 
before the board on complete and perfect titles were not confirmed, for 
the reason, unquestionably, that they required no confirmation from 
the government of the United States. Such lands had been severed 
from the domain of the crown of Spain before the treaty of cession, and 
had become private property, and were alike protected by the law of 
nations and by the terms of the treaty. These titles, therefore, must 
stand or fall upon their own merits . . 
The great error, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, of 
the 12th August, 1844, consists in supposing that while the act of 
the 14th April, 1814, confirmed incomplete titles, that the act of the 
18th April, 1814, confirmed those which were perfect and complete. 
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It has already appeared that the latter act had reference to another 
and altogether distinct class of claims, and only directed patents to 
issue where the decision of the commissioners was made final ·by the 
act of 1807, and when they had issued certificates of confirmation under 
its sixth section. Another manifest error in the opinion consists in 
regarding the certified copies of the proceedings of the board) pro-
cured in 1841, as certificates of confirmation issued by the commis-
sioners under the act of 1807. That these copies were so regarded is 
strongly corroborated by certain memoranda appearing on the outside 
of the copies, which are as follows: On the copy relating to the Don~ 
aldson and Scott claim is written, "certificate of commissioners, of 
confirmation, No. 133 ;" and on the other, relating to the Clarke claim, 
"confirmation to Daniel Clarke, No. 127." The other principal error 
consists in separating the two requisites as to the certificates of con-
firmation, that they should have been issued agreeably to the act of 
1807, and be on claim$ in the transcript of favorable decisions, and in 
regarding them as applicable to distinct and different classes. The 
language of the act cannot be made to sustain such a construction, and 
its true meaning is demonstrated, as it seems to me, by reference to 
the act under which the certificates were directed to be issued and the 
transcripts made. 
In conclusion, I am of opinion: 
1. That the grant to Maurice Conway is a complete and perfect 
Spanish grant to the extent of forty-two arpents from the river, and no 
more. That the said grant does not convey any lands beyond that 
extent, but that the title to the same is vested in the United States. 
2. That the patents which have been issued in the case of the Don-
aldson and Scott claim, and the Clark claim, were so issued . without 
authority of law, and are therefore void and of no effect. . 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, 
NATHAN CLIFFORD. 
The PRESIDENT oF THE UNITED STATES. 
STATEMENT OF LOUIS JANNIN. 
I. Has Congress the constitut-ional power to repeal an act confirming a 
Spanish grant ? 
II. If Congress had that power, and thought proper to exercise it in the • 
case of the Hmtmas claim, that claim should be immediately recon-
firmed) as it is good and valid to the full extent of the law claimed, 
and Congress is by law the only competent tribunal. 
These questions arise upon the petition of certain settlers on the 
Houmas grant in Louisiana, and upon an adYerse protest and petition 
of the owners of the grant. 
The second is narrowed down by the uniform action of the govern-
ment officials to the construction of a few words in the grant, describ-
ing its extent. 
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If the first question is decided in the negative, the decision of the 
second question becomes unnecessary. The first is probably the only 
real question in the case, and it will therefore be examined at length. 
It is neither intended nor necessary to submit an original disquisi-
tion on this question. The attributes and limits of the constitutional 
powers of the general and State governments have been thoroughly 
investigated by the greatest judicial minds in the country. We simply 
propose to submit copious extracts from their decisions, classed under 
appropriate heads. But it is, in the first place, necessary to explain 
how these questions arise. 
Statement of the casrj. 
Soon after .the purchase of Louisiana, Congress passed an act "for 
ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land within the 
Territory of Orleans and district of Louisiana," which was approved 
on the 2d of March, 1805.-(1 Land Laws, 122.) 
This act required the claimants to submit the evidence of their 
titles to a board of commissioners, appointed under the act. The 
commissioners were directed ''to decide, in a summary way, according 
to Justice and equity, on all claims filed, and their decisions were to be 
laid before Congress, and to be subJect to their determination thereon.'' 
The land claim in Louisiana known by the name of the '' Houmas'' 
claim, from an Indian tribe which had originally owned and sold it, 
was then owned in three divided portions, by William Conway, Daniel 
Clarke, and Donaldson and Scott. All three filed their claims with the 
board of commissioners, which, on the 3d and lOth of March) 1806, 
confirmed them unanimously. These claims are designated by num-
bers 125, 127, and 133, in the report of the commissioners, which was 
submitted to Congress on the 9th of January, 1812, by the Secretary 
of the Treasury.-(State Papers, Pub. Lands, by D. Green, vol. 2, 
p. 287.) 
The final determination of Congress remained suspended until the 
passage of the act of June 2, 1858, (11 Stat. at Large, 294,) by the 
second section of which all claims favorably reported on in the above-
mentioned report were confirmed, "saving and reserving, however, 
to all adverse claimants the right to assert the validity of. their claims 
in a court or courts of justice.'' 
The most valuable part of the Houmas claim fronts on the Mississippi 
river, and has been since 177 4, and now is, in the actual possession of 
the owners of the claim, and cultivated by them exclusively. But the 
claim, as confirmed, extends in the rear to the Amite river and Lake 
Maurepas; and though the claimants always had the legal possession 
of it, and paid taxes on it, a number of persons have settled on the 
back land. At one time entries were permitted to be made on that 
part of the claim, in violation of the act of March 3, 1811, section 6, 
which reserves from sale all lands to which a claim had been regularly 
filed. But in 1844 they were all set aside on account of their inter-
ference with the Houmas claim, the purchase-money was ordered to be 
refunded, and in 121 cases it was actually refunded. 
These settlers, not content with the provision in the confirmatory 
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act, which saves the rights of adverse claimants, now petition Con-
gress either to reject the Houmas claim in toto, or to repeal the confirm-
atory act, and to leave the parties where they were before the passage 
of that act. It has also been suggested that Congress might pass a 
bill authorizing the Houmas claimants to sue the United States for the 
confirmation of their claim. But that also presupposes that the con-
firmatory act was first repealed. 
The owners of the Houmas claim protest against the adoption of 
any of these propositions) and, indeed, against any action of Con-
gress which can in the least affect that claim. That claim is now 
confirmed; that confirmation is a vested right, and beyond the 
reach of Congress. For this reason, they submit that the joint res-
olution of March 3, 1859, which suspends the action of the Ex-
ecutive upon their claim, should be repealed . . It is a cloud upon their 
title, may mislead others, and seems to keep in suspense what has been 
finally settled, and cannot be unsettled by Congress. 
Thus, we are brought to the consideration of the question, whether 
Congress has the constitutional power to repeal the act by which our 
claim was confirmed? 
Under this head we shall show that-
1. A .confirmation of a Spanish grant by act of Congress is equiva-
lent to a legislative grant. It is a complete title, a legal title, and a 
vested right, with or without a patent. 
2. As soon as the Houmas claim was confirmed, all power of the 
general government over it as property ceased, and vested in the State. 
Any interference of Congress thereafter would be an unconstitutional 
infringement of the rights of the State of Louisiana. 
3. rrhe government of the United States being one of limited powers, 
the right now claimed for Congress to repeal the confirmatory act does 
not exist, unless it is expressly warranted by the Constitution. 
4. Any measure impairing a preexisting right of property is a 
judicial and not a legislative act, and when it destroys vested rights, 
is contrary to the fundamental principles of government. 
5. The power claimed for Congress is unconstitutional, because it 
would take our property "without due process of law." 
6. And because it would be taking private property for public use, 
without Just compensation. 
7. Application of these principles to the case of the confirmation of 
the Houmas claim, and equities of the case. 
I. A confirmation of a Spanish grant by act of Congress is equiva-
lent to a legislative grant. It is a complete title, a legal title, and a 
vested right, with or without a patent. · To persons familiar with the 
adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States on Spanish 
land titles, this is a self-evident proposition. To others it will be made 
clear by the following authorities: 
In the case of Grignon's Lessee vs. Astor, 2 How., 319. Pierre 
Grignon had a land claim in Michigan confirme<l by an act of February 
21, 1823, (3 Stat. at Large, 724,) which provided that on all the claims 
confirmed by the act patents should issue. Pierre Grignon died in 
March, 1823. The land was sold on the petition of the administrator 
of the estate, under an order of court of 1826. The patent was issued 
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in 1829 to Pierre Grignon's heirs. The plaintiffs claimed the property 
under the heirs-at-law: the defendants under the administrator's sale. 
Upon this state of fact~, the court say, (2 How., 344 :) "It has been 
contended by the plaintiff' s counsel that the sale in the present case is 
not valid, because Peter Grignon had not such an estate in the premises 
as could be sold under the order of the county court, it being only an 
equitable one before the patent issued in 1829; but the title became a 
legal one by its confirmation by the act of Congress of February, 1823, 
which was equivalent to a patent. It was higher evidence of title, as 
it was the grant of the fee which had been in the United States by the 
government itself, whereas the patent was only the act of its ministerial 
officers." 
Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Pet., 454. "That a grant may be made by 
law as well as a patent pursuant to a law, is undoubted, (6 Cr., 128,) 
and a confirmation by a law is as fully, to all intents and purposes, a 
grant, as if it contained in terms a grant de novo." 
Patton's Lessee vs. Easton, 1 Wheat.) 487. "The act of assembly 
vesting lands in the trustees of the town of Nashville is a grant of 
those lands.'' 
In Sims vs. Irvine, 3 Dallas, 456, Chief Justice Ellsworth said: nBy 
these means Sims acquired to the said island a complete, eq~titable title, 
and one which needed a patent of confirmation to render it a complete 
legal title. A confirmation of this equitable title, as effectual as that 
of any patent could have been, was afterwards comprised in the compact 
between Virginia and Pennsylvania, and in the ratification of the same 
by the legislative act of the latter." 
In Chouteau vs. Eckhard, 2 How., 374, the Supreme Court, speaking 
of the reports of commissioners, says: "On these reports coming before 
Congress, it acted directly by statute on such titles as were by the 
legislature considered well-founded and just claims." 
Les Bois and Bramell, 4 How., 463. 'c A confirmation of a French 
or Spanish claim, either by a board of commissioners under the act of 
1807 ~ or by Congress directly, · or by the district court, by force of the 
act of 1824, is a location of land by a law of the United States." 
Enfield vs. Permint, 8 New Ramp., 515. "A grant oflandJ by an 
act of the legislature, vests an actual seizin in the grantee." 
"The grant in such a case is a public act, much better calculated to 
give notoriety to the conveyance than an actual entry upon the land 
by an agent of the State, or by the grantee. And this ·notoriety of the 
grant is, in contemplation· of law, equivalent to an actual entry by the 
grantee." -(8 Cranch, 246, 248; 5 Coke, 94; 3 Green, 441. Hill vs. 
Dyer.) 
Enfield vs. Day, 11, New Hamp., 528. "A mere grant of land 
by the government is ordinarily evidence of an actual seizin at the time 
of the government, and vests such seizin in the grantee.'' 
Bissell vs. Penrose: 8 How., 331. ''By the confirmation the title 
became complete.'' 
To the same effect as the above is the case of Doe vs. Eslava, (9 How., 
447 ,) in which they are all reviewed. 
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II. As soon as this grant was confirmed, all power of the general 
government over it as property ceased, and vested exclusively in the 
State. Any interference of Congress thereafter would be an unconsti-
tutional infringement of the rights of the State of Louisiana. This is 
the doctrine of the leading case of Pollard's lessee vs. Hagan et al., 3 
How., 221. "The United States never held any municipal sovereignty, 
jurisdiction of right of soil in and to the territory of which Alabama or 
any of the new States were formed, except for temporary purposes, and 
to execute the trusts created by the acts of the Virginia and Georgia 
legislatures, and the deeds of cession executed by them to the United 
States, and the trust created by the treaty with the French republic 
of the 30th of April, 1803, ceding Louisiana." Ibid., p. 222 : "The 
manner in which the new States were to be admitted into the Union, 
according to the ordinance of 1787, as expressed therein, is as follows: 
'And whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free 
inhabitants therein, such States shall be admitted by its delegates into 
the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original 
States in every respect whatever.'" 
lb., p. 224: · "The object of all the parties to this contract of cession 
was to convert the land into money for the payment of the debt, and 
to erect new States over the territory thus ceded; and as soon as these 
purposes could be accomplished, the power of the United States over 
these lands as property was to cease.'' 
"Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, 
the municipal sovereignty of the new States will be complete, and they 
and the original States will be upon an equal footing in all respects 
whatever.'' 
Thus in Louisiana the United States held and still hold the public 
lands in temporary trust for the State. In practice, all lands in Louis-
iana were at first considered as public lands, until they were shown to 
be private property under the acts passed for the adjudication of land 
claims. As soon as any of these claims were confirmed, and thereby 
declared to be private, and not public property, they fell exclusively 
under the municipal government of the State. The protection of the 
property of the inhabitants of Louisiana, stipulated for in the treaty of 
cession, terminated with the admission of Louisiana as a State of the 
Union, because then these inhabitants were upon an equal footing with 
their brethren in the other States, and enjoyed the protection of, and 
were amenable to. the State authorities alone. This is the evident in-
ference to be dra~n from the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the 
case of the city of New Orleans vs. de Armas, 9 Pet., 234: ''The third 
article (of the treaty of cession of April 30, 1803) is expressed in these 
words: 'The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated 
in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, 
according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoy-
ment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the 
United States, and in the meantime they sha.Il be maintained and pro-
tected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion 
which they profess.' No other article of the treaty is supposed to con-
tain any stipulation for the rights of individuals. The article obvi-
ously contemplates two objects-one that Louisiana shall be admitted 
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into the Union as soon as possible upon an equal footing with the other 
States, and the other, that till such admission, the inhabitants of the 
ceded territory shall be protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, 
property, and religion. Had any of these rights been violated while 
this stipulation continued in force, the individual supposing himself 
to be injured, might have brought his case into this court, under the 
twenty-fifth section of the judicial act. But this stipulation ceased to 
operate when Louisiana became a member of the Union, and its in-
habitants were 'admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advanta-
ges, and immunities of citizens of ~he United States.' * * * 
The inhabitants of Louisiana enjoy all the advantges of American citi-
zens, in common with their brethren in their sister States, when their 
titles are decided by the tribunals of the State." 
III. The government of the United States is a government of 
powers, limited by the Constitution of the United States, and all the 
rights and powers not expressly delegated to it ·are reserved by the 
States. This is a proposition which requires no proof; and hence the 
question arises whether the power to repeal an act of confirmation-or, 
in other words, the power to divest private property-has been dele-
gated to Congress? It would be a vain undertaking to look into the 
Constitution of the United States for the justification of the exercise of 
such an authority, which is, besides, contrary to the law of nations, 
and to that feeling of right and wrong which is the basis of all legis-
lation. In other countries it might be necessary to inquire whether 
the measure contemplated was right or wrong, in an abstract sense. 
In the United States it is sufficient to ask whether it was expressly 
authorized by the Constitution? If not justified by the very terms of 
the Constitution, that power does not exist. 
Here, indeed, we might rest the case. But as there exist other con-
clusive reasons why the course suggested to Congress should not be 
followed, and as our avowed object is to make it perfectly clear that no 
argument whatever can be adduced in support of the power claimed 
for Congress, we shall show that the Constitution of the United States 
expressly prohibits it. The prohibitions applicable to this case are 
threefold, namely: 1st. The repeal of a grant is a judicial and not a 
legislative act, and therefore not within the competency of Congress; 
2d. It would be the taking away of our property ''without due process 
of law;" and 3d. It would be taking private property for public use 
without compensation. · 
IV. Any measure reative to a preexisting right of property, whether 
limiting or defeating it, is a judicial act, and therefore not within the 
authority of the legislative branch of the government, and when its 
object is to destroy vested rights, is contrary to the fundamental prin-
ciples of government. Congress had indeed, in one instance, the power 
of acting upon our claim, but that was authorized by the treaty of ces-
sion, a "supreme law of the l.and." Congress was bound to ascertain 
what lands in Louisiana were private property. That once done in 
regard to a particular claim, Congress could no longer affect it in any 
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manner whatever. Whatever could thereafter by possibility be done, 
in regard to such a claim, must necessarily be of a judicial nature. 
However difficult it may be to establish with precision the line of 
division between legislative and judicial powers, it has uniformly been 
held that any act influencing private controversies, dispensing with a 
general law to favor a party, or affecting vested rights, in substance, 
&c., is not the legitimate exercise of legislative authority, and therefore 
void. 
In Parmele vs. Thompson, 7 Hill, 77, the supreme court of New 
York pointedly said: ''The legislature has no right to determine facts 
touching the rights of individuals.'' 
In Vermont, an act granting an appeal beyond the time allowed by 
law, was held to be a decree rather than a law, and therefore void.-
(Bates vs. ·Kimball, 2 Chip., 77.) 
In Maine, it has been decided that the granting by the legislature of 
a new trial, after the time for appeal was elapsed, is a judicial act, and 
void.-(Lewis vs. Webb, 3 Greenleaf, 326.) 
t'The right (that is, apatentupona NewMadridlocation)thusmade 
complete, could not have been affected by any subsequent act of Con-
gress."-(Mills vs. Stoddard, 8 How., 365.) 
In Duncan vs. Bean, 2 Nott and McCord, 405, the court says: 
"It is certain that where a grant has once passed the great seal, it 
cannot be revoked, except by some legal proceeding, and this for the 
most obvious reason. The party may have i~ in his power to show a com-
pliance with the condition or a release from the performance of it. (6 
Comyn's Digest, 63; letter D, 70; 5 Com., 274, title Patent.) Despotic 
indeed would be the government which should exercise the power of 
revoking at will all grants of land which it may have made to individ-
uals, or of determining, without the intervention of a judicial tribunal, 
where there was ground for a revocation. The usual mode in England 
is by scire facias in equity, or by process on the law side of the exche-
quer court. But if it were consistent with the principles· of justice, that 
the sovereign power should of itself determine when a grant should be 
revoked, a second grant of land in this State should not be evidence of 
such revocation," &c. 
Vanhorn vs. Dorrance, 2 Dallas, 310: "l\1cn have a sense of property. 
Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their 
natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects that in-
duced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a 
community in which he could not enjoy the honest fruits of his labor and 
industry. * * * * The English history does not furnish an 
instance of this kind. The Parliament, with all their boasted omnip-
otence, never committed such an outrage on private property; and if 
they had, it would have served only to display the dangerous nature of 
unlimited authority; it would have been an exercise of power, and not 
of right. Such an act would be a monster in legislation, and shock all 
mankind.'' 
Ibid., page 311 : "It is immaterial to the State in which of its citizens 
the land is vested; but it is of primary importance that, when vested, 
it should be secured, and the proprietor protected in the enjoyment 
of it." 
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Sharswood's note to Blackstone, vol. 2, page 346: 
"In the United States, the bills of rights contained in the various 
State constitutions impose real and effective limitations upon legisla-
tures, and an act may be declared void, not because it is against reason, 
but because it is in violation of the constitution. In most, if not all, 
these bills of rights, is contained the provision that no man can be de-
prived of his property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law 
of the land; and by 'law of the land' is meant some general law estab-
lishing a rule for the community at large. Property can only be taken 
for a public use, and that upon compensation made. It is not com-
petent to the legislature to take the property of A and give it to B. 
(Hoke vs.Henderson,4 Devereux,N. C. Rep., 1; Jones's Heirs vs. 
Perry and fl,l., 16 Fayer, 59; in the matter of John and Cherry streets, 
19 Wend., 659; Wilkinson vs. Leland and al., 2 Pet., 627; Norman 
vs. Heist, 5 W. & S., 171.) Private acts of the legislature are, how-
ever, frequently obtained to enable trustees to convert real into personal 
property, or in general, to change investments; and such acts have 
been held constitutional and valid. (Norris vs. Clymer, 2 Ban., 277.) 
In these cases a change of the subject-matter, for the benefit of all inter-
ested, is effected, but no change in the right or title of any of the 
parties. Whenever such a change has been attempted, the act has 
been declared unconstitutional and void."-(Norman vs. Heist, 5 W. 
& S., 171; Bumberger vs. Clippinger, 5 W. & S., 311; Rogers vs. 
Smith, 4 Barr., 93; Brown vs. Hummel, 6 Barr., 86.) 
United States vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 738: "If land is granted by a 
State, its legislative power is incompetent to annul the grant, and 
grant the land to another. Such law is void. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 
Cr., 87." i 
But the case which probably exhibits in the most distinct manner 
the nature and limits of the legislative power, is the case of Taylor vs. 
Porter, 4 Hill, 140, decided by Judge Bronson. This case involved 
the validity of the statutory provision of New York, authorizing a 
private road to be laid out over the lands of a person without his con-
sent. 
The constitution of New York, which was in force when this contro-
versy arose, unlike the present constitution of that State, the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and the constitutions of nearly all the States, 
did not contain the provision that private property should not be taken 
for public use without compensation. The court admitted the right to 
take private property for public use, making just compensation there-
for, and then said: 
"There is no provision in the constitution that just compensation 
shall be made to the owner when his property is taken for private pur-
poses; and if the power exists to take the property of one man and 
transfer it to another, it may be exercised without any reference to 
.compensation. The power of making bargains for individuals has not 
been delegated to any branch of the government; and if the title of A 
·Can be, without his fault, transferred to B, it may as well be done 
without as with a consideration. This view of the question is sufficient 
to put us upon the inquiry, where can the power be found to pass such 
a law as that here under consideration? It -is not to be presumed that 
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such a power exists, and those who set it up should tell us where it 
may be found. Under our form of government, the legislature is not 
supreme; it is only one of the organs of that absolute sovereignty 
which resides in the whole body of the people. Like other departments 
of government, it can only exercise such powers as have been dele-
gated to it, and when it__;steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those 
of the most humble magistrate in the State who transcends his juris-
diction, are utterly void. Where, then, shall we find a delegation of 
power to take the property of A and give it to B, either with or with-
out compensation? Only one clause in the constitution can be cited 
in support of the power, and that is the first section of the first article, 
where the people have declared that 'the legislative power of the State 
shall be vested in a senate and assembly.' It is readily admitted that 
the two houses, subject only to the qualified negative of the governor, 
possess all the legislative power of this State ·; but the question imme-
diately presents itself, what is that legislative power, and how far does 
it extend? Does it reach the life, liberty, or property of the citizen 
who is not charged with a transgression of the laws, and when the 
sacrifice is not demanded by a just regard for the public welfare. * 
* * * The security of life, liberty, and property lies at the 
foundation of the social compact; and to say that this grant of 'legis-
lative power' includes the right to attack private property, is equiva-
lent to saying that the people have delegated to their servants the 
power of defeating one of the great ends for which governments were 
established. If there was not one word of qualification in the whole 
instrument, I should feel great difficulty in bringing my mind to the 
conclusion that the clause under consideration had clothed the legisla-
ture with despotic power; and such is the extent of their authority, if 
they can take the property of A, either with or without compensation, 
and give it to B. The 'legislative power of this State' does not reach 
to such an unwarrantable extent. Neither life, liberty, nor property, 
except when forfeited by crime, or when the latter is taken for public 
use, falls within the scope of the power.'' 
The reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall, in the great case of Fletcher 
vs. Peck, (6 Cr., 87,) which arose under very peculiar circumstances, 
throws .great light upon the subject under consideration. We submit 
the following extracts: 
Page 132. "The legislature of Georgia was a party to this transac-
tion; and for a party to p-r:onounce its own deed invalid, whatever cause 
may be assigned for its invalidity, must be considered as a mere act of 
power which must find its vindication in a train of reasoning not often 
heard in courts of justice.'' 
Page 134. "If the legislature felt itself absolved from those rules 
of property, which are common to all citizens of the United States, 
and from those principles of equity which are acknowledged in all our 
courts, its act is to be supported by its power alone) and the same power 
may divest any other individual of his lands, if it shall be the will of 
the legislature so to exact it." 
Ibid. "Although such powerful objections to a legislative grant, as 
are alleged against this, may not again exist, yet the principle on which 
alone this rescinding act is to be supported may be applied to every 
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case to which it shall be the will of any legislature to apply it. The 
principle is this: that a legislature may, by its own act, divest the 
vested estate of any man whatever, for reasons which shall, by itself, 
be deemed sufficient." 
Page 136. "To the legislature all legislative power is granted; but 
the question, whether the act of transferring the property of an indi-
vidual to the public, be in the nature of the legislative power, is well 
worthy of serious reflection. 
"It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general 
rules for the government of ~ociety; the application of tho e rules 
to individuals in society) would seem to be the duty of other depart- · 
merits." · 
Ibid. "A contract executed is one in vvhich the object of contract is 
performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. 
The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the 
grant. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, con-
tains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, 
amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies 
a contract not to reassert that right. A party is therefore always 
estopped by its own grant." . 
Page 138. (By the Constitution of the United States:) "No State 
shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing 
the obligation of contracts." 
"A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may 
confiscate his property, or may do both." . 
In this case the judgment of the court was unanimous. But 1\rfr. 
Justice Johnson entertained, on two points, an opinion different from 
the court, and wrote a separate opinion. In this he said, (6 Cr., 143:) 
'(I do not hesitate to declare that a State does not possess the power 
of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, or 
the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose laws 
even on the Deity." 
' (A. contrary opinion can on] y be maintained upon the ground that 
no existing legislature can abridge the powers of those which will suc-
ceed it. To a certain extent this is certainly correct; but the distinc-
tion lies between power and interest, the right of jurisdiction and the 
right of soil. 
"rrhe right of jurisdiction is essentially connected to, or rather iden-
tified with, the national sovereignty. To part with it is to commit a 
species of political suicide. In fact, a power to produce its own anni-
.hilation is an absurdity in terms. It is a power as utterly incommu-
nicable to a political as to a natural person. But it is not so with the 
interests or property of a nation. Its possessions nationally are in 
nowise necessary to its political existence; they are entirely accidental, 
and may be parted with in every respect similarly to those of the indi-
viduals who compose the community. When the legislature have once 
conveyed their interest or property in any subject to the individual, 
they have lost all control over it; have nothing to act upon; it has 
passed from them; is vested in the individual; becomes intimately 
blended with his existence, as essentially so as the blood that circulates 
through his system. The government may indeed demand of him the 
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one or the other, not because they are not his, but because whatever is 
his is his country's. 
"As to the idea, that the grants of a legislature may be void because 
the legislature is corrupt, it appears to me to be subject to insupera-
ble difficulties. The acts of the supreme power of a country must be 
considered pure for the same reason that all sovereign acts must be con-
sidered just; because there is no power that can declare them otherwise. 
The absurdity in this case would have been strikingly perceived, could 
the party who passed the act of cession have got again into power, and 
declared themselves pure, and the intermediate legislature corrupt.'' 
V. The power claimed for Congress is further unconstitutional, be-
cause it would take our property without due process uf law. 
The fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution provides that 
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public uses with-
out just compensation." 
Due process of law. It is now well settled that these words are equiv-
alent to the phrase, nlaw of the land," which is found in many State 
authorities.-(Story on the Constitution,§ 1789; Sedgwick on Statutory 
and Constitutional Law, p. 610.) 
We take the following collection and abridgment of cases and au-
thorities from Mr. Sedgwick's work: 
Page 434. "This important limitation of legislative power is to be 
found, I believe, without exception, in the constitutions of all the 
States of the Union.'' 
Page 507. "Much discussion has taken place in regard to what is 
meant by the phrase, 'the law of the land.' Perhaps, in most respects, 
there is now here to be met with a better definition of it than is to be 
found in the argument of Mr. Webster, in the Dartmouth College case. 
'By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law, which 
hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall 
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of 
general rules which govern society. Everything which may pass under 
the form of an enactment is not the law of the land.'" 
Ibid., p. 5.37. "The same doctrine has been declared in a very 
elaborate case in the State of New York. An act of that State, author-
izing priYate roads to be laid out over the lands of an owner with.out 
his consent, provided for the damages to be assessed by a jury of six 
freeholders, and declare that the road should, when laid out, be for the 
use of the applicant and his assigns; and in action of trespass the valid-
ity of this statutory provision came up for consideration. The constitu~ 
tion of the State, as it then stood, provided 'that no member of this 
State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges 
secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land and the 
judgment of his peers,' (Constitution of 1821, art VII, § 1 ;) and also, 
that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, with-
out due process of law.' (lb.,§ 7.) After showing that the act worked 
a transfer of property from one individual without his consent to another, 
the Supreme Court held that no such legislation was compatible with 
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'the law of the land,' nor such a proceeding compatible with 'due 
process of law.' They said: The words 'by the laws of the land,' 
as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed for the 
purpose of working the wrong. That construction would render the 
restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the Constitu-
tion into mere nonsense. The people would be made to say to the 
two houses, 'You shall be vested with the legislative power of the 
State, but no one shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights 
or privileges of a citizen, unless you pass a statute for the purpose. 
In other words, you shall not do the wrong unless you choose to do 
it. * * * The meaning of the section is, that no member of the 
State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of his rights and privi-
leges, unless the matter shall be adjudged against him upon trial had 
according to the course of the common .law. It must be ascertained 
judicially tbat he has forfeited his privileges, or that some one else has 
a superior title to the property he possesses, before either of them can 
be taken from him. It cannot be done by mere legislation.' So of the 
phrase 'due process of law,' it was said: (It cannot mean less than a 
prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the prescribed 
forms and solemnities for asserting guilt or determining the title to 
property. The same measure of protection against legislative encroach-
ment is extended to life, liberty, and property; and if the latter can be 
taken without a forensic trial and judgment, their is no security for 
the others. If the legislature can take the property of A and transfer 
it to B, they can take A himself, or put him to death. But none of 
these things can be done by mere legislation. There must be due pro-
cess of law.' (Taylor vs. Porter, per Bronson, J., 4 Hill) 140.) In 
North Carolina and Tennessee the term 'law of the land' has received 
the same construction." -(Hoke vs. Henderson, 3 Dev., 12; Jones vs. 
Perry, 10 Yerg., 59; see, also, in Iowa, Reed vs. Wright, 2 Greene, 
Iowa, 22; in Texas, James vs. Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251; in Pennsyl-
vania, Brown vs. Heummel, 6 Ban., 87; and Ervine's appeal, 16 Penn. 
R,, 256; Kinney vs. Beverly, 2 Hen. & Munf., 336; Arrowsmith vs. 
Burlingim, 5 McLean R., 498; and Blackwell on Tax Titles, 27, 34.) 
Ibid., p. 359. "In New York the subject has been again recently 
considered in reference to the temperance law. An act passed in 1855, 
(9th April,) entitled 'An act for the prevention of intemperance, 
pauperism, and crime, declared substantially that intoxicating liquor 
should not be sold or kept for sale, except for medical, sacramental, 
chemical, and mechanical purposes; and a violation of this provision 
was declared a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.' It 
was further enacted, that, upon complaint of a violation of this pro-
hibition, liquor illegally kept should be seized; and if found to be kept 
in violation of the act, or if not claimed, should be adjudged forfeited, 
and destroyed. Proof of the sale of liquor was to be considered suffi-
cient to sustain an averment of an illegal sale, and proof of delivery to 
be prima facie evidence of sale. No person was to be allowed to main-
tain an action to recover for any liquor sold or kept by him, unless he 
could prove that the liquor was lawfully sold or kept within the act; 
and finally, it was declared that all liquor kept in violation of the act 
should be deemed a public nuisance. 
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"Tony bee and Berberich, having been found guilty of violating the 
act, appealed to the supreme court, and the act was held to be in con-
flict with the constitutional provisions above cited. It was considered 
that the object of the statute was to prohibit the common and ordinary 
use of property long and familiarly known; that liquor came clearly 
within the definition of property; that the prohibition of its sale worked 
a virtual deprivation of property; that to do this by fines, forfeitures, 
and imprisonment, coupled with a presumption against nuisance, was 
not due process of law; that the right of protection belonging to the 
citizen was seriously impaired by requiring him preliminarily to prove 
that the liquor was lawfully kept; that it was not competent for the 
legislature to declare any recognized species of property a nuisance; 
and that the whole act was void, as being an arbitrary interference 
with the rights of property, guarantied by the Constitution.'' -(People 
vs. Barberich & Tonybee, 11 How. Pr. R., 289.) 
This decision has been affirmed on appeal.-(Wynehamer vs. The 
People, 3 Kernan, 378.) 
Page 541. "The vested interest of a husband in a legacy bequeathed 
to his wife, cannot be altered by subsequent legislation; and the act 
of 1848, by which it was attempted to act retrospectively, is uncon-
stitutional, on the ground that it takes away property without due 
process of law."-(Westervelt vs. Gregg, 2 Kernan, 202.) 
Page 610. "So also in Rhode Island, on the first circuit, Mr. 
Justice Curtis has decided, under the constitution of that State, that 
the phrase 'law of the land' is equivalent to 'due process of law,' and 
that it is necessarily implied, and included the right to answer to and 
contest the charge, and the consequent right to be discharged from it, 
unless it be proved; and when a law of the State of Rhode Island, 
passed in 185:2, designed to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquors, 
required the accused, before he could answer to or contest the charge) 
to give security in the sum of two hundred dollars, with sureties, to 
pay all fees and costs adjudged against him, it was held that this pro-
vision conflicted with the constitution, and rendered the law void. 
(Greene vs. Briggs, 1 Curtis, 311.) In 1853, the State of Rhode Island 
passed another liquor law, which was also declared void for a similar 
reason. (Greene vs. James, 2 Curtis, 189.) To the same effect is the 
decision in Webster vs. Cooper."-(14 How., 488..) 
VI. The repeal of the confirmatory act would be taking private prop-
erty for public use, without compensation. This is likewise prohibited 
by the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution. 
Nor would there be the least difference in principle, if, instead 
of annulling the grant in toto, Congress were to declare that the 
Houmas claimants should be authorized to sue the United States, as if 
no confirmation had taken place. This would be a declaration by Con-
gress, that they mean to treat and consider as public property, what 
they previously had declared to be private property. If such a course 
did not take away the land itself, it would take away the confirmation, 
which is also a right, a property, and an immunity from further vex-
ation. Thus, if a court took a more contracted view of the meaning 
of the grant than the commissioner and Congress had done be+'ore, the 
claimants might lose a portion of the land embraced in the confirma-
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tion. Such an act would, therefore, at least be an indirect taking of 
property, which is as unconstitutional as absolute and direct spoliation. 
An act of Congress which would take private property without 
~ompensation, whether for public or private use, would not be a law, 
but a mere act of power to which no court would give validity. Such 
is the tenor of the language of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Fletcher vs. Peck, (6 Cr., 87.) And, indeed, the authorities we have 
submitted under the two preceding heads cover this ground entirely, 
and we therefore dismiss it, referring only to some other authorities, if 
further examination should be desired. 
Bloodgood vs. the Mohawk and Hudson R. R. Co., 18 Wend., 59. 
Matter of John and Cherry st., 19 Wend., 659. 
In the matter of Albany street, 11 vVend., 151. 
Varick vs. Smith, 5 Paige, 137. 
Tonawanda R. R. Co. vs. Munger, 5 Denis, 255. 
Wallace vs. Karlenowefski, 19 Barb., 118. 
Plank Road Co. vs Thomas, 20 Penn. R., 90. 
VII. All these principles apply to our case, and show the entire 
want of po-vver in Congress to do anything in opposition to the con-
firmation of our claim by the act of 1858. 
Legislative assemblies are governed by precedents, and the circum-
stance that, during the long existence of this government, while Con-
gress must fi·equently have been importuned by parties whose interests 
were in conflict with parties who were in possession of rights derived 
from and vested bv acts of Congress, the national legislature never 
attempted to interfere, affords strong evidence that the non-existence 
of such a power never was questioned.* 
*The act of August 4, 1854, the second section of which repeals an act of June 
29, 1854, entitled, " An act to aid the Territory of Minnesota in the construction of a railroad 
therein," is no exception to this rule. The circumstances of that case show very clearly that 
it does not fall under the principles stated and supported in this argument. On the 4th of 
March, 1854, the territoriallPgislature of Minnesota passed an act incorporating the Minnesota 
and Northwestern Railroad Company, the 8th section of which provided," that any lands that 
may be granted to the said Territory to aid in the construction of said railroad shall be, and 
the same are hereby, granted in fee simple" to the said railroad company. The act of Con-
gress of June 29, 1854, granted to the Territory of Minnesota, for the purpose of aiding in 
the construction of a railroad, the locality of which was described, every alternate section of 
land, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road. But it 
seems that Congress was informed of the aforesaid act of the territorial legislature in favor 
of the Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Company, and intended to exclwle that com-
pany from the benefit of a donation ; for the 3d section of the act of August expressly 
directed that the said lands should not inure to the benefit of any company heretofore con-
stituted or organized. Thus the act was passed; but it appears that by some fraudulent 
maneuver it read as promulgated, "constituted and organized," thus attempting to prevent 
the exclusion of the Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Company, which was constituted 
before the date of the act of Congress, but organized only after that date. This discovery 
excited the indignation of Congress, and induced the passage of the act of August 4, 1854, 
which repealed that of June 29, 1854. The company continued to contend that by the former 
act, in conjunction with the territorial act, they had a vested right to the alternate odd sec-
tions along the line of their road. 
The matter was brought before the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior, and 
those officials concluded to disregard the clmm of the railroad company, and have always 
done so. This course was justified and vindicated in the letters of the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office to the Secretary of the Interior, dated November 2, 1855, and June 22, 
1857. These letters contain a full and able argument on the whole case. While admitting 
that the duty of executive officers is restricted to the execution of the laws, they do not con-
fine themselves to this plea. They justify the act of August 4, 1854, by showing that no 
vested right has been d1vested by 1t. When the repealing act was passed, the road had not 
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But if the opponents of the Houmas claim made other and very differ-
ent demands upon Congress; if they demanded what is clearly within 
the constitutional power of Congress-though what that would be, 
cannot easily be imagined, since by the confirmation, the authority of 
Congress over this claim is terminated-it ought to be refused upon con-
siderations of equity and fairness, peculiar to this case, independently 
of the merits of the grant, which form the subject of the second part of 
this argument. 
In Menard vs. Massey, 8 How., 306, the Supreme Court of the 
United States says: "By the third article of the treaty by which Lou-
isiana was acquired, and by the laws of nations) the inhabitants of the 
ceded territory were entitled to be maintained and protected in the free 
enjoyment of their property." 
The United States were under the necessity of ascertaining what 
was public and what was private property in the country ceded by 
France, both because they had bound themselves to protect private 
property until Louisiana shall become a State, (City of New Orleans 
vs. De Armas, 9 Pet., 234, heretofore referred to,) and because they had 
purchased the public lands which had to be prepared for sale and set-
tlement. They therefore were under the necessity of establishing the 
rigorous, though unavoidable, presumption, that all lands to which a 
private right could not be shown, should be considered and treated as 
public lands. The stringency of this principle was, however, tempered 
by the prompt establishment of tribunals for the ascertainment and ac-
knowledgment of private claims. The first of these acts was that of 
M~rch 2, 1805, (1 Land Laws, 122.) The 4th section of this act de-
scribes what evidence persons claiming under complete and incomplete 
French and Spanish grants had to submit to the boards of commission-
ers. And by the 5th section, these commissioners were "to decide in 
a summary way, according to justice and equity, on all claims filed," 
and their " decisions were to be laid before Congress in the manner 
hereinafter directed, and be subJect to their determination thereon.'' 
The terms of this act show that its framers were aware that the 
necessity of the case and the dictates of common justice required that 
this investigation should be promptly closed, and the apprehensions 
of the inhabitants be quieted. '11he commissioners were to decide in a 
summary way, and it was to be inferred that Congress would act with 
all practicable expedition. These requirements fell harshly upon the 
inhabitants who had changed their allegiance. Accustomed to a patri-
archal government, which granted laws for the asking, and never 
disturbed any man's ·possession, (Morale's regulationti, inspired by 
new-born official zeal and disputes with the governor, are known to have 
been bru,t~tm fulmen,) they had often neglected their title papers. 
yet been located, and the land to which the Territory would have been entitled, but for that 
act, was not yet known or desi~nated. Moreover, the 4th section of the act of June 29, 1854, 
expressly provides, that" no title shall vest in the said Territory" until certain conditions 
were complied with, and a compliance with these conditions had not even been commenced 
when the prospective conditional grant was repealed. 
The railroad company was alone a loser by the repeal of that act. The Territory and 
State of Minnesota afterwards received a greater quantity of land for similar purposes, no 
longer fettered by its promise to the Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Company, con-
tained in the act of the territorial legislature of March 4, 1854. 
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With much trouble they collected them, and when they submitted 
them they had a right to hope and expect a prompt answer from the 
tribunal to which they had been referred. 
The United States established their own tribunals in their own 
cause. It could not be otherwise; but as a just nation, they were 
bound not to suspend the course of justice indefinitely, and still less to 
change the tribunals, from motives of expediency hostile to the claim-
ants. These tribunals were the board of commi~sioners, acting in 
the first instance, and Congress acting as the appellate tribunal in the 
last resort. These were special tribunals, and no other authority or 
court in the country had any jurisdiction in the matter. From the 
moment the act of March 2, 1805, was passed, the Houmas claimants 
could not take a single step in opposition to it. Their claims were 
confirmed by the board of commissioners on the 3d and lOth of March, 
1806. The record was not removed into the appellate court, Congress, 
until the 9th of January, 1812; and but for the promised "final 
determination" by the act of June 2, 1858) their and all the other 
claims embraced in that voluminous report, exceeding a league square, 
would still be undecided. And would it be fair, under these circum-
stances, to keep them still longer in suspense, even if it could be done 
constitutionally? 
As on this point, in the moral aspect of the case, it is of great 
importance to show that the tribunals established by Congress for 
these claims are exclusive of all others, we submit some authorities: 
By an act of JYiarch 3, 1815, (3 Statutes at Large, 114,) commission-
ers were appointed to adjudicate on the rights of certain claimants to 
lands in Mississippi Territory. A decision of this board gave rise to a 
suit between private individuals, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States held (Brown vs. Jackson, 7 Wheaton, 240,) that as no appeal 
had been given from the decision of these commissioners, the Supreme 
Court had no right to review or disturb their decisions made with the 
authority delegated to them. 
By an act of August 3, 1846, (9 Statutes at Large,) the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
the Attorney General were appointed to decide on all cases of suspend-
ed entries. In Foley vs. Harrison, 15 How., 450, the decision of this 
board was held final. 
To the same effect are the decisions in Elliott vs. Peirsol, 1 Pet., 
328; Wilcox vs. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; and Cousin vs. Blanc's Exec-
utor, 19 How., 209. 
Hence it follows, that if the claimants had not construed the long 
silence of Congress as an acquiesence in the decision of the commis-
sioners, if they had set up their claim as plaintiffs in any court of jus-
tice, they would have been met by the unanswerable objection, that 
their claim was pending before a special tribunal, which alone could 
-take cognizance of it, and which had not yet decided on it. 
It may be asked, by those unacquainted with the working of this 
:system, whether the Houmas grant, being a complete grant, could not 
have been established in a court of justice, independently of any confir-
·mation. The 4th section of the act of March 2, 1805, seems to make 
.optional in cases of complete grants, what is absolutely required in 
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cases of incomplete titles. But this difference soon vanished in prac-
tice, and in reality they all stand upon the same footing. The Gen-
eral Land Office respects no grant whatever that has not been expressly 
confirmed. Without a confirmation it ignores them ; it has no right 
to confirm or acknowledge them upon its own judgment, and the 
claims are known to that office only through the confirmations. By 
the 4th section of the act of April 25, 1814, even complete grants in 
certain parts of Louisiana were required to be filed, under the penalty 
that, if not recorded, they should never afterwards be recognized or 
confirmed, or received as evidence against a title received from the 
United States. If not confirmed, or at least filed for confirmation, the 
land office would proceed to the sale of the land, whatever the title 
may be ; and after the land should have been parcelled out among 
purchasers of small tracts, its ownership would be converted into law-
suits, and its value gone. Hence it is that the reported decisions of the 
federal courts do not exbibit a single instance of an unconfirmed com-
plete grant as the basis of a suit in a petitory action, or in action 
of ejectment. That the practice of the General Land Office has been 
correctly stated, will appear from the letter of the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office to the undersigned counsel, dated the 28th ultimo, 
which is printed in the Appendix. 
If, therefore, Congress would now refer the Houmas claimants to the 
federal courts for a new adjudication of their claim, it would virtually 
amount to this: that after having called these parties before their own 
tribunals, and after these tribunals, both in the first instance and on 
appeal, have decided in favor of the claim, Congress, dissatisfied with 
this decision, would annul it, and create another tribunal to try the 
case de novo. If the case is correctly stated-and of that there can 
be no doubt-then it bears no discussion. It would be one of the class 
of cases which we quoted when speaking of the constitutional pro-
hibition to take property without due process of law. 
As all titles which existed in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, 
before the treaty of cession of 1803, ultimately had to be, and were, 
adjudicated upon and confirmed by Congress, it would follow, if our 
title would now be disturbed by Congress, that any of these titles 
might be attacked before and opened by Congress, and success would 
depend upon the influence exercised by the contestants. 
PART SECOND. 
If, notwithstanding the wa.nt of constitutional power, Congress 
should wish to review the case, were it only to satisfy themselves 
whether the decision to be made is in reality conformable, not only to 
law, but to equity, we are prepared to dis-cuss the original merits of 
the grant. 
On this subject we shall submit evidence to the honorable committee, 
and it will be necessary in the first place to explain the nature of this 
.evidence. 
In 1837, Mr. John S .. Preston, on behalf of the widow and heirs of 
the late General Wade Hampton, who was largely interested in the 
Houmas claim, submitted a memorial to Congress) accompanied by 
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documentary evidence, which was ordered to be printed by the Senate 
on January 29, 1838. It is Senate Document No. 144, of the 25th 
Congress, 2d session. When referring to it, we shall designate it as 
Senate document of 1838. 
On August 12, 1844, Chancellor Bibb, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
ordered patents to be issued on two of the three claims made under the 
Houmas grant. 
The opponents of the claim addressed strenuous and emphatic remon-
strances to Congress, the consequence of which was that, by a resolu-
tion of the Senate, of December 10, 1844, the Secretary of the Treasury 
was required "to communicate to the Senate a copy of his written 
opinion, addressed to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
directing patents to be issued in favor of the claimants under the 
Houmas claim, in the State of Louisiana,'' &c. 
In consequence of this call, Mr. Secretary Bibb made a communica-
tion to the Senate, dated January 8, 1845, which, on January 13, 
1845, was ordered to be printed by the Senate, and is Senate Document 
No. 45, of the 28th Congress, 2d session. This we shall designate in 
our references as Senate document of 1845. 
By prolonged agitation the adversaries of the claim succeeded in 
procuring the passage of a joint resolution by Congress, on the 26th 
of June, 1846: the purport of which was that the Attorney General of 
the United States was to examine the title of the Houmas claim, and 
to report thereon to the President, and if he found that patents under 
such claim had been issued contrary to law, the President was requested 
to cause proceedings to be instituted for the purpose of having the 
validity of such patent or patents judicially determined. 
Thereupon Mr. Attorney General Clifford gave an official opinion, 
dated the 31st of December, 1847.-(4 Opinions of the Attorneys Gen-
eral, 643.) 
The foregoing three documents, viz: the Senate document of 1838, 
the Senate document of 1845, and the opinion of the Attorney Gene-
ral, having been printed by authority of Congress, it was necessary to 
indicate the collections in which they are to be found. We submit, 
however, copies of them besides. 
The Attorney General concludes his opinion in the following words: 
"In conclusion, I am of opinion-
" 1st. That the grant to Maurice Conway is a complete and perfect 
Spanish grant, to the extent of forty-two arpents from the river, and 
no more; that the said grant does not convey any lands beyond that 
extent; but that the title to the same is vested in the United States. 
"2d. That the patents which have been issued in the case of the 
Donaldson and Scott claim, were so issued without authority of law, 
and are, therefore, void and without effect." 
In consequence of this opinion, a suit was instituted in the name of 
the United States, to set aside the patents issued by direction of the 
Secretary of the Treasury on the Clarke and Donalson and Scott por-
tions of the Houmas claim. 
This suit was tried and decided by the United States circuit court 
at New Orleans, presided over by Mr. Justice J. A. Campbell, of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. In this decision, which was 
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rendered on the 21st of November, 1856, the court held tha.t the act 
of April 18, 1814, upon which the Secretary of the Treasury had based 
his decision that patents should issue, did not apply to complete grants 
exceeding a league square, like the Houmas claim. But the court con-
fined itself strictly to the object of the resolution of Congress, and 
concluded the decision in the following words: 
"I do not decide any question upon the validity of the defendant's 
title to the land they claim, nor upon the effect of any other act of the 
officers of the land office, in respect to it, in determining its bounda-
ries, nor the effect of this patent, in any other respect than of its being 
a paper issued without legal authority." 
We submit, also, written evidence, properly attested, which will, 
with more propriety, be described as we come to it. Among this are 
the title papers, surveys, and other proceedings in other confirmed 
Louisiana claims, which we shall use as precedents. That they are fit 
precedents will directly be shown. All these are certified by the regis-
ter of the land office at New Orleans, as extracts from the records of 
the board of commissioners. 
The only question to be examined, is the depth from the Mississippi 
river to which the clain1 is to extend. 
The commissioners under the act of 1805, Mr. Charles Hopkins, 
Solicitor of the General Land Office, and Mr. Secretary Bibb, held and 
decided that the Houmas grant extended to the full depth claimed, that 
is, the Amite river and Lake Maurepas. (Senate Doc. of 1845, pp. 85, 
126.) Solicitor Birchard, of the General Land Office, would limit it 
to a league and a half in depth, (Senate Doc. of 1845, p. 40,) and Mr. 
Attorney General Clifford, it has been seen, holds that its depth is 
only forty-two arpents from the Mississippi. 
Hence, it is apparent that the only matter that ever was disputed in 
relation to the grant was its depth. A translation of the title papers 
is found on page 954 of Clarke's Land Laws, and also in the Appendix of 
the first volume of Bioren's Laws of the United States, page 551. But 
it is unnecessary to recite the title at length, because it is evident that 
the controversy turns exclusively upon the meaning of certain words 
of the grant of the rear land made by Governor Galvez on June 21, 
1777. 
By this the governor granted to Maurice Conway, "toda la tierra 
vacante y detras 0 a la espalda de los quarenta primeros que posee /' 
literally, "all the land vacant behind and in the rear of the first forty 
which he possesses.'' 
The order of survey by Governor U nzaga, the survey by Andry, and 
the final grant by Governor Galvez, expressly state the extent of the 
front on the Mississippi, the direction and course of the side lines, 
which open. very widely, and that the side lines of the rear grant are 
to be prolonged in the same direction as those of the front grant. All 
this has never been disputed, and requires no further notice here. 
Yet it may be proper to submit a summary statement of the title, to 
explain how the difference of opinion concerning the depth arose. 
On the 9th of September, 1776, Maurice Conway, who was then the 
sole owner of the front tract, petitioned Governor Unzaga to grant to 
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him all the vacant land in the rear of the first depth of forty arpents, 
of which he then was possessed. 
On the 27th September, 1776, Governor Unzaga issued an order of 
survey, directing Andry, the government surveyor, to put the peti-
tioner in possession of the vacant land in the rear of his first forty 
arpents. 
On the 9th of October, 1776, Andry went on the ground; in com-
pany with Maurice Conway, Louis Judice, the commandant of the 
post or district, and the Indian chief who had sold the original front 
tract. There he measured the front line of ninety-six arpents on the 
river; then he retraced the side lines to a depth of forty arpents, 
planted stakes at the end of forty arpents, and other stakes two arpents 
farther back, "para no deviar el rumbo," which has been translated, 
"in order not to vary the direction," and by another translatm:, "in 
order to keep the course.'' 
Upon the coming in of a sketch of this survey, Governor Galvez, 
Unzaga's successor, made, on the 21st of June, 1777, a complete grant 
to Maurice Conway of all the land lying in the rear of the first forty 
arpents, following the same direction, and referred to Andry's survey. 
Thus the question arose, what was meant by "all the vacant land 
in the rear of the first forty arpents ?" 
The literal meaning for which the claimants contend is, all the land 
in the rear, between the prolongation of the side lines, which the gov-
ernment had a right to give; that is, as far back as the Amite river 
and Lake Maurepas, the first considerable water-courses, and at the 
same time the boundary between Spanish Louisiana and the British 
province of Florida. This, on a straight line drawn from the Missis-
sippi, in the center of the front of the grant to the Amite, gives a 
depth of about thirteen or fourteen miles. The side lines, owing to 
their divergence, are considerably longer. 
On the part of the opponents of the claimants, it is contended that, 
as Andry planted no stakes further back than forty-two arpents from 
the river, the grantee took only what was included between these side 
lines of forty-two arpents in depth and a rear line connecting the 
extremities of the two measured side lines. 
As Congress always was the supreme appellate tribunal in the adju-
dication of land claims submitted to boards of commissioners, exclu-
sive of every other jurisdiction; as, notwithstanding a previous final 
decision, we are again ca.lled before this tribunal by the petition of our 
adversaries, we are compelled to illustrate the question thus presented 
as we should do it before a court of Congress, however much we may 
regret that we cannot spare to the honorable committee these weari-
some details. 
The question then is, how are the words used in the grant, and in 
the survey to which the grant refers, to be construed? Certainly not 
according to the rules applicable to the description, location, and 
survey of grants in England and the United States, but as they were 
understood in Louisiana by Andry, the surveyor, and Galvez, the 
governor, themselves, at the time of these occurrences. 
It is because this obvious rule was not adhered to) or rather because 
the materials for applying it were wanting, that the authorities in 
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Washington city differed from the commissioners of 1806, who resided 
on the spot, and were in possession of those materials. 
And herein lies the whole difficulty of this class of cases; a difficulty 
often felt by the Supreme Court of the United States, as is forcibly 
stated by that court in Bissell vs. Penrose, (8 How., 331:) "The in-
quiry was difficult and embarrassing, on account of the scarcity and 
imperfect materials within the reach of the courts from which to col-
lect Spanish laws and ordnances, as they consisted of royal orders, 
orders of the local governors, and also the usages and customs of the 
provinces, which were not readily accessible to the profession or the 
courts in this country." 
In United States vs. Arredondo and others, (6 Pet., 691,) the Su-
preme Court examined this subject very thoroughly. The court said, 
(p. 717): "From a careful examination of the whole legislation of 
Congress on the subject of the Louisiana and Florida treaties, we can-
not entertain a doubt that it has from their beginning been intended 
that the titles to the lands claimed should be settled by the same rules of 
construction) law, and evidence, in all their newly-acquired territory; 
that they have adopted, as the basis of all their acts, the principle that 
the law of the province in which the land is situated is the law which 
gives efficacy to the grant, and by which it is to be tested whether it 
was property at the time the treaties took effect." 
Ib., p. 718. "From the whole scope and spirit of the laws on the 
subject of Spanish titles, the intention of Congress is most clearly man-
ifested that the tribunals authorized to examine and decide on their 
validity, whether special or judicial, should be governed by the same 
rules of law and evidence in their adjudication on claims of the same 
given character.'' 
Ib., p. 719. " The selection of this tribunal for a final and conclu-
sive adjudication of the large claims, affords neither an indication of 
the intention of Congress, nor furnishes us any reason that in the ex-
ercise of that jurisdiction we should consider that 'the principles of 
justice,' the rules of a court of equity, 'the law of nations,' of treaties 
'of Congress,' or 'of Spain,' the rules of evidence, or ' "the principles 
of law,' can be at all affected by the magnitude of the claim under 
consideration. The laws which confer the authority and point to the 
guides for its exercise make no such discrimination, and every 'prin-
ciple of justice' forbids it.'' 
Ib., p. 713. "Our next rule of decision is, 'and proceedings under 
the treaty.' By these are understood the acts and proceedings of the 
government, or others under its authority, subsequent to the treaty, in 
taking possession of the ceded territory) in organizing the local gov-
ernment, its acts within the authority of the organic law, the promises 
made, the pledges given by either the general or local government; 
also the proceedings of commissioners and other officers or tribunals 
appointed by Congress to decide and report on these claims, so far as 
they have adopted and settled any rules and principles of decision 
within their powers as guides to their judgment. These, in our opin-
ion, are the 'proceedings under the power referred to) and intended 
by the law, according to which we may decide, and are made a rule or 
precedent for us.' '' 
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lb., p. 713. "Where Congress have, by confirming the reports of 
commissioners or other tribunals, sanctioned the rules and principles 
on which they were founded, it is a legislative affirmance of the con-
struction put by these tribunals on the laws conferring the authority 
and prescribing the rules by which it should be exercised, or which is 
to all intents and purposes of the same effect in law. It is a legisla-
tive ratification of an act done without previous authority, and this 
subsequent recognition and adoption is of the same force as if done by 
preexisting power, and relates back to the act done." 
lb., p. 714. "There is another source of law in all governments, 
usage, custom, which is always presumed to have been adopted with 
the consent of those who may be affected by it. In England, and in the 
States of this Union which have no written constitution, it is the supreme 
law, always decreed to have had its origin in an act of a State legis-
lature of competent power to make it valid and binding, or an act of 
Parliament, which, representing all the inhabitants of the kingdom, 
acts with the consent of all, exercises the power of all, and its acts be-
come binding by the authority of all. (2 Co. Inst., 58 Wills, 116.) 
So it is considered in the States, and by this court. (3 Dall., 400, 2 
Pet., 256, 257. )" 
'' A general custom is a general law, and forms the law of a con-
tract on the subject-matter ; though at variance with its terms, it en-
ters into and contests its stipulations as an act of Parliament or State 
legislature. This court not only may, but are bound to notice and 
respect general customs and usage as the law of the land, equally with 
the written law.'' 
So, again, in Mitchel and al. vs. United States, (9 Pet .. 741,) the 
court say: · 
"The confirmation of similar grants by acts of Congress, or by 
boards of commissioners acting under their authority, are also power-
ful evidence of the lawful exercise of the authority of these officers; 
and being proceedings under the treaty and laws, they are made a rule 
by which, among others, we may adjudicate on the claims of the pres-
ent parties.'' 
To the same effect is the case of Smith vs. The United States, 10 
Pet. 331. 
These principles, so convincingly stated by the Supreme Court, 
apply with great force to our case. 
'rhose who contest the extent we claim for the Houmas grant, urge, 
that while it is true that the grant of Governor Galvez gave to Mau-
rice Conway "all the vacant land behind or in the rear of his first 
forty arpents," between the prolongation of the side lines of the front 
tract, this description is too vague to attach to any particular land) 
may render the grant void for uncertainty, and can at best be only 
explained by consulting the certificate of Andry, to which the grant 
refers. This is found in the original Spanish, in Sen. Doc. of 1845, p. 8, 
and translated in Sen. Doc. of 1838, p. 18. From this certificate, it ap-
pears that Andry went on the spot, measured the front of the first 
grant on the river and its two side lines, each to the depth of forty 
arpents, and that at the end of these side lines he planted a post, and 
other posts, two arpents farther back, to indicate the second grant; 
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that consequently the only land of which Andry gave possession to 
Maurice Conway, under the second grant of 1 ~77, was what lay two 
arpents further back of the depth of the original grant, and that conse-
quently the two grants combined should be restricted to forty-two 
arpents from the river. 
This might be plausible and logical reasoning, if the ''proceedings'' 
of Andry were to be construed as an English or American grant or 
survey might be construed. Such, however, is not the rule of de-
cision, as has been shown by the above-mentioned decisions, and is 
shown, with particular reference to surveys, by the following decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the United States : 
In Buyck vs. the United States, 15 Pet., 224, the Supreme Court 
say: "In coming to our conclusion upon this point, we have not been 
influenced by any of the English common law rules, which make 
grants void for uncertainty; such as, for instance, if the king grants 
lands in a peat waste, without ascertaining what part, or the special 
name of the land, or how bounded, it is void for uncertainty, for there 
can be no election in that case. (Bacon, vol. 4, tit. Grant, 81.) And 
yet, if an individual so grant, it would be good. We apply to the 
case the laws and ordinances of the government under which the claim 
Driginated, and that rule which must be of universal application in 
the construction of grants, which is essential to their validity, that 
the thing granted should be so described as to be capable of being dis-
tinguished from other things of the same kind, or be capable of being 
ascertained by extraneous testimony. '' 
In The United States vs. Low., 16 Pet., 167, Mr. Justice Catron 
says : ''According to the strict ideas of confining a survey to a loca-
tion in the United States, the survey would be located adjoining the 
natural object called for, there being no other to aid and contest the 
generp,l call ; and therefore the head of the lagoon would necessarily 
have formed one boundary; but it is obvious more latitude was allowed 
in the province of Florida. '' 
In the case of Smith vs. the United States, 10 Pet., 331, the Supreme 
Court held: "It has also been distinctly decided, in the Florida case, 
that the land claimed must have been severed from the general domain 
of the king, by some grant which gives it locality by its terms, by a 
reference to some description, or by a vague general grant, with an au-
thority to locate, which must have been made before the 24th of July, 
1818." 
The cases of the United States vs. Forbes, 15 Pet., 181; O'Hara vs. 
The United States, 15 Pet., 275; United States vs. Clark, 16 Pet., 
231, are signal instances of the latitude which was allowed in surveys. 
Indeed, a survey was by no means indispensable to the validity of a 
grant. 
In the case of The United States vs. Arredondo, 13 Pet., 134, the 
.Supreme Court say: "We do not consider the want of a survey as 
interfering with the right of the party to the land granted; but it 
must be taken, near as n~ay be, as it is described in the petition, where 
it was asked for, and as it was granted, and cannot be taken elsewhere. 
If it cannot be found there, the appellees have no claim to an equi-
valent; or, if upon the survey, it shall be found to interfere with 
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previous grants to third parties, the concession will be lessened in 
quantity, according to the extent of the rights of third parties, and an 
equivalent for such diminution cannot be surveyed elsewhere." 
The only ruling and universal principle applicable both to Spanish 
grants and surveys, was: Id cert~tm est quod certum reddi potest. A 
description which, by the aid of extraneous testimony, could enable a 
surveyor, acquainted with the country, to locate a grant with a 
reasonable degree of adherence to the presumable intentions of the 
grantor, is all that would be required; and our grant comes entirely 
within that rule. 
We have no difficulty in doing away entirely with the objections 
drawn from the fact that Andry ran the lines of the new grant only 
two arpents back of the terminus of the first grant, and did not close 
the back line at all. In this respect Andry followed a usage universal 
in Lower Louisiana, in all grants having a great depth. 
This section of country is a flat alluvial plain, covered with woods, 
subject to periodical overflows of the Mississippi, except when pro-
tected by embankments. The land is highest on the immediate banks 
of the river, where the overflows deposit the coarser particles of the 
detritus held in suspense in the water. The rear lands are mostly 
very low, covered with water a great part of the year, and even when 
the river is low, very generally marshy and difficult to penetrate. 
Land had little value in those days; but the labor of a superior offi-
cer, such as the surveyor general of the province always was, had 
value, and as the payment of this labor was the only charge incum-
bent upon the grantee, it was diminished as much as possible. 'J.1he 
surveyor general, therefore, very frequently confined himself to run 
the front line on a water-course, and to stake off the side lines for a 
distance short of the forty arpents granted. As these side lines were 
always straight lines, and as the depth was indicated in the grant 
itself, this sufficed to give to the grant a fixed locality, which could 
be traced upon the ground, without liability to error, by any surveyor 
that might come afterwards. On this point our evidence is perfectly 
conclusive, and as this point is the main reliance of our adversaries 
we shall discuss it very fully. 
We applied for information and evidence on this subject to the sur-
veyor general of the United States in Louisiana. In reply, the 
undersigned counsel received from him a letter, dated the 28th of last 
January, and the documents mentioned in it. All these are respect-
fully submitted as document A. 
The material parts of the letter are as follows: 
I now send you the affidavit requested to the fact that the French 
and Spanish surveyors did not generally survey to the full depth the 
side lines of tracts on the river, but merely measured their fronts, and 
established barnes, or posts, at regular intervals from each other, and 
at short distances from the river on such side lines, for the purpose 
expressed in their proces verbal, of indicating their direction. This 
was sufficient to comply with the requirements of the order, in virtue 
of which the survey was made; nor was more required by the grantee, 
for he and the neighbor on either side signed, with the surveyor, the 
proccs verbal, therein expressing satisfaction therewith. 
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Inclosed is a certified list of a few of the very many instances where 
this rule was followed by the French and Spanish surveyors. 
I cannot conceive with what reason it can be asserted that the es-
tablishment by Andry, in the survey of the Conway claim, of posts at 
the distance of forty-two arpents from the river, restricted it to this 
depth ; for he expressly states their only purpose was ''in order to 
keep the course'' of the prolongation of the side lines. And this was 
his frequent custom. 
Two instances occur at once to my memory-those of the claims of 
Piseros and D'Etrepy. (Old board reports, Nos. 88 and 3, in T. 12 
S., R. 8 E., S. E. district, east of the river.) I inclose copies of my 
rough translations of his p1·oces verbal in both these surveys. You 
can have them verified and compared with the records of the register 
of the land office in New Orleans. In these surveys, for the same 
purpose as fully expressed, he established posts at forty-two arpents 
from the river; and yet the claims have been surveyed, and even re-
spected by the United States, with the entire depth to the lake. 
In townships 12 and 13 S., R. 10 E., S. E. district, east of the river, 
you will find several claims (those of Fortier and others) where the 
surveyor, Lalande de Ferrieres, in 1765, ran out the side line less than 
twenty arpents from the river, and then upon another course estab-
lished, at one or two arpents further, bornes, to show the direction of 
the prolongation to Lake Pontchartrain, thus rendering the side lines 
broken, and not always parallel. They have been so resurveyed by 
our Government. 
Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
W. J. McCULLOH, 
Surveyor General Lo~tisiana. 
Lours J ANIN, Esq., New Orleans. 
The affidavit mentioned in this letter is as follows: 
I, William J. McCulloh, surveyor general of public lands in the 
district of Louisiana, solemnly swear, it is within my knowledge, de-
rived from frequent reference to the plats of survey, (original or copies 
filed in this office,) that it was the general custom of the surveyors 
employed by the French and Spanish governments, in locating tracts 
in the province of Louisiana, having a depth of forty arpents, merely 
to measure the fronts of such tracts, and to indicate the courses of the 
side lines by planting bornes or posts at equal intervals from each 
other, and at short distances from the river, without actually running 
and measuring the full depth of such side lines, and without closing 
the survey by running the rear line between the extremity of such side 
lines; and that in tracts having greater depth than forty arpents, or 
a depth extending to another river, lake, or other natural boundary, 
it was their custom, invariably follow£3d, as far as I can ascertain, after 
careful examination, to measure to the forty arpent points on such side 
lines, and then at short distances therefrom to establish bornes or 
posts, to exhibit the further prolongation of the side boundaries. 
WILLIAl\l J. McCULLOH, 
Surveyor General, Louisiana. 
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Sworn to, and subscribed before me, at Donaldsonville, Louisiana, 
this 28th day of January, A. D. 1860. 
CHARLES S. ILSLEY, 
Justice of the Peace. 
The next document included in his letter is a certificate giving a list 
of 63 confirmed claims, which were surveyed by French and Spanish 
surveyors, in the manner described in Mr. McCulloh's letter and affi-
davit, and have been acknowledged and confirmed by the United States 
in conformity with these surveys. 
At the bottom of this list Mr. McCulloh gives the following certifi-
cate: 
SuRVEYOR GENERAL's OFFICE, 
Donaldsonville, La., January 28, 1860. 
I certify, that by authenticated copes of the plats in this office, by 
Lewis Andry, Lallande de Ferrieres, Carlos Trudeau, Manuel Andry, 
and F. V. Potier, it appears they did not, in any of their surveys of the 
above-mentioned claims, run the side lines to the full depth claimed, 
but that they only measured their river fronts, and on the side lines 
established bornes to indicate their direction. 
The above cases are taken indiscriminately, and many other analo-
gous cases could be cited to show that it was the rule of the French 
and Spanish surveyors in Louisiana to make only such partial surveys 
of claims fronting on the Mississippi river. 
WILLIAM J. McCULLOH, 
Surveyor General, Louisiana. 
Document A also contains translations of the title papers, prods-
verbals of French and Spanish surveys, and plans made by French and 
Spanish surveyors, all belonging to titles confirmed by the United 
States. They fully prove Mr. McCulloh's statements in his letter to 
the undersigned. 
Before the claimants had receive this very satisfactory evidence from 
the surveyor general of the United States for the State of Louisiana, 
they had procured from the office of the register of the land office at 
New Orleans, who has in charge all the records of the various boards 
appointed to adjudicate and report on land claims in the southeastern 
district of Louisiana, copies of title papers in confirmed claims, upon 
which the confirmation was based, and which, therefore, according to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, are to be considered as proof 
of usages and customs existing when rights accrued under the former 
government of Louisiana, and therefore to be respected by the United 
States. We submit them as documents B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, 
L, }1, and N. Each of these documents is certified by the register of 
the land office as having been given in evidence in support of a partic-
ular claim, and the number of the claim; the report in which it was 
embraced, and the act by which it was confirmed, are stated in the 
register's certificate. Each of these documents is accompanied, either 
by a translation of its material parts, or has on the cover a statement 
hat they are translated in this brief. Thus the fullest opportunity for 
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examination is afforded to those whose duty it may be to enter upon 
this inquiry, and they will b~ found fully to support our explanations 
of the usages and customs of the time. We a.re painfully aware that 
the minute examination in which we are engaged cannot be otherwise 
than irksome to the committee, as it is to ourselves. But this is not 
our fault, it is the fault of Congress. Congress constituted itself the 
supreme tribunal in these matters, and forced the owners of the Houmas 
claim to appear before them. They have been before Congress since 
the 9th of January, 1812. At last, on June 2, 1858, Congress dis-
posed of the matter. And now the petition of certain intruders upon 
our land compels us to appear ' again before Congress. Congress hav-
ing assumed jurisdiction over the matter, can no more than any other 
court decline the investigation of the facts, upon the decision of which 
the controversy depends. And we hope, therefore, not to be blamed 
if we give to our examination that extension which the abundance of ma-
terial puts within our power, and which the special character of the 
subject, and its novelty to those who are to investigate it, imperiously 
demand. 
Yet we shall specially mention only a few of these documents. In 
connection with the evidence furnished by Mr. McCulloh, we must, 
however, refer to document B, which embraces the original order of 
survey, pro008 verbal of Andry, and complete title, in the claim of 
Dominique Bouligny, confirmed as claim No. 313 by the old board, 
(2 Public Lands, 286.) This, with the exception of the description of 
the land, is almost literally the same title which Maurice Conway had 
obtained, namely, a petition by Ducros, a first decree by Governor 
Unzaga, ordering the surveyor to put the petitioner in possession, a 
report by Andry, and a final grant thereon by Governor Galvez. This 
explains better than any philological disquisition, how Andry and 
Galvez understood these matters, and by itselfputs to rest the reason-
ing of our adversaries who would interpret them differently. The pe-
titioner asks for the land behind his first forty arpents as far as Lake 
Barataria. Unzaga orders Andry to put him in possession of the land 
claimed. Andry goes on the ground, as he says, "in consequence and 
in obedience of that decree," is accompanied by the grantee and his 
neighbors, measures the side lines to the depth of forty arpents, and 
then two arpents further back, where he plants other and the last 
posts. Upon this the governor decrees that, considering Andry's re-
port, from which it appears that he had put Ducros in possession of 
the land petitioned for to the lakes, he grants that land. 
Let it be observed that Andry does not say one word about posses-
sion; yet the governor construes that Andry's going upon the land 
newly granted to the depth of two arpents, in company with the gran-
tor, is putting him in possession of the whole grant. And thereupon 
the governor grants the land, not only the two arpents in depth actu-
ally visited by Andry, but the whole land demanded to the lake, many 
miles back. 
This is literally what was done in Maurice Conway's case, except 
that the land granted was ''all the vacant .land in the rear of the front 
depth," instead of the well-defined terminus of the lake. 
What stronger proof could be adduced than this to show that we 
Rep. No. 150-6 
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have been so n1any years disturbed and annoyed because the authori-
ties in Washington city were not in possession of such title papers and 
precedents, which were in great number before the commissioners of 
1806, and became their guides? 
Those who would make the validity of old grants in Louisiana de-
pend upon a pains-taking and microscopic dissection of the language 
of the title papers in a dubious translation, do not execute the treaty 
faithfully and honestly. They must be understood according to the 
intention and in the spirit of the original parties to them. The rela-
tions of the Spanish governors and the inhabitants of Louisiana were 
patriarchal, good faith and liberality, and a corresponding trustful and 
loose manner, characterized them, and an instance of technical quib-
bling never was heard of. 
To show the primitive simplicity of-the colonial government of Louis-
iana, and the absence of all strictness and formality in the Spanish 
mode of granting lands, we may instance the case of "The United 
States vs.fiDavenport's Heirs," (15 Howard,p. 1,) in which two incom-
plete grants made by a commandant, one for ninety-two thousand one 
hundred and sixty acres, and the other for two hundred and seven 
thousand three hundred and sixty acres, were confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
"The evidence of the grant," says the Supreme Court, (p. 5,) "con-
sists in copies of the petition of Edward Murphy to the commandant, 
dated in February, 1798, for a donation of the tract of La Nana, situ-
ate to the east of the Sabine river, on the road leading from the town 
of Natchitoches. The tract asked for forms a square of four leagues 
upon that road, the center of which is the prairie adjoining the bayou 
La Nana. The motive of the application was that the petitioner might 
have summer pasturage for his cattle and other animals. The petition 
was granted by the commandant, and the procurator was ordered to 
put the grantee in possession. The procurator fulfilled this order the 
1st of August, 1798, by going upon the land with the grantee, and in 
the presence of witnesses 'took him by the right hand, walked with 
him a number of paces from north to south, and the same from east to 
west, and he, letting go his hand, (the grantee,) walked about at plea-
sure on the said territory of La Nana, pulling up weeds, and made 
holes in the ground) planted posts, cut down bushes, took up clods of 
earth and threw them on the ground, and did many other things in 
token of the possession in which he had been placed, in the name of 
his Majesty, of said land, with the boundaries and extension as prayed 
for.'" And this was the whole title, and it was confirmed. 
In the same case, another claim to a tract of land called "Las Ome-
gas'' was prosecuted. The order of the commandant to the procurator) 
to put the petitioner in possession, was executed with the same cere-
monial as in the case of the N ana tract. 
These were incomplete titles, executed not by the governor, but by 
the commandant, and together they covered two hundred and ninety-
nine thousand five hundred and twenty acres. Those who dispute the 
Houmas claim would undoubtedly have rejected them, but the Supreme 
Court of the United States confirmed them. 
We hope, therefore, that the great two arpents argument, which has 
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so long been the main reliance of our adversaries, and the main cause 
of the vexation we have suffered, may now be considered as fairly and 
permanently disposed of. 
We are thus brought to the real original question, viz: What extent 
of land passed under the grant, irrespective of Andry's proceedings, 
which were sufficient to put us in possession of whatever was included 
in the grant, but explained only the width in front and the direction 
of the side lines, and not the superficial extent. That must be collected 
from the grant itself. It is, "all the vacant land lying and aqjoining 
his front tract of ninety-six arpents on the river, by forty in depth, be-
tween the prolongation of the side lines of the front tract.'' 
All the title papers agree in this. (See Senate Doc. of 1838, pp. 17 
to 20.) Conway first petitions for "all the depth which may be vacant 
immediately after the said depth of forty arpents.'' Governor U nzaga, 
on this petition, directs Andry, the surveyor, to go on the land and 
put the petitioner in possession of the land "which then may be vacant 
on the back of the forty arpents of depth which he possesses, and running 
in the same direction.'' 
Andry certifies that, in pursuance of the above decree, he had gone 
on the land in the presence of the commandant and the vendor; that 
''he proceeded to put the petitioner in possession of the depth granted to 
him by the foregoing decree;" that, having ascertained the direction of 
the side lines of the front tract and measured them on the ground, he 
ran them _two arpents further back, "para no variar el rumbo," in 
order not to vary the course, which plainly means that he ran these 
two short lines to indicate the course the further prolongation of those 
lines should have. 
This report having been laid before Governor Galvez, he issued the 
grant; and, referring to Andry's proceedings, he called these "pro-
ceedings concerning the possession which he had given to Maurice Con-
way, by virtue of the foregoing decree issued by my predecessor) of all the 
vacant land behind or in the rea1· of the first forty arpents ;'' and, find-
ing these proceedings conformable to the regulations, he granted to 
Conway "the said lancl behind or in the 'rear of the forty arpents," 
"following the same direction as those." 
That these three men, Unzaga, Andry, and Galvez, who were men 
of intelligence, and one of whom had sufficient worth and capacity to 
beat the British and to become viceroy of Mexico, should not have 
known and understood what they did, is not fairly to be presumed. 
They used an indefinite term, "all the land in the rear," but they 
knew that it was well explained by a local usage. If these words were 
.included in a cession to the United States, they would infallibly be ex-
plained according to their literal meaning, which is, "all the land the . 
Spanish governor had a right to grant between the prolongation of 
those side lines," and that was up to the Amite river, at that time 
the boundary of the British province of West Florida. This is a 
much plainer description than that in the treaty of cession of 1803, 
under which the United States claimed the country bounded on the 
east by the Perdido, on the west by the Mississippi, north by the 
thirty-first degree ?f latitude, and south by the isla.nd of Orleans, 
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which for many years before had always been administered as a por-
tion of West Florida. 
But these indefinite terms, "all the depth," "the depth that may 
be found," "the depth according to the titles," and others of similar 
import, are very frequently found in sales passed in the Spanish times 
in Louisiana, and occasionally even in grants. Their well-understood 
meaning was that the land was to run back between the side lines, 
until they struck a considerable water-course, and if the side-lines met 
before touching such a water-course, they stopped at that point. 'rhere 
existed, besides, a local usage peculiar to Lower Louisiana. There 
exists a chain of lakes to the east of the Mississippi-Lakes Maurepas, 
Pontchartrain and Borgne-all connected together, and the latter with 
the Gulf of Mexico, and it was customary with the governors to make 
grants run back from the river to these lakes. 
According to this usage this grant was understood by all of the par-
ties to it. But the topography of this then almost impenetrable 
country w.as but little understood, and it is more than probable that 
they did not know but very indistinctly at what distance from the 
river the side lines when prolonged would reach Lake Maurepas, or 
the principal river falling into it, the Amite. These points, and con-
sequently also the superficial quantity, the governor left to be ascer-
tained by the grantee when he should feel it his interest to do so. In 
not one of the numerous river grants running to these lakes-and we 
shall presently speak of a number of them-were the side lines ever 
protracted to the lake, and its contents ascertained with accuracy. So 
this grant never was actually surveyed until September) 1805. (Senate 
Document of 1845, pp. 6, 7.) This survey was laid before the board 
of commissioners; then, for the first time, the precise length of side 
lines, the points where they reached Lake Maurepas and the river, and 
the superficial extent of the grant, were ascertained. Upon this sur-
vey the confirmation was made. 
We shall presently show that it is with this extent that the claim 
was possessed in Spanish times; but we would previously show that 
our adversaries are as usually mistaken when they say that this 
survey was unauthorized, because it was made after the change of 
government. 
"The fourth section of the act of March 2, 1805, (1 Land Laws, 
123,) required the claimant, even under a complete grant, to file his 
grant and a piat. These private surveys constitute a part of the evi-
dence of the claim upon which the decision of the commissioners was 
founded. (Bissell vs. Powers, 8 How.) 334.) Congress have thus 
virtually recognized these private surveys as competent and proper. 
evidence of the particular tract of land claimed under the grant or 
concession, carrying out thereby the construction previously given to 
the act of 1806, and the instructions of the Secretary. (Ibid, p. 336.) 
The private survey to Mackay, of February 27, 1806, which was filed 
with the claim, under the act of March 2, 1805, designated and located 
the grant, so as to give effect and operation to the act of 1811, reserv-
ing the premises from sale. (Ibid., p. 341.)" 
From this case and the cases of Menard's heirs vs. Massey, 8 How., 
309; Stoddard's heirs V8. Chambers, 2 How., 284; Mills vs. Stoddard, 
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8 How., 364; Barry vs. Gamble, 8 How., 53, it appears that the land 
designated by a private survey filed with the board of commissioners 
was withdrawn from sale under the sixth and tenth sections of the act 
of Congress of March 3, 1811, and that the subsequent confirmation 
of the claim applied to the land so designated. 
It will be freely admitted that the grant of Galvez to Maurice Con-
way is quite contrary to modern practice, and to what does and must 
prevail in older countries, where land has more value, and that it is 
quite indefinite in its terms as to the quantity of land granted. 
But its locality can be, and has been, ascertained with absolute pre-
cision, by protracting the side lines to the water-courses in the rear, 
and ''a description which will identify the land is all that is necessary 
for the validity of a grant." (McArthur vs. Browder, 4 Wh., 485.) 
"If a grant be made which describes the land granted by courses and 
distances only, these, though not safe, are the only guides given to us, 
and must be followed." -(Chinoweth et al. vs. Lessee of Haskell, 
3 Pet., 96.) 
Our opponents, in their attacks upon the grant, question the best 
established principles. They dispute the power of the governor, 
although it is well known that his power was unrestricted, (9 Pet., 
132, 134, and 135; 6 Pet., 6~1; 7 Pet., 51; 8 Pet., 436; 15 
Pet., 128,) and that no grant of the governor was ever revoked by the 
king, and no grant ever rejected by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, on the ground of want of power on the part of the governor. 
They find objections to the grant in its magi tude, although the Supreme 
Court has decided that this can exercise no effect whatever upon the 
validity of a grant. 
They assert dogmatically that the grant ought to have been re-
stricted according to O'Reilly's regulation, although in Delassus vs. 
The United States,~ Pet., 135, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The 
objection made to this plain title is, that the concession is not made in 
pursuance of the regulations of O'Reilly. This objection was consid-
ered in the cases heretofore decided by this court, and especially in 8 
Peters, 455. It is apparent that these regulations were intended for 
the general government of subordinate officers, not to control and limit 
the power of the person from whose will they emanated. The Baron 
de Carondelet, we must suppose, possessed all the powers which had 
been vested in O'Reilly." 
In the case of Arredondo, 6 Peters, 760, the Supreme Court con-
firmed a grant of 289,645 acres, in the case of Mitchel, (9 Peters, 725,) 
one of 1,200,000 acres, and in the case of Davenport's heirs, one of 
92,160, and the other of 207,360 acres; and although they were made 
by simple orders of a commandant, and not ratified by the governor. 
Our claim contains considerably less than 200,000 acres. 
It is evident that our adversaries must have taken it for granted that 
their assertions would be implicitly believed, and pass without contra-
diction. 
It is clear that the governor had the power to make the grant) that 
he actually made it, and that whatever is included in it became the 
property of the grantee. 
In support of the correctness of the explanation we have given of 
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the meaning of the words used in the grant, we submit the testimony 
of the three oldest and most experienced surveyors in Louisiana, 
Augustus S. Phelps, Allou d'Hemecourt, and Louis Bringier. It con-
tains, besides) explanations of the usual mode of surveying, of which 
we have already sufficiently spoken. But their testimony may be con-
sidered to be more entitled to weight if given entire. 
The testimony of A. S. Phelps is contained on pages 33, 34, and 35 
of document 0, which is the record in the suit of The United States, 
plaintiff in error, vs. James McMasters and Richard A. Stewart, which 
was tried in the circuit court of the United States, at New Orleans, 
and is now pending, on appeal, in the Supreme Court. 
Answers of Augustus S. Phelps to the interrogatories propounded by 
defendants. 
Answer to the first interrogatory. I was first commissioned as United 
States deputy surveyor for the State of Louisiana in the year 1828 or 
1829, and have been recommissioned in the same capacity under the 
several surveyors general from that time to the present. 
Answer to second interrogatory. I have r'esurveyed more than a 
thousand tracts of land, the titles to which were derived from French 
or Spanish grants, and 1nostly located upon either side of the Missis-
sippi river, in the section of country lying between the mouth of Red 
river and the lowest grants on the Mississippi river. 
Answers to third to ninth interrogatories, inclusive. In the portion 
of Louisiana mentioned in the section of country above-mentioned cer-
tain general rules appear to have been observed by the government 
officers and surveyors, during the whole period of the colonial ex-
istence, as regards the concession and survey of lands, whether under 
French or Spanish authority. In the earlier period, grants were 
usually or almost universally given to settlers ~ronting on rivers or 
other water-courses, calling for a specified distance of front on the 
bank of the water-course, with side lines running back from the front 
and nearly at right-angles with the water front at the point of de-
parture, to a distance of forty arpents, equal in our measure to 11613060 
English chains. A right line conRecting these two points completed 
the boundary of the tract, without .specifying or having reference to 
the superficial quantity, which was seldom or never mentioned in 
either the grant, plat, or proces verbal of survey. .As the settlements 
in the colony extended and increased, double concession grants, as they 
were called, were given, bounded by a grant or grants in front, with 
an extension of the side lines of the tract in front of them to an addi-
tional distance of forty arpents, usually, but frequently, specially in 
the vicinity of New Orleans, to the lake or some water-course in the 
rear, and sometimes to an indefinite distance. 
I have examined and inspected many hundreds of all the papers 
connected with the French and Spanish grants, being original docu-
ments. In the decree or concession which was issued by the represen-
tative of the king, and which conveyed the fee to the land, I do not 
remember a single instance in which it described the course or direc-
tion of any of the boundary lines. The usual form in which the 
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boundaries and extent of the tract was expressed in the concession was 
the specific length of the front on a particular water-course, bounded 
above (on one side) by the lands of A B, (the adjoining proprietor,) 
and below (on tho other side) by the lands of CD, or public domain, 
as the case may be, and extending to the ordinary depth) (profundidad 
ordinaria,) which was always understood to mean forty arpents of 
Paris, or, as frequently the case in the vicinity of New Orleans, to a 
water-course; and sometimes) but very unfrequently, to some other 
specified or to an indefinite distance. Some instances I have known 
in which it was stated in the grant of a double concession that the 
length of the front of the double concession was a certain length, cor-
responding with the front of the tract immediately in front of it, though, 
in fact, it was surveyed, occupied, and always held and regarded as 
having a much greater or less length of front, as the case might be, 
depending on the converging or diverging of the side lines of the front 
tract. 
In the plat and proc&s verbal of survey emanating from the King's 
surveyor, who was always a commissioned officer of high standing, 
the general custom was to note very definitely the following facts: the 
shape and length of the front line or lines, the course or direction 
(usually a right line with a magnetic bearing) of the side lines, their 
lengths, and the names of the grantee and of the adjacent proprietors. 
The courses and lengths of the back or rear lines were seldom or never 
mentioned in the proces verbal, and were not often shown upon the 
face of the plat. The main object with French and Spanish surveyors 
was to furnish the means of perpetuating and identifying, with great 
certainty, the boundaries of the front portion of the tract of land sur-
veyed, together with the means of ascertaining, at any future time, 
the direction of the side lines, giving little attention to the boundaries 
of the balance of the tract, which in fact was, at the time, frequently 
nearly, if not quite) inaccessible. In order to define and exhibit clearly 
and minutely their operations, as made on the front of the tract, it 
was necessary to protract the plat or diagram on so large a scale that 
the ordinary size of paper used by them generally (foolscap) could 
only contain the figure of the front portion of the tract, and extend-
ing back a few arpents, which was indeed as far, generally, as the 
marks of the survey on the ground extended. 
So far as I have been able to learn from tradition and observation, 
the French and Spanish surveyors, who deliyered the land to the 
grantee, always endeavored to run and establish the side lines of the 
grants in this portion of the colony, so that said side lines should be, 
as near as they could judge, at right angles with the general course 
of the water-front within view. This view, in most cases, must have 
been of limited extent, by reason that the banks of the water-courses 
must have been densely covered with forest trees and undergrowth. 
Hence it happens that, in a great majority of cases, the side lines of 
the grants are either diverging or converging, and not parallel. An-
other result that would be derived from the practice of their system, 
and which is found to be the fact, is, that within this portion of the 
colony there is not to be found any vacant lands of triangular form, 
or otherwise lying between adjacent tracts, as granted and surveyed, 
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only when lands once granted have been entirely abandoned by the 
grantee or his successors, except in one case, which is in West Baton 
Rouge, and in thjs case there is ground to believe it resulted from an 
unintentional error. 
In resurveying French and Spanish grants in Louisiana, whether 
under contracts with the general government or for individual claim-
ants, the United States deputy surveyors have been instructed by their 
superiors, in all cases, to conform to the original mode as far as it could 
be known and "\-Vas possible. For my part, I have always conformed 
to and obeyed those instructions to the best of my ability, and all 
other surveyors, so far as I know and believe, have pursued the same 
practice. I have never beard the propriety of this practice questioned, 
unless it may be in the case now in controversy. 
The remainder of his testimony relates to a particular grant, bas no 
bearing upon the subject under review, and is therefore omitted. 
The depositions of Allou d'Hemecourt and Louis Bringier are to be 
found on pages 68, 69, and 70 of document P, which is a certified copy 
of all the testimony introduced in the case of The United States vs. 
Clarke, the very suit which was tried by Mr. Justice Campbell, of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, under the joint resolution of 
~nne 26, 1846, for the purpose of testing the authority under which 
Secretary Bibb had issued patents upon the Houmas claim. 
Depositions of d' Hemecourt and L. Bringier, fo1· the defendants. 
Filed August 2, 1855. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Eastern District of Louisiana: 
In the United States circuit court, fifth circuit and eastern district of 
Louisiana. 
UNITED STATES ~ 
vs. 
DANIEL CLARK et al. 
Jean Charles Allou d'Hemecourt, a witness for the defendants, hav-
ing been duly sworn, deposes: 
I am sixty-six years of age; I am a professional surveyor; hava 
been engaged in the profession for the last forty years, the last twenty-
seven of which in Louisiana; I have been well acquainted with the 
surveys of the old Spanish surveyors, particularly those of Messrs. 
Laveau Trudeau, Andry, and Lafon. It was the custom of these old 
surveyors, in surveying a piece of land, not to trace out every line of 
the tract and run out the side lines to their extreme limits, but simply 
to establish the front line and run the side lines back two or three 
arpents, so as simply to establish their proper course and direction. 
This was done also in surveying tracts bordering on the river bank. 
The expression in regard to the depth of tract in sales, avec toute la 
JYrofondeau que s'y trouve ou trouvera, ou qu/il peut y avoir, all the 
depth which may be found there is a common and usual one in sales 
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of that period. This expression I have even seen in concessions; the 
usual form, however, in these was "as far back as the lake," or "as 
far back as the prairies inondees," inundated prairies. 
\Vhen these expressions were used, they were intended to sell or 
concede all the depth that could be found in rear of the front line, 
without guarantee of the special number of arpents. It is to my 
knowledge that all the plantations along the river above Carrollton 
were granted in this way, with all the depth to the lake. The lake is 
more than two leagues distant from the river. 
Mr. Louis Bringier is the only surviving surveyor of olden days that 
I now know of. 
No cross-examination. 
ALLOU D'HEMECOURT. 
Excepted to by United States Attorney. 
Lours BRINGIER also a witness for the defendants, having been duly 
sworn, deposes : 
I am seventy-one years of age; I have been a surveyor for thirty-
five years past, and was made surveyor general of Louisiana in 1825; 
I was first made a surveyor of the parish of St. James, by Governor 
Villere in 1822, or thereabouts; I first began making maps as far back 
as 1808. 
I have in my possession certain archives of the State, comprising 
Mr. Laveau Trudeau's old surveys. Spanish surveys I have had 
frequent opportunities of examining, but not so many of the old French 
surveys. 
I was acquainted with Mr. Lafon, surveyor; he was a man rather 
extravagant in his notions, un peu braque; he was the deputy of the 
surveyor general south of Tennessee; I do not know that he was ever 
surveyor general of this State. The first surveyor general of this 
State was Laveau Trudeau; he was succeeded by Bouchon, to whom 
succeeded Duplantier. 
Having heard the testimony of Mr. D'Hemecourt, I agree with him, 
and corroborate his view as to the manner in which surveys were 
made of side lines, and also as to the force of the expression, ''all the 
depth which may be found." The side lines were surveyed their 
entire length only, at the request of parties who had to pay for the 
extra labor thus imposed on the surveyor, and to clear the road to 
enable him to proceed. 
No ~ross-examination. 
L. BRINGIER. 
The foregoing testimony was taken at the request, and by the con-
sent, and in the presence of J. P. Benjamin, Esq., for the defendants, 
and Thomas S. McCay, United States attorney, and by me reduced to 
writing in the presence of the witnesses, and by them subscribed and 
sworn to. 
In testimony whereof, I hereto set my hand at New Orleans, this 2d 
August, 1855. 
ROBERT M. LUSHER, 
United States Commissioner, Eastern District of Louisiana. 
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All this evidence was taken contradictorily with the district attorney 
of the United States. 
In further illustration of this mode of construing and surveying 
grants, we shall refer to some of the documents already submitted. 
Let it be, however, understood that this was a local usage, prevailing 
only in the lower part of Louisiana, where there is infinitely more 
swamp than dry land, notwithstanding the extensive embankments 
now constructed, where the nature of the ground, and the water, and 
the tangled growth which cover it, render surveying very laborious 
and costly, and where the rear lands were generally of very little value. 
By far the greater part of the Houmas grant is such swamp. 
Document K are title-papers in the claim of B. Lafon. (Claim 316 
of the report of the old board, 2 Public Lands, 278.) There is a 
complete grant by the governor and commissaire ordonnate~tr, of March 
10, 1763, to Maxent, the granting words of which are: 
"We grant to him the land he petitions for, at the place called 
Chantilly, to wit: beginning at the boundary of the thirty arpents, sit-
uated in said place which we granted on the 9th instant to Dufossat, 
as far as the point called Chefmenteur.'' 
Upon this grant, and upon the further order of the intendant, Morales, 
Carlos Trudeau, then the surveyor general of the province, made, on 
the 28th of April, 1800, a "planofigurativo," (that is, not an actual 
survey, but a map compiled from materials in his office,) representing, 
as the report says, the remainder of the land, from the boundary of the 
village or settlement of Chantilly to the river Chefmenteur, petitioned 
for by the applicant. And by referring to the plano .figu1·ativo, of 
which a certified copy is in the document, it will be found that, under 
this description, Trudeau set apart for the petitioner the whole remain-
der of the peninsula, as far as Lake Pontchartrain, the Chefmenteur 
river, and Lake Borgne, bounding it by the adjoining concessions. 
There never was in Louisiana a surveyor general longer in office, 
more experienced, more competent, and more universally respected than 
Carlos Trudeau. 
Document L are title-papers of the claim nf Charles J. B. Fleuriau, 
reported on by the old board, No. 213, (Public Lands, vol. 2, p. 272,) 
and confirmed by special act of Congress, of July 27, 1854. 
The first is a petition of Joseph Villars Dubreuil, of the 1st of June, 
1763, to the governor and commissaire ordonnateur, showing that 
already, in 1744, he had conceived the project to establish several stock 
farms; that, with a view of finding lands adapted to this purpose; he 
had examined the lakes of the "Onachas ;" that he had only discov-
ered a tongue of land near La Fourche des Chetimachas, (now called 
Bayou I1afourche,) in the rear of Lake Perrier, fit for his purpose, and 
belonging to the Indian tribes of the Onachas and Conachas; that he 
had made a bargain with these Indians, by which, for a certain num-
ber of heads of cattle, they had abandoned to him the above-mentioned 
land, and also another tongue of land, separated from the former by 
the Bayou Chaique-machas, (sic.) The first tract may have 25 arpents. 
front of high land, bounded on one side by Bayou Chaique-machas, 
and on the other by Lake Perrier, and bounded (on the other two sides) 
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by trembling prairies. He therefore prays that his aforesaid purchase 
from the Indians be approved. 
On this petition the governor and ordonnateur made to him a grant, 
on the 1st of June, 1763. The only description of the land in the 
grant is: "the land mentioned in the petition." 
Under the confirmation of this grant by special act of Congress: 
more than 40,000 acres have been surveyed by the United States for 
the claimants. It is true that the greater part of this land is worth-
less ; and such is the case with all the large grants in the lower part 
of Louisiana, near the Mississippi. 
Document l\tl relates to the claim of the widow of Jacques Fortier. 
(No. 68 of Harper's report of January 6, 1821, confirmed by act of 
Congress of February 28, 1823-a general act.) The notice repre-
sents that she is the owner of a tract of 27! arpents front of the Mis-
sissippi, "with all the depth to be found." This claim was confirmed 
in the very words in which it was made. 
Thus we find this expression in a report confirmed by Congress. 
And how was it interpreted by the United States surveyor? This is 
shown by the approved survey. The side lines were protracted until 
they met, the front tract having converging side lines. It is evident 
that, if the side lines of the front tract had been parallel or diverging, 
they would have been protracted until they reached Lake Pontchar-
train, this tract being in that part of Lower Louisiana, on the eastern 
bank of the Mississippi, where grants very frequently extended to the 
lake, and to which the custom we contend for applies. 
But document N is a case absolutely in point, and, as we presume, 
unanswerable.· This is the claim of Charles Devilliers, confirmed by 
the old board of commissioners as claim No. 135, (2 Pub. Lands, 26.) 
Perry, the original claimant, presents a petition on the 3d of Novem-
ber, 1764, to d' Abadie, director general and commandant of the pro-
vince, in which he represents that he is the owner of a tract of 15 
arpents front on the Mississippi, by 40 in depth; that he has a large 
tamily, and limited means, and therefore prays for a grant of "toute 
la profondeur, et largeur de sa terre excedant ses quarante arpents con -
tenant quinze arpents de face;" that he had received no concession, but 
had purchased his front tract. The underscored passage is absolutely 
the only description of the land asked for contained in the petition, 
and means ''all the depth and width of his land beyond his forty 
arpents, having fifteen arpents front." 
Here, then, we have the identical description of the land asked for, 
which is found in Maurice Conway's petition and grant, "all the 
depth'' behind the front depth of forty arpents of the front tract. 
On the 6th of November, 1764, the director general (or governor) 
made a grant upon this petition. Had he followed the precise words 
of the petition, and simply granted "all the depth," we should here 
have the exact counterpart of the Houmas claim. But the governor 
explains in the grant what he understands by "all the depth," and it 
can hardly be questioned that his act is the best proof of a local usage, 
as he contributed to create it. The grant says, that ''considering the 
demand which Mr. Perry has addressed to us, to grant to him the 
depth which may be found beyond the ordinary depth of forty arpents 
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of his plantation, which has fifteen arpents front on the river St. Louis 
or Mississippi, below and on the same side as the city of New Orleans, 
* * * * in virtue of the powers, * * we have granted, and 
hereby grant to him, the said dept.h bryond his ordinary depth of forty 
arpents, as far as the lake." 
The words here above quoted are the only ones describing the land 
referred to, either in the petition or in the grant. The governor sets 
out by stating that he intends to grant the land asked for by the peti-
tioner-that was, "all the depth;'' and with that intention the gov-
ernor says that this depth goes to the lake. 
So, in our own case, the governor would have mentioned the water-
course to which "all the depth" extended, if a correct map of the 
country had been in existence at that time. Being uncertain whether 
the prolongation of the said lines would touch the lake or the river, 
they left this matter to be inquired into by the grantee) if he should 
choose to take the trouble and incur the expense, being persuaded that 
the well known local term of ''all the depth'' would take him to one 
or the other. 
Lafon's survey shows that the lower line goes to the lake, and the 
upper to the river. 
But we have contemporaneous explanations, showing that the depth 
was considered to extend thus far. This grant was claimed and pos-
sessed under the Spanish government with a great depth) though what 
this was, was not precisely ascertained until an actual survey was made. 
This evidence is contained in Senate Document of 1838) pp. 21 to 29. 
On the 5th of March, 1778, less than a year after the grant) and 
within nineteen months of ·the operations of Andry, Maurice Conway 
sold a portion of this land to Oliver Pollock by notarial act. He sold 
36 arpents of the front of it, with the depth, "to the lake." (In the 
Spanish sale_, on page 21 of the foregoing document, there is a misprint 
in the 4th line) to wit: el fondo hasta ellado, instead of el fondo basta 
ellago. Lado means side, and lago lake. The misprint is apparent 
from the remainder of the sale.) He states, when he purchased 
the land jointly with Latil, that he bought the other half of it from 
Alexander Latil on the 4th of January, 1776; that, in the first 
of these sales, it was stated that the land had only half a league in 
depth; that he had applied to the governors of the province, Unzaga 
and Galvez; that the former authorized Don Louis Andry to go to the 
district of Lafourche, which is the place where said land is situated, 
and to give to him (Conway) possession of what more land he wanted, 
besides what he had purchased; that Andry having done so, on the 9th 
of October, 1776, he measured the said land in his (Conway's) presence, 
from the boundary of Fran<5ois Duchan to that of Michel Chiasson, 
and he found that it contained 96 arpents in front, and a depth to the. 
lake, and as I (Conway) had purchased only forty arpents, he, (Andry,) 
by virtue of the above-mentioned order of Don Louis de Unzaga, put 
me in possession of the whole remainder, asfar as the lake)· all which 
was approved by Don Bernardo de Galvez on the 21st of July, 1777. 
And as I have the right and power to sell, I hereby sell to the said 
Oliver Pollock the said 36 arpents in front in this wise, viz: 21 arpents 
in front, with the above-mentioned depth, bounded on both sides by me, 
HOU?IfAS LAND CLAIMS. 93 
the vendor, for the sum of $2,000, and 15 arpents front, with the same 
depth, also bounded on one side by me, the vendor, and on the other 
by G-abriel Per6, for $1,500, which make together $3,500; and I de-
clare that this is the just price and full value of the aforesaid 36 arpents, 
'With the above-mentioned depth; and the said Pollock declares that he 
accepts the sale of the aforesaid 36 arpents, "w~ith the above-mentioned 
depth." 
The preceding extract is a translation of all that is in the slightest 
degree material in that sale. 
It is obvious that what Maurice Conway then says of Andry's opera-
tions, is less a statement than an explanation of the meaning and pur-
poses of Andry's proceedings. Andry does not in his p1·oces verbal 
speak of the lake, nor does he describe the depth of \vhich he had given 
possession, in any other manner except as the depth "granted to him 
(Conway) by the foregoing decree" ofUnzaga. Andry had his doubts 
where the prolongation of the side lines would touch a considerable 
water-course; he was not well acquainted with this section of country, nor 
could he have traced these lines in a day or a week, or without receiv-
ing more pay than the whole rear land was worth. But there is no 
doutb that both he and Maurice Con way understood that it wouldgotothe 
first considerable water-course or lake, such being the depth of the 
larger grants between the river and those lakes. Maurice Conway as-
sumed that it would reach the lake, and he was right as to one, and wrong 
as to the other line. A large anterior claim in this immediate vicinity 
goes from the Mississippi to Lake Maurepas, and the Amite. This is 
the claim confirmed in the name of John McDonagh. (See Public 
Lands, vol. 3, p. 254.) 
The declarations contained in this sale are perfectly unsuspicious. It 
was made in a notarial act passed in New Orleans, which was, according 
to the practice of the civil law, open to the inspection of every one; 
and when it is recollected what a small community New Orleans, and 
even all Lower Louisiana then was, how few transactions then took 
place, how everybody's business was known to everybody, it would be 
absurd to suppose that Conway would have ventured to state a deliber-
ate falsehood over his signature in the presence of Andry and Galvez. 
He could have had no po~sible object in doing Bo, for if it had been 
necessary he would have gone to the expense of a measurement of the 
side lines; he could have obtained from the governor an explanation, 
inserting into his grant whatever he might have found to be the true 
distance of the side lines. And he would have appeared contemptible 
if he had designedly misrepresented in an authenticated and public act 
what everybody knew to be the local custom and understanding. 
So, also, after the death of Maurice Conway, when William Conway, 
his heir and executor, found it necessary to execute a mortgage in favor 
of James Mather, who had become security for one of Maurice Con-
way-'s debts, he gave that mortgage on a part of the Houmas grant, 
which still belonged to Maurice Conway at the time of his death, and 
had been adjudicated to William Conway. In the notarial act of mort-
gage, which was passed on the 5th of February, 1795, (p. 23 of Senate 
Document of 1838,) he describes this land as having thirty arpentsfront 
by a depth to the lake. 
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It does not appear that under the Spanish government any objection 
was ever made to this depth claimed for the Houmas grant. On the 
contrary, the fact that a very great though not accurately defined depth 
was claimed for this grant was brought home, directly and distinctly, 
to the very head of the land department of the government, who had 
the exclusive right to grant land, and to regulate all matters apper-
taining to the land system-to Morales, the intendant. And he re-
ceived this claim not with animadversion, but with assent. (See Senate 
Journal of 1838, p. 24.) We there find the extract from the last will 
and testament of G. A. de St. Maxent, in the 18th article of which it 
is declared that he was the owner of a plantation called the '' Houmas,'' 
at about eighteen leagues from the city of New Orleans, which he had 
purchased for the price of $6,000 from :Thiaurice Conway, about seven 
years ago, measuring eighteen arpents in front by upwards of four 
leagues in depth. 
"Upwards of four leagues in depth" is still indefinite, but clearly 
shows that Maxent considered himself entitled to a great depth. He 
may, during a dry season, in hunting excursions, have gone to a dis-
tance into the woods, which he approximately estimated as being in a 
direct line, at least four leagues from his front, and not having at that 
distance encountered such a water-course as, according to the usage, 
was the boundary of such a claim, he concluded that his land must 
have a greater depth than that distance. He was not very far from 
the truth as regards the central, the Clarke portion of the claim; for 
the sides lines of this are now ascertained to be, one thirteen, and the 
other fourteen miles in length, and four leagues are nearly thirteen 
1niles. The thing, however, which this declaration conclusively proves 
is not that the land had that precise or any precise depth, but that 
1.\-Iaxent wrote under the impression produced by t.he well known usage. 
That this declaration, made in a will, in the solemn. hour when he 
was settling his account with this world, without the possibility of 
being influenced by interest, is entitled to the weight of contempora-
neous evidence of the common understanding of a well known usage, 
is self-evident. 
After the death of Maxent, his will, and all the judicial proceedings 
relative to his estate, passed under the eye of J. V. Morales, the in-
tendant of the province, acting at the same time in a judicial capacity, 
and of the licentiate, (a title nearly equivalent to doctor of laws,) 
Manuel Serrano, the assessor of the intendency, that is, the legal 
adviser, the solicitor of the treasury of the government. These high 
law-officers signed all the orders issued in the settlement of the estate, 
sometimes with their names in full, and sometimes with their flourishes 
or paraphs. In Spanish countries each official adds to his signature a 
flourish, which is as well known as his signature, and supposed to be 
more difficult of imitation. Often they sign with their flourish alone, 
and then it is called a "half-signature." In Spanish bills of costs the 
charge for a half-signature is something less than for a full signature. 
These two officers then ordered the appraisement of the land of the 
Houmas, and its sale for cash:, provided it brought more than two thirds 
of its appraised value. (Page 24 of Senate Document of 1836.) By 
the law of Spain, a judicial sale was first made · for cash; but if the 
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property did not bring two thirds of the appraised value, it was offered 
again on credit. Such is still the law of Louisiana. 
This order was addressed to Evan Jones, the commandant of the 
post of Lafourche, and as such the local judicial officer. He recom-
mends, on the 1st of August, two persons to act as appraisers; on the 
3d of the same month, Morales and Serrano appoint them, and then 
these persons make and return their appraisement. They say that 
they-are well acquainted with the Houmas lands belonging to the estate 
of the late Colonel Gilbert Anthony de St. Maxent; that the tract 
measures about twenty-nine arpents in front by upwards of four leagues 
in depth; that the same is now uninhabited, without any buildings or 
improvements whatever, and they appraise it at $2,400. 
Thereupon, Morales and Serrano order that this appraisement be 
shown to the printer, and that the printer advertise the property to be 
sold on the 13th of the same month, at the intendant's house.-(Page 
25.) 
The printer accordingly advertised it in the Gazette. On page 29 
will be found the French original, and on page 26 a translation of this 
advertisement, in which the property is advertised as "a (tract of) land 
twenty-nine arrpenfs in front by about four leagues in depth). at the 
place commonly called Houmas, belonging to the estate of the late St. 
Maxent, appraised in the inventory at $2,400. 
But immediately after having given the first order of sale, which 
dhected the property to be sold at the intendant's house in New 
Orleans, Morales and Senano, amended this order, and gave .a new 
one, (p. 26,) which sets forth that, whereas the previous decree was to 
be executed only if Evan Jones, the commandant of Lafourche, should 
have been unable to sell said lands, an order was directed to him to 
proceed to said sale for cash, but not for less than two thirds of its ap-
praised value, to pay the sum due for the making of the levee, and that 
the balance of the proceeds should be forwarded "to this tribunal." 
In compliance with this order, Evan Jones, the commandant, sold 
this tract of land at auction on the 12th of August1 and it was adjudi-
cated to Louis Faure, the highest bidder, for $1,650, this being $50 
more than two thirds of the appraised value.-(Page 26.) 
In the report of this adjudication, the land is described as follows: 
"The said land situate at the Houmas, belonging to the estate of the 
late Colonel Anthony Gilbert de St. Maxent, measuring twenty-nine 
arpents in front, by the depth which could be fmtnd, opening about thirty-
six degrees.'' 
We have already abundantly shown, that the depth which could be 
found) was an expression applied only to lands which had more than 
the ordinary depth-which had such a depth as could be ascertained 
only by an actual survey not yet executed. This was indeed more 
exact than the designation of" upwards of four leagues in depth." It 
gave at once to understand that a survey was requisite to know the 
real depth, and that that depth would depend upon a water-course. 
It is important to observe that this was a judicial sale, ordered to 
pay for the levee which had been made in front of the land. It is well 
known that lands on the Lower Mississippi can be cultivated only if 
protected by a levee, and that the levees had to be continuous, for oth-
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erwise the water would have gained on the plantations from behind.. 
'J.Ihe Spanish government imposed upon each front proprietor the obli-
gation to construct and maintain the levee in front of his land, and if 
he neglected it the government had the levee mad.e, and the land was 
seized and sold to pay for it. 
In a judicial sale such property passes as is advertised. Here the 
advertisement gave to the land "upwards of four leagues in depth." 
How much more could only be ascertained by extraneous evidence. 
But four leagues passed at all events, and certainly. 
Now this description was contained, as has been shown, in several 
proceedings which were submitted to Morales, and on which he made 
orders. The very unusuu.l phrase, "upwards of four leagues in depth," 
must have attracted his notice. He must be presumed to have read 
what he signed. The consistent declarations of St. Maxent, who was 
a colonel of the local militia_, of Evan Jones, the commandant, of 
Morales, the intendant, and Serrano, the assessor of the appraisers, 
&c., must be looked upon as conclusive evidence of the existence of a 
local custom, according to which those expressions had a well-defined 
meaning. Could the purchaser, under such an order and advertise-
ment, afterwards have been disturbed by Morales, as the head of the 
land department, when he, as chief judge, had ordered that sale? 
"The power of granting the public domain was in Morales, who 
resided in New Orleans."-(Les Bois vs. Brammell, 4 How. R., 449.) 
But this is not all. On another occasion, the attention of Morales 
was drawn to the depth of the Houmas claim in a very special and em-
phatic manner; this very depth being the gist of an especial commu-
nication. 
St. Maxent, at the time of his death, owned two tracks of land in 
the Houmas claim. In his will (p. 24) he speaks of one only; but the 
evidence in the Senate Document of 1838 does not inform us how long 
before his death that will was made. One of these two tracts was the 
plantation of 18 arpents front by a depth of upwards of four leagues, 
mentioned in the will. The other was the tract of land to which the 
above-mentioned proceedings relate. The latter had twenty-nine ar-
pents in front by upwards of four leagues in depth, was uninhabited, 
and without any buildings or improvements at the time of St. Maxent's 
death, and was appraised at $2,400, and sold to Louis Faure for $1,650. 
The other was the ''plantation'' of St. Maxent, mentioned in his will. 
It had only 18 arpents front on the :Mississippi, by upwards of four 
leagues in depth. It is to this latter property that the petition of P. 
Marigny refers, which is found on page 27 of the Senate Document of 
1838. P. Marigny, who styles himself the syndic of the creditors of 
Colonel Gilbert de St. Maxent, represented to the intendant that, ac-
cording to an official letter which had been addressed to him (the in-
tendant) by Michel Cantrell, commandant of the post of Cabahanoce, 
the plantation belonging to the estate of St. Maxent, situated in the 
post of Lafourche, and commonly called the Houmas, could not be sold, 
because, although it had been several times offered at auction only 
$1,500 had been offered for it; that the said plantation had been ap-
praised by three appraisers, at $4,500; that perhaps the reason why a 
higher price than $1,500 had not been offered for it, was \hat the peo-
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ple were ignorant of the depth belonging to said plantation, which St. 
Maxent stated, in his will, to be upwards of four leagues ; that, there-
fore, the bids were not in proportion to the value which that depth must 
give to the plantation. Wherefore he prays that an order may be ad-
dressed to Michel Cantrelle, containing this representation, and the 
intendant's decree thereon, that the sale may be postponed until Au-
gust next; that circulars may be sent to the neighboring posts tore-
ceive bids, "rtnd informing every one of the depth which belongs to said 
plantation." And thereupon the order was given, "Let it be done as 
prayed for,'' and signed by the paraphs of Morales and Serrano. · 
Thus this claim was notoriously made ever since 1778, forced upon 
the notice of the public officers, and never questioned. Under this 
claim the grantee &nd his assigns had a possession of tw.enty-six years 
under the Spanish government, which claim would suffice to protect 
them; for, under the Spanish law, the domain could be acquired by 
the prescription of ten years. (See the decisions of the supreme court 
of Louisiana in Sanchez vs. Gonzalez, 11 Martin R., 210; Pepper vs. 
Dunlop, 9 Ann . . R., 141.) And this is incidentally recognized by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in Mitchell vs. The United States, 
9 Pet., 760. This provision of the Spanish law is the source ·0f the 
most important enactment contained in the second section of the act 
of the 3d of March, 1807, by which persons who were, on the 20th of 
December, 1803, (the day when Louisiana was delivered to the United 
States,) and had been for ten consecutive years prior to that day, in 
possession of a tract of land not exceeding two thousand acres, were 
confirmed in their titles to said land.-(1 Lou. Laws, 153.) 
The terms of this act show that ''their titles'' were their possession-
it was unnecessary to show anything else; and a vast number of claims, 
of which the original titles were lost, or difficult of access, were con-
firmed under that section. 
The restriction to 2,000 acres was owing to the doubts which at that 
period were entertained concerning the authority of the governors and 
the usages and customs of the colony-doubts which haN€ since been 
dispelled by t.he Supreme Court of the United States. 
The difference between the easy and loose manner in which the 
Spanish government acted in regard to its domain, and the mathemat-
ical precision of the American government in the management of its 
public lands, is indeed so radical, that minds thoroughly familiar with 
the latter are with difficulty brought to realize the totally dissimilar 
aspect in which transactions mus~ be viewed under the two systems. 
The rule, and the only safe, just, and rational rule, is to investigate 
how the Spanish government would have considered a claim. What 
that government would have done, the United States are now bound 
to do in relation to these old claims. That obligation is greatly 
increased in proportion to the length of time that has elapsed before 
the United States finally acted, and the unavoidable disappearance of 
much of the evidence. Measured by that test, we can safely say that · 
in the history of all the Spanish grants in Louisiana, which are con-
tained in the records of the different boards of commissioners, and form 
no uninteresting or unimportant part of the ante-Arne rican history of 
Louisiana, not a single incident is to be found fromwhich the most, 
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remote inference could be drawn, that such a claim as ours, accom-





GENE:RAL LAND 0Fl!'ICE, 
February 28, 1860. 
SrR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 17th instant, 
in which you desire an answer to the following questions: 
1st. ''Assuming the case of a complete grant, derived from the Span-
ish government, which never was filed in o:r acted upon either by a 
board of commisioners or by a court of the United States, having 
authority to decide on Spanish land grants, has any such grant, under 
the -above-mentioned circumstances, ever been held by the General 
Land Office entitled to a public survey and to a patent, and has the 
land embraced within it been withheld from sale, and treated as private 
property?'' 
2d. "Or have not all lands in Louisiana been treated as public 
property, unless the title thereto was established before a board of 
commissioners, or a court of the United States?" 
Whilst this office desires to avoid answering all speculative inquiries, 
we have no objection in the present case to reply to your first interrog-
atory in the negative, and to the second in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Lours tTANIN, Esq., 
Present. 
JOSEPHS. WILSON, 
Commissioner. 
